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ABSTRACT
Hospital readmissions are burdensome and costly to both healthcare providers
and patients. In the U.S., one in ve Medicare patients is readmitted within 30 days
of discharge. We study how to use operations research models to reduce hospital
readmissions. Our approach focuses on both the hospital operations level and the
policymaker system level. We develop a delay-time optimization framework to maxi-
mize the detection of post-operative complications via post-discharge checkups. Then
we study how to design a bundled payment policy to balance and incentivize pre-
and post-discharge readmission reduction eorts. We build a readmission prediction
model using laboratory values observed during the index hospitalization. Ultimately,
we provide novel methods for reducing readmissions in the continuum of care span-
ning between the pre- and post-discharge stages, at the hospital and policymaker
levels.
ix
CHAPTER I
Introduction
1.1 Background
In the United States, hospital readmissions are heavily scrutinized as a driver
of healthcare costs. According to Weinberger et al. (1996), up to half of all hos-
pitalizations are readmissions. Furthermore, it is estimated that up to 75% of all
readmissions are preventable by patient education, pre-discharge assessment, and
domiciliary aftercare (Benbassat and Taragin, 2000). In eect, preventable hospital
readmissions represent approximately $25 billion in annual healthcare costs (PwC
Health Research Institute, 2010). One in eight Medicare patients are readmitted
within 30 days of discharge after surgery (PerryUndem Research & Communica-
tions, 2013), and 56.5% of readmitted Medicare patients are readmitted through the
Emergency Department (ED) (Kocher et al., 2013), contributing to high costs. These
readmissions represent not only preventable healthcare costs, but also a tremendous
burden on patients and their families.
In order to address this problem, policies such as the Aordable Care Act (ACA)
have been implemented (Koh and Sebelius, 2010). Following the ACA, the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) now penalize hospitals with worse than
expected 30-day readmission rates (Joynt and Jha, 2012). For example, Section 3025
of the Aordable Care Act added Section 1886(q) to the Social Security Act establish-
ing the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP). This program requires
CMS to reduce payments to the Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS) hos-
pitals with excessive readmission rates beginning in October 2012 (James, 2013). To
provide stronger readmission reduction incentives, the CMS is gradually shifting its
reimbursement schemes from Fee-For-Service to Pay-For-Performance and Bundled
Payment. Among these reimbursement schemes, the Bundled Payment is believed
to be most eective at providing incentives to reduce readmissions (Andritsos and
1
2Tang, 2018; Guo et al., 2016). The CMS has established the Bundled Payment for
Care Improvement (BPCI) Initiative in 2013. Under BPCI, a hospital receives a
bundled payment for all costs incurred during an episode of care. Specically, Model
2 of BPCI denes an episode of care to be \the inpatient stay in an acute care hos-
pital plus the post-acute care and all related services up to 90 days after hospital
discharge" (CMS, 2018a). These circumstances encourage healthcare professionals to
more actively search for and implement solutions to minimize hospital readmissions
(Wong et al., 2013).
Various methods have been proven eective at reducing readmissions. Nonethe-
less, such methods are costly(Jack et al., 2009), as they require hospitals to exert
readmission reduction eort in two stages of care, namely the inpatient stay stage (be-
fore discharge) and the post-discharge follow-up stage (after discharge). For instance,
a hospital can extend the length of stay to further stabilize a patient's condition in
the inpatient stay stage. It can also perform follow-up checkups (e.g., oce visits
and telephone calls) and treatments in the post-discharge stage. There is a lack of a
systematic approach for hospitals and policymakers to manage readmissions. More-
over, the proliferation of Electronic Health Records and rich data therein provides an
opportunity to leverage analytics to predict the readmission risk and better target
interventions.
This dissertation aims to create new models to study how hospitals and public
health policymakers can reduce hospital readmissions to mitigate the readmission
crisis. Figure 1.1 gives an overview of the thesis.In Chapter II, we present our
model of post-discharge monitoring as well as analytical and numerical results. In
Chapter III, we study how hospitals balance readmission reduction eorts and how a
policymaker designs an eective reimbursement and penalty program to incentivize
readmission reduction. Chapter IV presents a model using pre-discharge laboratory
data to forecast readmissions. Finally, we conclude the thesis and discuss future
research work in Chapter V.
1.2 Post-discharge Monitoring
Post-discharge checkup policies can reduce readmissions through early detection of
health conditions, however, the methods behind designing eective checkup policies
are poorly understood.
In practice, checkup policies implemented by hospitals are designed and based
on unsupported heuristics. For example, current practice recommends that doctors
rst follow-up with cystectomy (a major surgery for bladder cancer) patients with
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Figure 1.1: Overview of the Dissertation
an oce visit approximately two weeks after their hospital discharge; however, 40%
of readmitted cystectomy patients are readmitted within one week of discharge, and
as many as 67% of readmitted cystectomy patients are already readmitted before the
rst scheduled oce visit (Hu et al., 2014; Skolarus et al., 2015). If post-surgical com-
plications can be detected and treated promptly, many readmissions can be avoided.
This chapter seeks to reclaim this missed opportunity by identifying the optimal
timing as well as the type of checkups to perform after discharge. It also provides
guidance for how many visits would be most eective. This will give healthcare
professionals an increased chance of detecting a patient's health condition before it
causes a readmission.
We develop and analyze a new delay-time analysis model to identify the optimal
type and timing of checkups to implement post-discharge monitoring plans. By
analyzing the structure of the optimal policies, we develop checkup schedules that
can detect up to 43.7% more readmission-causing conditions before they result in a
readmission. Further, we uncover simple rules of thumb that can help doctors design
and improve monitoring plans even in the absence of advanced computer software or
complex computations.
1.2.1 Contributions
This work is published in Liu et al. (2018a) and Krishnan et al. (2016). The main
contributions of this chapter are summarized as follows: we develop new extensions
of the traditional delay-time framework, providing new insights into the structure
of delay-time machine maintenance problems and broadening the scope of problems
in which delay-time analysis can be applied. In particular, we analyze the optimal
4structure of the checkup policies without assuming a specic parametric family. We
show that imperfect checkups (such as phone calls) can aect the timing and detec-
tion probability signicantly by considering the detection rate of checkups. Moreover,
we incorporated various sources of data to estimate the hidden time-to-develop the
condition distributions using the numerical inverse Laplace transform.
In addition to theoretical implications, this study contributes benecial insights
for physicians and other healthcare decision makers to help them improve post-
discharge monitoring for patients. The application of our model and ndings has
the potential for broad impact including reduced hospital readmissions, improved
quality of patient care, improved patient satisfaction, and reduced healthcare costs,
all without overburdening clinicians (as clinician burden is often a major barrier to
implementation of new healthcare practices). This is achievable by aligning checkup
policy design with a number of key insights, namely: timing of checkups is the most
important factor, checkup timing should be adjusted according to checkup detection
rates, and checkup quantity is more important than checkup quality.
1.3 Chapter III: Balancing Pre- and Post-discharge Eorts
To incentivize hospitals to reduce readmissions, the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) have established the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Pro-
gram (HRRP) to penalized hospitals with excessive readmission rates. Moreover, the
CMS has been experimenting with dierent reimbursement schemes, such as Pay-
For-Performance (P4P) and Bundled Payments (BP), to provide stronger nancial
incentives for hospitals to reduce readmissions.
The battle against readmissions requires hospitals to exert readmission reduction
eort in two phases of care: pre-discharge (during the inpatient stay) and post-
discharge follow-up (after the patient has left the hospital). For instance, before
discharge, a hospital can extend the length of stay to further stabilize a patient's
condition. After discharge, the hospital can perform follow-up checkups (e.g., oce
visits, telephone calls, and e-visits) and treatments to prevent readmissions. Though
proven eective, these readmission reduction eorts can be overly costly. For ex-
ample, the Reengineered Hospital Discharge Program (Project RED) conducted a
randomized clinical trial and found that readmission reduction could substantially
impact on health care nancing (Jack et al., 2009). Due to the excessive nancial
burden of the required eorts and investments, the momentum of readmission re-
duction has stalled since the implementation of the HRRP, as reported in a JAMA
study (Desai et al., 2016).
5As a policymaker, the CMS faces challenging decisions when designing the BP
policy and readmission penalty programs to properly incentivize readmission reduc-
tion. If the cost (or penalty) of a readmission is small, hospitals may be unmotivated
to take action. If the costs of readmission reduction measures (e.g., extended length
of stay and intensive post-discharge follow-up care) are too expensive, hospitals may
give up. In addition to the cost and penalty structures, the length of the readmis-
sion penalty window and length of an episode of care also play an important role.
A New England Journal of Medicine article (Joynt and Jha, 2012) argued that hos-
pitals have little control over readmissions that occur more than seven days after
discharge, therefore policymakers should consider limiting the readmission penalty
window. Further complicating the matter are factors such as the baseline readmis-
sion risk of the patient cohort, the type of the complications that cause readmissions,
and the eectiveness of the post-discharge treatments in preventing readmissions.
This chapter studies operational factors that are critical to eective bundled pay-
ment policy design. We study key policy-level decisions such as designing readmis-
sion penalty programs, subsidizing post-discharge follow-up treatments, and short-
ening/extending the readmission penalty window length. Specically, we study how
a hospital may allocate readmission reduction eorts between the pre- and post-
discharge phases of care. In the pre-discharge phase, the hospital exerts eort to
reduce the readmission risk of a patient cohort. In the post-discharge phase as a pa-
rameter, the hospital provides post-discharge follow-up care to prevent readmission.
This integrated two-stage framework enables us to analytically study how the CMS
should design a bundled payment policy to align incentives.
1.3.1 Contributions
This work is to be submitted for publication in Liu et al. (2018b). This chapter
makes theoretical contributions to the machine maintenance literature. We develop a
novel Strengthen Then Maintain (STM) framework and study how a decision maker
balances eorts between the strengthening stage and the maintaining stage. The
maintaining stage is modeled as a discrete time nite horizon Markov Decision Pro-
cess (MDP) machine maintenance problem. We provide a closed-form expression for
the cost-to-go function for the machine maintenance MDP under an engaged policy.
We prove a theoretical bound on the optimality gap for the closed-form solution when
an engaged policy is not optimal. By studying the closed-form expression analyti-
cally, we demonstrate how the cost-to-go is aected by the failure rate of the machine
(which is analogous to the patient in a healthcare setting). By integrating the two
6stages, we study how an entity in charge of the maintenance of a machine should
allocate eorts between the two stages { in the strengthening stage, the failure rate
can be reduced; and in the maintaining stage, the machine is maintained accordingly.
The analytical results of the STM framework can be generalized to many machine
maintenance problems.
We also uncover novel insights for designing an eective Bundled Payment policy
to reduce readmissions. Our analytical results suggest that hospitals have more
nancial incentives if the readmission penalty window is shortened, the cost of
post-discharge follow-up treatment is reduced, the cost/penalty of readmission is
increased, and the post-discharge treatment ecacy is improved. For patients that
are likely to experience acute events leading to a swift readmission, a more eective
mechanism is to shorten the penalty window. For other cohorts, subsidizing inpatient
and outpatient eorts may be eective. We believe that our model is the rst study
that analytically addresses how the penalty window length impacts the incentives
for readmission reduction. Unlike many game-theoretical studies which use stylized
functional forms, our model is less restrictive with minimal assumptions imposed on
the functional form. At the core of our model is a Markov Decision Process model,
which directly captures the patient's deterioration and the cost structures.
1.4 Chapter IV: Pre-discharge Risk Prediction
Radical cystectomy has one of the highest rates of complications and readmissions
of any surgical procedure, with 25% of patients experiencing unplanned readmission
within 30 days (Borza et al., 2017; Stimson et al., 2010; Hu et al., 2014; Skolarus et al.,
2015). These high readmission rates, coupled with increasing policy focus on reducing
readmissions, have motivated investigations into identication and optimization of
patients at highest readmission risk. However, the ability to predict readmission
using traditional administrative data is limited. This limitation makes it unclear
where and when to focus resources, leaving readmission rates largely unchanged
(Minnillo et al., 2015; James et al., 2016).
In this chapter, we used data from electronic health record to examine whether
incorporating dynamic laboratory data into readmission prediction models improved
risk stratication after radical cystectomy. Specically, we assessed daily post-
operative values for commonly obtained laboratory tests, and used machine learning
techniques to compare values between readmitted and non-readmitted patients. We
characterized the trajectory of laboratory values obtained in complete blood counts,
basic metabolic panels, and coagulation studies during the index hospital stay. The
7framework showcases that common postoperative laboratory values may have dis-
criminatory power to help identify patients at high risk of readmission after radical
cystectomy.
1.4.1 Contributions
This work is to be submitted for publication in Kirk et al. (2018). In this work,
we combined a logistic regression model and a support vector machine (SVM) model
to incorporate longitudinal clinical data. By combining a regression model and a
machine learning model, the framework is able to predict readmissions without loss
of interpretability. Moreover, the SVM model can handle missing values. This is es-
pecially important, as missing values are very common in real-world clinical datasets.
This study demonstrates the unique promise of readily available, dynamic data to
inform risk stratication of patients most likely to be readmitted after cystectomy.
Incorporating available, dynamic sources of physiological data (such as laboratory
values) into prediction algorithms could enable more accurate identication and tar-
geting of patients at greatest readmission risk.
CHAPTER II
Post-Discharge Monitoring
ABSTRACT: Hospital readmissions aect hundreds of thousands of patients
every year, negatively impacting patients and placing a tremendous burden on the
national healthcare system. Post-discharge checkup policies can reduce readmissions
through early detection of health conditions, however, the methods behind designing
eective checkup policies are poorly understood. Under current practice, up to 67%
of readmitted patients return to the hospital before their rst scheduled oce visit.
This work aims to develop eective checkup plans to monitor patients following
hospital discharge using a variety of checkup methods including phone calls and
oce visits. We develop and analyze a new delay-time analysis model to identify
the optimal type and timing of checkups to implement post-discharge monitoring
plans. By analyzing the structure of optimal policies, we develop checkup schedules
that can detect up to 43.7% more readmission-causing conditions experienced by
readmission-bound patients. Further, we uncover simple rules of thumb that can
help doctors design and improve monitoring plans even in the absence of advanced
computer software or complex computations.
2.1 Introduction
In the United States, hospital readmissions are heavily scrutinized as a driver
of healthcare costs. According to Weinberger et al. (1996), up to half of all hos-
pitalizations are readmissions. Furthermore, it is estimated that up to 75% of all
readmissions are preventable by patient education, pre-discharge assessment, and
domiciliary aftercare (Benbassat and Taragin, 2000). In eect, preventable hospital
readmissions represent approximately $25 billion in annual healthcare costs (PwC
Health Research Institute, 2010). One in eight Medicare patients are readmitted
within 30 days of discharge after surgery (PerryUndem Research & Communica-
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9tions, 2013), and 56.5% of readmitted Medicare patients are readmitted through the
Emergency Department (ED) (Kocher et al., 2013), contributing to high costs. These
readmissions represent not only preventable healthcare costs, but also a tremendous
burden on patients and their families.
In order to address this problem, policies such as the Aordable Care Act (ACA)
have been implemented (Koh and Sebelius, 2010). Following the ACA, the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) now penalize hospitals with worse than
expected 30-day readmission rates (Joynt and Jha, 2012). For example, Section 3025
of the Aordable Care Act added Section 1886(q) to the Social Security Act estab-
lishing the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program. This program requires CMS
to reduce payments to the Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS) hospitals
beginning in October 2012 (James, 2013). These circumstances encourage health-
care professionals to more actively search for and implement solutions to minimize
hospital readmissions (Wong et al., 2013).
Numerous interventions have been proposed to prevent readmissions (including
better pre-discharge care and improved discharge instructions). Post-discharge check-
ups such as phone calls, home visits, and oce visits have been independently shown
in the clinical literature to signicantly reduce hospital readmissions (Dudas et al.,
2001; Wong et al., 2013) and oset increases in demand for physician services (Green
et al., 2013). The purpose of these checkups is to detect developing conditions before
they worsen and cause either an unnecessary trip to the ED and/or an inpatient
readmission.
Although checkups can mitigate the readmissions crisis, the methods behind de-
signing eective checkup policies are poorly understood. Specically, healthcare
providers remain uncertain about how many checkups to schedule, what types of
checkups to schedule, and when to schedule those checkups. In practice, checkup
policies currently implemented by hospitals are designed and based on unsupported
heuristics. For example, current practice recommends that doctors rst follow-up
with cystectomy (a major surgery for bladder cancer) patients with an oce visit
approximately two weeks after their hospital discharge; however, 40% of readmitted
cystectomy patients are readmitted within one week of discharge, and as many as
67% of readmitted cystectomy patients are already readmitted before the rst sched-
uled oce visit (Hu et al., 2014; Skolarus et al., 2015). Our research seeks to reclaim
this missed opportunity by identifying the optimal timing as well as the type of
checkups to perform after discharge. It also provides guidance for how many visits
would be most eective. This will give healthcare professionals (both clinicians and
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non-physicians) an increased chance of detecting a patient's health condition before
it causes a readmission.
Because most hospitals do not yet have a systematized mechanism for managing
follow-ups for their cohort of patients, much of the follow-up decision making is left to
the treating surgeon, and it is typically determined on a case-by-case basis. This work
seeks to improve the ecacy of these personalized follow-up plans. This approach
has been conrmed as having low barriers to implementation relative to a larger
scale, system-wide approach that considers costs and savings relative to total hospital
resources. This is because medical professionals currently make decisions on a per-
patient basis (hence no major culture change required) by weighing the expected
benet (e.g. early detection, readmission reduction, improved quality, etc.) versus
the amount of time the practice is able/willing to commit to follow-ups. Cost-based
calculations are not frequently used in these individual patient decisions, in part
because it is dicult to assign a monetary value to early detection of a condition. This
chapter provides analytical, data-based methods and decision guidelines (medical
professionals are comfortable with both) to better personalize these decisions that
doctors already make on a daily basis.
To provide contextual grounding for our practice-focused readmission detection
approach, we develop our models in close collaboration with a urological practice,
with a focus on cystectomy, which is one of the highest readmission rate surgeries in
the U.S. Other papers have shown similarities in the readmission characteristics of
cystectomy patients and other types of surgical patients (Jacobs et al., 2017). This
approach could hence be generalizable to other types of surgery and other patient
conditions by changing the model parameterization based on historical data, as long
as the processes for follow-ups and underlying disease dynamics remain similar. More
information about the key assumptions that must be veried before applying our
models to other diseases is provided in subsequent sections.
The post-discharge monitoring process after cystectomy proceeds as follows. At
the time of discharge, a monitoring schedule is determined by the discharge team
and the patient is made aware of when they will be receiving phone calls and when
they are scheduled to return for an oce visit to check on their recovery. During
a phone call or oce visit, the patient will be tested to see if they have developed
a condition that is likely to lead to readmission. For cystectomy, the two most
common conditions are infection and failure to thrive (unable to eat enough food),
which account for the majority of readmissions (Hu et al., 2014; Skolarus et al., 2015).
These conditions exhibit important characteristics that are suited to early detection
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and mitigation: (1) these types of conditions are readily detectable via phone call,
telemedicine, or oce visit, (2) the window for detection is long enough to make
a follow-up potentially eective (e.g. patients stay at home with an infection for
several days before becoming sick enough for readmission), and (3) early detection
can be eective in mitigating the condition on an outpatient basis or at the very
least result in a reduced cost ED visit or readmission (e.g. providing antibiotics to
treat infection, or early detection means the condition is less serious when treatment
begins leading to reduced cost and better patient outcomes).
If a condition is detected early by a follow-up, steps to mitigate the condition can
be immediately undertaken. These steps can include starting antibiotics to eliminate
infection, or IV treatment for patients suering from failure to thrive. Hence, early
detection may avoid the readmission entirely, prevent an expensive ED visit, or at
the very least lessen the time and cost of overcoming the condition while improving
the quality of the outcome by catching the condition before it becomes too severe.
At the suggestion of our clinical collaborator, we do not attempt to directly quantify
the monetary value of such outcomes in our model, but instead leave the decision to
the clinician/practice as to the amount of follow-up eort that is reasonable relative
to the increased likelihood of early detection.
To capture this personalized follow-up process, we develop a delay-time modeling
approach adapted from the machine maintenance literature to analyze and optimize
post-discharge checkup policies. Several unique features of readmission dynamics
require new extensions of the traditional framework, providing new insights into the
structure of delay-time machine maintenance problems and broadening the scope
of problems in which delay-time analysis can be applied. In addition to theoreti-
cal implications, this chapter contributes benecial insights for physicians and other
healthcare decision-makers to help them improve post-discharge monitoring for pa-
tients.
As a proof of concept, we calibrate, test, and validate our models on nationwide
data for cystectomy patients. Cystectomy, often performed on bladder cancer pa-
tients, is a type of surgery that involves removal of all or part of the urinary bladder.
Cystectomy patients experience one of the highest readmission rates of any surgery,
as approximately 25% of cystectomy patients are readmitted within 30 days of dis-
charge from the hospital (Hu et al., 2014; Jacobs et al., 2013).
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Sections 2.3 and 2.4, we develop
and analyze our model to understand key properties of the optimal checkup policies.
We identify the importance of checkup timing, and how checkup timing is aected
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by the stochasticity of how long patients are ill prior to readmission (delay-time),
as well as the detection rate of checkups. In Section 2.5, we verify our ndings
through numerical analyses by applying our model to the national State Inpatient
Database patient cohorts. The numerical analyses also demonstrate that our model
is robust to the system parameters and consistently outperforms current checkup
policies. Using the same number of checkups, current practice (which is expected
to detect only 16% of the conditions experienced by readmitted patients) can be
improved by up to 43.7%. In Section 2.6, we summarize the theoretical and practical
implications of our study. In particular, we highlight how our model provides valuable
extensions to the traditional delay-time analysis framework and how our ndings can
eectively detect readmission-causing conditions and improve the quality of patient
care, thereby mitigating the national readmissions crisis.
2.2 Literature Review
Readmissions play a critical role in recent clinical literature. It is estimated that
up to 75% of readmissions are preventable by patient education, pre-discharge assess-
ment, and domiciliary aftercare (Benbassat and Taragin, 2000), and post-discharge
checkups such as phone calls, home visits, pharmacists' visits, and doctors' oce
visits can signicantly reduce hospital readmissions (Dudas et al., 2001; Wong et al.,
2013; D'Amore et al., 2011; Bellone et al., 2012; Costantino et al., 2013). Within the
healthcare operations research literature, models have been created to improve post-
discharge health outcomes, including reducing readmissions and mortality rates:
Bartel et al. (2014) analyzes how the initial hospitalization length of stay impacts
post-discharge mortality rate; Chan et al. (2012) studies the impact of ICU dis-
charge strategies on readmissions; Kim et al. (2014) analyzes how ICU admission
control strategies impact readmission rate. Bayati et al. (2014) builds a classica-
tion model to predict readmissions and analyzed intervention decisions. However,
this work does not address the timing of interventions. Leeds et al. (2015) conducts
a statistical analysis to study how surgeons make discharge decisions and the eect
of decision-support tools for discharge. None of those models directly address how
patients should be monitored after hospital discharge. To address that question, two
areas in the operations research literature are especially relevant to our study: (1)
machine maintenance and inspection, and (2) disease screening.
Machine maintenance and inspection: The literature of machine maintenance
and inspection is very well-established. Literature surveys (Barlow and Proschan,
1996; Wang, 2002) categorize maintenance policies into two groups: preventive main-
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tenance (PM) and corrective maintenance (CM). Our problem aligns more closely
with PM frameworks since PMs proactively prevent failure, whereas CMs are only
performed after failures occur. PMs can be scheduled in the following fashion: (1)
age-dependent policies perform PM at a xed time T ; (2) periodic and sequential
policies schedule multiple PMs in xed or variable intervals; and (3) failure limit
policies perform PMs when the failure rate of a machine exceeds a predetermined
threshold. The dynamics of machine deterioration are typically modeled by (1)
Markovian processes (Sim and Endrenyi, 1993), (2) semi-Markovian processes (Mil-
ioni and Pliska, 1988; Yeh, 1997), (3) hidden Markov models (White, 1977), and
(4) delay-time models (Wang, 2012). More specically, Sim and Endrenyi (1993)
models the deterioration as a continuous time Markov chain and considers multiple
failure types and repair/maintenance actions. They minimize the long-run average
down-time and cost, which is not suitable for our problem. Yeh (1997) uses phase-
type distributions to approximate general distributions of a semi-Markovian model.
They develop algorithms for optimal state-age-dependent policies that also minimize
long-run average cost. White (1977) develops a POMDP model for the machine
inspection/maintenance problem which minimizes the long-run average cost. These
models are not suitable for our problem because they assumed Markovian deteriora-
tion and optimized long-run average cost and down-time.
Wang (2012) gives a thorough survey on delay-time models, which are a special
case of semi-Markovian models with three states. Traditional delay-time analysis
is based on renewal theory and reliability which assumes the unit lifetime has an
increasing failure rate. The goal of those models is typically to determine an in-
spection schedule that minimizes long-run costs (Christer and Jack, 1991; Jardine
and Tsang, 2005) or minimizes expected down-times (Dagpunar, 1994) given iden-
tical units that can be replaced. Our problem necessitates several extensions: (1)
unlike interchangeable machine components, patients cannot be \replaced"; (2) our
objective is to maximize the probability of a checkup (inspection) detecting a pa-
tient's condition; (3) readmission rates depend on time since discharge, so we have a
time-varying failure rate; and (4) existing models do not allow for policies composed
of dierent types of inspections with varying inspection detection rates (Christer,
1999). Monitoring policies composed of inhomogeneous checkups (e.g. phone calls,
oce visits, etc.) are particularly valuable because empirical evidence indicates that
policies consisting of mixed checkup methods are more eective than policies con-
sisting of only one checkup method (Holland et al., 2005; Wong et al., 2013).
Close to our work is Milioni and Pliska (1988), where a semi-Markovian model
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with three states was used to model machine deterioration and catastrophic failure
(i.e. no repair/replacement after failed). They considered two objectives: minimize
the cost of inspections, false positives, and treatment; and minimize the probability
of failure. Existence of optimal solutions and algorithms for solving the problems
were established. However, the authors did not provide insights into the structure of
the optimal policies. Moreover, they assumed perfect inspections in the sick state.
Although this model is somewhat similar to our model, the key dierence is that this
model is still a long-run steady state planning model in both objective functions.
Disease screening: Within the healthcare operations research eld, models have
been developed to establish medical inspection schedules that detect the onset and
progressions of diseases such as chlamydia infection (Teng et al., 2011), diabetes
(Brandeau et al., 2004), AIDS (Sanders et al., 2005; Jonasson et al., 2017), hepatitis
(Fu et al., 2012), breast cancer (Ayer et al., 2012; Brailsford et al., 2012; Ayer et al.,
2015; Maillart et al., 2008), colorectal cancer (Harper and Jones, 2005; Gunes et al.,
2015; Erenay et al., 2014), cervical cancer (Myers et al., 2000), prostate cancer (Pin-
sky, 2004; Tsodikov et al., 2006; Zhang et al., 2012a), bladder cancer (Kent et al.,
1989), and glaucoma (Helm et al., 2015). Delay-time models are used to model hep-
atitis progression (Fu et al., 2012) and vascular patency loss (Zhang et al., 2012b).
Most of the models are based on discrete time Markovian assumptions (Ayer et al.,
2012; Myers et al., 2000; Kent et al., 1989; Ayer et al., 2015; Maillart et al., 2008;
Erenay et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2012a), which do not t into our problem since the
deterioration dynamics of the readmitted patients are not necessarily Markovian.
Bavafa et al. (2017) studies a three-state continuous time Markov model in the
context of primary care routine visits. The authors examine the eectiveness of of-
ce visits as well as e-visits as a cost-eective preventative action. However, the
model assumes Markovian deterioration and focuses on steady-state planning from
the perspective of the primary care providers. Fu et al. (2012) applies delay-time
models on hepatitis screening. However, they focus on optimal statistical estimation
rather than the optimal monitoring schedule planning. Closest to our work is Zhang
et al. (2012b), where follow-up checkups are scheduled to minimize the probability
that the time between patency loss and its detection exceeds some length of time.
The results on the timing of checkups under the assumptions of deterministic delay-
time and Weibull-distributed failure rate are generally consistent with our ndings.
However, the authors consider perfect checkups only and do not consider general
distributions. Their work focuses on the timing of checkups only and does not study
how quantity, quality, or mix of dierent checkups impact monitoring schedules.
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Moreover, they estimate the distributions using maximum likelihood methods as-
suming Erlang and exponential distributions, whereas we use best-t distributions
obtained directly from the data. The novelties of our work leverage the composi-
tion of dierent checkup methods (e.g. oce visits and phone calls) and address the
tradeos in scheduling checkups with both perfect and imperfect inspections under
inhomogeneous failure rates. Our work dierentiates from Zhang et al. (2012a) in
the following aspects. 1) In contrast to their model, we analyze the optimal structure
of the checkup policies (consisting of perfect checkups) without assuming a specic
parametric family. 2) For imperfect checkups, we show that imperfect checkups
(such as phone calls) can aect the timing and detection probability signicantly by
considering the detection rate of checkups. Moreover, 3) we incorporated various
sources of data to estimate the hidden time-to-develop the condition distributions
using numerical Laplace inverse transform. Helm et al. (2016) developed a mixed
integer programming (MIP) approach to solving a planning problem for how many
healthcare professionals to sta to implement a follow-up program. This model,
however, assumed a homogeneous population(s) of patients and was designed as a
static planning model for a cohort of patients taking the hospital's perspective. Our
model, on the other hand, is patient centered and can be tailored based on each
individual's projected readmission density curve { focusing on the operational level
rather than a steady-state planning model. Our delay-time modeling approach also
enables us to identify structural properties, which is not possible using their MIP
formulation.
2.3 Model for Optimizing Post-discharge Checkup Policies
In this section, we develop and analyze a general model for designing monitoring
plans for patients after they are discharged from the hospital. First, we introduce our
model notation and parameters. A summary of the notation is presented in Table
2.1).
2.3.1 Delay-Time Model for Readmissions
Based on our eld research, the dynamics of an inpatient readmission occur as
follows. After a patient is discharged, he/she may develop a readmission-causing con-
dition. When this condition rst develops, it does not necessarily cause an immediate
readmission (e.g. an infection). Instead, the patient's condition will degrade over
time, eventually becoming so severe that he/she must return to the hospital and be
readmitted. These dynamics are identical to those found in machine failure models,
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 The random variable representing time-to-readmission (time
between discharge and readmission) given no checkups
g() The probability density function of 
D Delay-time, i.e., the length of time prior to  that the illness
was detectable by a checkup; this is equivalent to the amount of
time that a patient is in the ill state
f() The probability density function of D; accordingly, F () is the
cumulative distribution function of D
 The time when the condition developed, i.e., when the illness is
rst detectable by a checkup
g() The probability density function of 
ti The time when checkup i is performed
T The latest time following discharge that readmissions are
tracked until; thus, this also represents the latest time during
which a checkup can be placed
m The number of dierent checkup methods available
yij 2 f0; 1g An indicator variable that denotes whether checkup method
j 2 f1; :::;mg is used at ti
rj 2 [0; 1] The detection rate of checkup method j, i.e. if checkup
method j is performed when a patient is ill, then the checkup
will detect the illness with probability rj
r(i) 2 [0; 1] The detection rate of the checkup employed at ti 8 i 2 f1; :::; ng
wj 2 N The maximum number of times checkup method j can be used
 = (t1; :::; tn A checkup policy
; y11; :::; ynm)
Ni 2 f0; 1g An indicator variable that denotes whether or not an illness is
detected at ti given policy 
Table 2.1: Model Notation and Parameters
which have been shown in the machine maintenance literature to be well modeled
by a delay-time model. Unlike Markovian models, our model handles general dis-
tributions under mild conditions (see Section 2.3.4). Moreover, since our problem
has a short planning horizon (30 days) and a transient nature (patient-centric not
steady-state planning), continuous delay-time models allow us to keep track of how
long a patient has been in each state and we can tailor the objective function as we
shall see later. As seen in Figure 2.1, we consider individual patients stochastically
progressing through three sequential states upon discharge: healthy, ill, and read-
mitted. Thus, within the framework of traditional delay-time analysis models used
in preventative maintenance, the patient represents the system, illnesses represent
defects, and readmissions represent failures.
Remark II.1 (\Ill State"). It is important to note here that the ill state is dened as
identifying a patient in a state that causes them to be at risk for a future readmission.
This includes conditions such as infection and failure to thrive, but also includes
conditions such as when the patient has failed to ll a prescription, is taking their
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medicine incorrectly, or has not understood or followed post-discharge treatment
plans such as exercise or nutritional guidelines. Both medical and compliance issues
can be checked for during a phone call or oce visit and incorporated into our
modeling framework.
At time 0, we assume a patient is discharged in a healthy state. After a stochastic
amount of time, , the patient develops a detectable condition and is considered to be
in the ill state (the rst black dot in Figure 2.1). We denote this time  as the time-
to-develop the condition. Following a period of time (delay-time), D (between the
rst and second black dots in Figure 2.1), the patient's condition worsens to the point
where he/she is readmitted to the hospital. We denote this time-to-readmission as
 = +D (the second black dot in Figure 2.1). Lastly, we let T denote the length of
our model's planning horizon (e.g. T = 30 days). Clinical literature and policy both
support a nite horizon model as the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
specify that hospital admissions only qualify as readmissions if they occur within 30
days of discharge.
Figure 2.1: Patient State Progression and Checkup Policy
At the point of a patient's discharge, the case manager needs to determine the
post-discharge checkup plan for the patient for the next 30 days. Given n checkup
opportunities, our goal is to place a checkup at each time ti; i 2 f1; :::; ng (white
circles in Figure 2.1), to maximize the probability of detecting the patient in the ill
state. While there is a possibility of a competing risk of patient mortality, 30-day
mortality rates post-discharge are very small relative to readmission rates
In addition to choosing checkup times, decisions must be made regarding what
type of checkup method (e.g. phone calls, home visits, doctors' oce visits) to use
at each checkup time, ti. Given m dierent checkup methods, the indicator variable
yij 2 f0; 1g denotes whether checkup method j 2 f1; :::;mg is used at time ti. In
Figure 2.1, y1a = y2b = y3c = y4d = 1. To model checkup method resource limitations,
let wj denote the maximum number of times checkup method j 2 f1; :::;mg can be
used.
As mentioned in the contextual grounding of Section 2.1, we are developing this re-
search to help personalize monitoring plans for each patient at the provider/practice
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level. Thus, we allow these constraints to be tailored to what the clinician believes is
an appropriate level of checkup intensity (i.e. how many oce visits and phone calls
they are able/willing to make). For example, our clinical collaborator indicates that
most surgeons would typically be willing to do one oce visit, two in cases where they
are more concerned about the patient, and a maximum of three where the patient's
condition indicates very high risk. These determinations, however, are typically
made by the clinician based on a medical and historical knowledge of the patient
and their condition and are dicult to quantify in a cost-based or constraint-based
structure. Further, budgets for checkups are not typically considered when making
individual checkup decisions for specic patients, hence the inclusion of costs does
not t the current practice and would provide barriers given that many clinicians are
averse to such an approach in individual patient decision making. Hence, we allow
the provider/practice to determine how many oce visits and phone calls (i.e. wj's)
they believe to be appropriate on a patient-by-patient basis and enter this number
as a model parameter. The model also allows for clinicians to perform sensitivity
analysis to determine, for example, the marginal benet of an extra phone call or
oce visit compared to their base resource allocation.
To account for the dierences in checkup methods, e.g. an oce visit is more
eective than a phone call, we let the detection rate rj 2 [0; 1] denote the probability
that method j 2 f1; :::;mg will detect a condition when the patient is in the ill state
(i.e. true-positive). If r = 1, then we say that the checkup is a perfect checkup.
If r < 1, we say that the checkup is an imperfect checkup. The detection rate
accounts for the chance that a condition is present and yet is not detected. This
could be due to an inability to detect illness based on the questions asked, poor
patient responsiveness, or other reasons. Patients not answering the phone can also
be considered, but based on discussions with a company that provides automated
phone calls to detect readmittable conditions (www.cloud9hcs.com), they achieve full
patient responses to their readmission detection scripts (questions) in greater than
85% of their phone calls. We do not consider false-positives in this model.
Each checkup policy is now dened as,  = (t1; :::; tn; y11; :::; ynm). Further, let
Ni 2 f0; 1g be the indicator variable denoting whether or not the patient is detected
in an ill state at time ti, given policy . Our objective is to select the checkup policy
that maximizes the probability of detecting the patient in an ill state (detection
probability in shorthand):
max

nX
i=1
E[Ni ]: (2.1)
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2.3.2 Optimization Formulation
The time-to-develop the condition, , is described by a dierentiable probability
density function g(), which is assumed to be independent of delay-time, D. This
assumption is necessary for the mathematical formulation and is present in all re-
lated machine maintenance literature. We also conrm statistical independence of
these two random variables in Section 2.5.1 using historical data. D has PDF f(),
CDF F (), and complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) F (). Fur-
thermore, the time-to-readmission, , has probability density function g(), which is
the convolution of  and D. The checkup optimization can be expressed as follows:
max
t1;:::;tn
y11;:::;ynm
nX
i=1
mX
=1
yir
iX
s=1
Z ts
ts 1
g(k) F (ti   k) dk
i 1Y
q=s
mX
=1
yq(1  r) (2.2)
s.t.
mX
l=1
yil = 1; 8 i 2 f1; :::; ng (2.3)
nX
i=1
yil  wl; 8 l 2 f1; :::;mg (2.4)
0 ti < ti+1 T ; 8 i 2 f1; :::; n  1g (2.5)
where t0 = 0 and the empty product, , equals 1.
The rst term in the objective, yir, accounts for the detection rate of the method
used for checkup i. The second term represents the probability that the patient de-
veloped the condition between checkups (s   1) and s and is still not readmitted
by checkup i. The last term (the product) represents the probability that checkups
s; :::; (i   1) all failed to properly detect the patient's existing condition. The con-
straint of Eq. (2.3) ensures that only one checkup method is utilized at each checkup
time, Eq. (2.4) ensures that checkup method resource capacities are not violated,
and Eq. (2.5) ensures proper ordering of the checkups.
Remark II.2. Note that our objective function only considers the probability of de-
tection and does not account for how early the condition was detected. We chose
this objective for several reasons. First, it is intuitive for the clinical audience and
captures the essence of the post-discharge monitoring goal - to detect conditions
and prevent readmissions. Second, there is no data, to our knowledge, that cap-
tures quanties the benets of capturing a condition earlier versus later. To capture
this relationship, it would require the estimation of the detection probability as a
function of the earliness of detection, which is dicult given the lack of delay-time
related data. Nevertheless, capturing conditions early would likely be benecial. It
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is possible to modify our objective function to achieve this, given proper data on the
benets of early detection.
2.3.3 Solution Approach
We solve this program numerically by dividing it into subproblems and enumer-
ating all feasible y vectors. For each subproblem, we implemented an algorithm that
combines a genetic algorithm (GA) with an ascent algorithm in the following fashion.
The GA is used to generate solutions through random initialization, mutation, and
crossover.
initialization
Generate 200 solutions1 according to the recursive construction described in Proposition
II.4. Each of the 200 initial seeds is generated assuming a deterministic delay-time
randomly sampled from the true delay-time distribution; t 1
while Not converged 2 or t  200 or gradient norm  10 5 do
1. Keep the top 25 ttest solutions and eliminate the rest 175 solutions
2. Randomly mate solutions from the 25 solutions to generate 175 ospring solutions
3. Mutate 20 randomly selected solutions by randomly permuting the timing
4. Apply 5 iterations of gradient ascent to each solution
5. t t+ 1
end
Note:
1 : A solution, for a n checkup problem, is a n dimensional vector. For example, n = 2,
(t1; t2) is a valid solution where t is the timing of checkups. The tness of a solution is its
detection probability (i.e. the objective value).
2 : We say the algorithm converged if the change in population average tness is less than
10 5 from t to t+ 1.
Algorithm 1: Solution Procedure
In each generation, after the genetic operations, an ascent algorithm is applied
to each of the solutions in the solution pool for no more than ve iterations with
decreasing step size. The master algorithm stops if the gradient is suciently small
or the maximum number of iterations is reached. Note that the ascent algorithm
alone is sucient to nd local optima if the distributions are dierentiable with
support on (0;+1). The GA component is added to encourage escaping from local
optima in the search for a global optimum and to handle distributions that are not
dierentiable and/or have nite support.
Remark II.3. Note that the objective function is not necessarily concave. For exam-
ple, when the delay-time is deterministic and we are optimizing for only one perfect
checkup, the concavity of the objective function is equivalent to the concavity of the
probability density function of the time-to-develop the condition. However, under
reasonable parameterizations in our numerical analysis, we found that our problem
tends to have a unique optimum near the mode of the time-to-readmission curve (see
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Figures 2.2 and 2.3). Hence the rst order necessary conditions we analyze below
provide strong intuition regarding the region of interest for scheduling checkups.
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Figure 2.3: Objective Value for Two Checkups
2.3.4 Moving Parts and Assumptions
Our model consists of three moving parts that require estimation. The estimation
of these moving parts is crucial and challenging due to data scarcity and censoring.
In this section, we discuss each of the moving parts and modeling assumptions sur-
rounding them. Later in Section 2.5, we discuss the estimation in detail and conduct
sensitivity analysis
• Detection rate of imperfect checkups (r)
The detection rate of an imperfect checkup is dened as the probability of
detecting an existing condition. In our numerical analyses, we consider r =
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0:6 for phone calls as a baseline and conduct sensitivity analyses by varying r
between 0.2 and 1. In Section 2.4.3, we analyze the impact of detection rate (r)
by studying gamma g distributions.
• Time-to-develop the condition distribution (pdf: g)
The time-to-develop the condition distribution is the probability density of de-
veloping a readmission-causing condition after discharge. In order to establish
the First Order Necessary Condition, we require g to be continuously dier-
entiable with support on [0; T ]. In Section 2.4.1, we analyze the structure of
the checkup timing assuming g is unimodal. However, in Section 2.4.2, the
unimodality assumption is relaxed.
• Delay-time distribution (pdf: f)
The delay-time distribution is the probability density of the time between con-
dition onset and readmission. We assume that the delay-time is independent of
the time-to-develop the condition. In order to establish the First Order Nec-
essary Condition, we assume f to be continuously dierentiable with support
on [0; T ]. In Section 2.4.3, we analyzed the impact of detection rate (r) by
studying exponentially distributed delay-time. Table 2.3 shows the results of
the sensitivity analyses using dierent delay-time distributions.
Our model also assumes that 1) the 30-day post-discharge mortality rates are
small relative to 30-day hospital readmission rates and therefore can be neglected;
2) the post-discharge checkup plan is not dynamically modied or updated; and 3)
the planning horizon is nite (i.e., 30 days).
2.4 Structural Properties
In this section, we analyze special cases to develop structural insights, which are
extended to more general cases through numerical analyses in Section 2.5. We rst
focus on the timing of checkups. Then we examine how dierent features such as
stochastic delay-time, D, and dierent detection rates imply small modications to
the general timing structure. The analysis in Sections 2.4.1-2.4.3 serves to develop
intuition into rules of thumb that are combined to design a practical, implementable
policy for providers/practices described in Section 2.4.4, with each section providing
a key building block. The overarching goal is to provide guidance toward a prac-
tical policy that is eective based only on historical data without relying on the
optimization itself.
23
2.4.1 General Checkup Timing in Optimal Policies
We later show through numerical analyses (Section 2.5) that checkup timing has
the highest impact on detecting an ill patient, so we begin our analysis with this
feature. To understand the general structure of checkup timing, we analyze the
case of current practice where standard protocol dictates a single doctor's oce
visit (n = 1). We begin by assuming a deterministic delay-time, D = z  0, and a
perfect detection rate. We later generalize these analytical results through numerical
analyses in Section 2.5. The objective function for this special case can be rewritten
as follows:
max
t1
E[N1 ] = max
t1
Z t1
0
g(k)(1  F (t1   k)) dk = max
t1
Z t1
t1 z
g(k) dk (2.6)
The second equality follows from the fact that the deterministic delay-time, D =
z  0, implies F (t1   k) = 1, if t1   k  z, and F (t1   k) = 0 otherwise.
Dierentiating the objective function with respect to t1 yields the following First
Order Necessary Condition (FONC) for optimality
0 =
@
@t1
Z t1
t1 z
g(k) dk =) g(t1   z) = g(t1) (2.7)
Based on results from our data on readmitted cystectomy patients, we also lever-
age the fact that the time-to-develop the condition of readmitted patients, g(k), is
unimodal. By unimodality of g(k), the condition g(t1   z) = g(t1) implies that
(t1   z) is before the mode of g(k) and t1 is after the mode of g(k). Thus, the
probability density of developing a condition at t1   z must equal the probability
density of a condition developing at t1. In practical terms, this informs decision-
makers that, given only one checkup opportunity, they should schedule the checkup
a little bit (< z) after the time when conditions are most likely to develop.
Next, consider a more aggressive approach with n checkups. The following propo-
sition shows that the general multivariate optimization can be transformed into a uni-
variate optimization, focused only on the time of the rst checkup. The proposition
indicates the best way to achieve maximum coverage of high risk times in a patient's
post-discharge recovery. Specically, we want our checkups to cover as much of the
period of time when the patient is at highest risk of having a readmission-causing
condition as possible. This results in the following two insights. First, if checkups
are too close (i.e. spaced closer than z time units), there is unnecessary overlap in
the coverage (i.e. two checkups covering the same time period). Better coverage can
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be achieved by spacing them further apart without any loss in detection (since delay-
time is deterministic). Second, we want the checkups to cover the high-risk period
(i.e. the time window containing the highest time-to-develop the condition density),
hence it is best to center all of the checkups around the mode of the time-to-develop
the condition distribution, since the density is decreasing monotonically on either
side of the mode.
Proposition II.4. If the delay-time is deterministic (D = z with probability 1) and
the time-to-develop the condition g is unimodal, then (1) it is sucient to optimize
t1 only; (2) the checkups are spaced z days apart equidistantly ; and (3) the densities
of developing the condition are equal at t1   z and tn
max
t1;:::;tn
nX
i=1
E[Ni ] = max
t1
Z t1+(n 1)z
t1 z
g(k) dk (2.8)
s.t. g(t1   z) = g(t1 + (n  1)z) (2.9)
ti+1 = ti + z; 8 i 2 f1; :::; n  1g (2.10)
Proof. We rst show that (tn  t1) = (n  1)z. In other words, the time between the
rst and last checkups is exactly (n  1)z.
The structure of our objective function appropriately avoids double counting the
detection of conditions. To see how, notice that under the assumptions of determin-
istic delay-time (D = z) and perfect detection rates, the objective function in Eq.
(2.2) becomes
nX
i=1
Z ti
ti 1
g(k) F (ti   k) dk =
nX
i=1
Z ti
max(ti 1;ti z)
g(k) dk (2.11)
Thus, only the earliest successful checkup contributes a positive amount to the objec-
tive function. For example, if a condition was present during a time interval (; +D)
and three checkups were scheduled at some arbitrary times ti; tj; tk 2 (;  + D),
then only the checkup at minfti; tj; tkg contributes a positive amount to the objective
function.
This implies that an optimal solution must be such that the intervals (ti   z; ti)
are disjoint for all i. To see why, consider an arbitrary checkup schedule that has
nondisjoint intervals. Suppose the smallest index corresponding to nondisjoint in-
tervals is j < n such that (tj   z; tj) and (tj+1   z; tj+1) are nondisjoint. Then,
tj = tj+1   z +  with  2 (0; z). We can construct another solution that is
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strictly better, by increasing tj+1 by (z   ). This increases the objective value by a
non-negative amount:8>>><>>>:
R min(tj+2 z;tj+1+z )
tj+1
g(k) dk; if j  n  2R tj+1+z 
tj+1
g(k) dk; if j = n  1
(2.12)
If j = n   1, then the change in the objective value is strictly positive. Similarly,
if j  n   2 and the upper limit of the integral in Eq. (2.12) is tj+1 + z   , the
change in the objective value is strictly positive and the adjustment of tj+1 leaves
the intervals (tj+1   z; tj+1) and (tj+2   z; tj+2) disjoint. The last case we need to
consider is if j  n  2 and the upper limit of the integral in Eq. (2.12) is tj+2   z.
In this case, there is a non-negative change in the objective value and the intervals
(tj+1   z + (z   ); tj+1 + (z   )) and (tj+2   z; tj+2) become nondisjoint, so we can
repeat the steps above. This process terminates in nite iterations and results in a
strictly positive change in the objective value. Thus, we can conclude that an optimal
solution must satisfy (tn   t1)  (n   1)z. Figure 2.4 illustrates how Eq. 2.12 is
derived in the case of j  n  2 and tj+2   z  tj+1 + z   .
tj−1 − z tj−1
tj − z tj
tj+1 − z tj+1
tj+2 − z tj+2γ
tj−1 − z tj−1 tj − z tj
tj+1 − z
+(z − γ)
tj+1
+(z − γ)
tj+2 − z tj+2
gain
Figure 2.4: Schematic Sketch for Eq. 2.12
We will now argue that an optimal solution cannot have (tn   t1) > (n   1)z.
Combining this with our previous nding yields our desired result that an optimal
solution must satisfy (tn t1) = (n 1)z. If (tn t1) > (n 1)z, then 9 i 2 f1; :::; n 1g
such that ti+1   ti = z + , with  > 0. In other words, there is at least one pair of
consecutive checkups that are spaced farther than z apart. A checkup schedule with
this property is necessarily suboptimal because the objective value can be improved
by adjusting either ti or ti+1 (without changing any other checkup times), depending
on their relative positions to the mode of g().
In particular, if ti < ti+1  mode of g(), we can increase the objective value
by shifting the checkup i from ti to ti + , where  2 (0; ]. This increases the
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objective value by
R ti+
ti
g(k)dk  
R max(ti+ z;ti 1)
max(ti z;ti 1) g(k)dk. Observe that the second
term is integrated over the interval [max(ti   z; ti 1);max(ti +    z; ti 1)], which
has length  . Since the second integral interval is to the left of the rst inte-
gral interval, and these two intervals are to the left of the mode, it follows thatR ti+
ti
g(k)dk  
R max(ti+ z;ti 1)
max(ti z;ti 1) g(k)dk > 0. By symmetry, if ti > ti+1  mode of
g(), we can shift checkup i + 1 from ti+1 to ti+1   , where  2 (0; ], to achieve a
nonnegative improvement . If ti < mode of g() < ti+1, we can achieve a nonnegative
improvement by moving ti to the right (if g(ti)  g(ti+1)) or moving ti+1 to the left
(if g(ti) < g(ti+1)). The improvement is strictly positive if g is strictly unimodal,
i.e., has a unique mode.
We can now conclude that an optimal solution must satisfy (tn   t1) = (n  1)z.
Given our previous result that an optimal solution must have checkup times such
that the intervals (ti; ti + z) 8 i are disjoint, this implies that an optimal solution
must be of the form ti = ti 1 + z; 8 i 2 f2; :::; ng. This is equivalent to letting
ti = t1 + (i   1)z; 8 i 2 f2; :::; ng. Note that this only holds assuming the delay-
time is deterministic. This proves that maxt1
R t1+(n 1)z
t1 z g(k) dk is in fact optimal.
Remark II.5. If the distribution of the time-to-develop the condition is right/left
skewed (yet still unimodal), this does not aect our optimality results at all, since
our results assume nothing about the skewness of the curve. The checkups would still
be centered around the mode, even though the mode will be later/sooner in the 30-
day readmission window. If the distribution is not unimodal, then alternative optima
might exist. Nonetheless, some of the properties from Proposition II.4 still hold. For
example, under the assumptions of bimodal distribution and deterministic delay-
time, we know the following: (1) if there was only one checkup to place, Proposition
II.4 still holds; (2) if there were multiple checkups, checkups are placed no closer
than z days apart (might be farther than z days apart depending on the shape of the
bimodal curve). For the general case with multiple modes, the First Order Necessary
Conditions still hold and the problem can still be solved numerically.
From Proposition II.4, we see that the problem eectively becomes the single
checkup problem while letting D = nz. Thus, an optimal solution in the case of
perfect inspection checkups and deterministic delay-times must satisfy the following
conditions
g(t1   z) = g(t1 + (n  1)z) (2.13)
ti+1 = ti + z; 8 i 2 f1; :::; n  1g (2.14)
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Reducing the n-dimensional optimization problem to a univariate optimization
problem makes these conditions especially valuable because these univariate op-
timizations are easy to solve using ascent search or binary search even without
specialized computer software. This can be achieved by solving the univariate
FONC equation (which is in the form of  (t1) = 0) using binary search since
g(t1   s)   g(t1 + (n   1)z) is monotone increasing for a unimodal function), as-
cent search, or Newton's method. Furthermore, the conditions imply that an optimal
policy schedules one contiguous block of checkups with the checkups collectively cov-
ering a time of length nz. Practically speaking, this informs decision-makers that if
they have n perfect checkups (e.g. doctors' oce visits), then the checkups should be
scheduled surrounding the time when conditions develop most frequently such that
there are z (delay-time) time units between each checkup.
2.4.2 Eect of Stochastic Delay-time on Optimal Checkup Timing
Proposition II.4 gives us the block structure of an optimal checkup policy with
deterministic delay-time, D. In this section, we investigate how stochastic D aects
the spacing of checkups within the block of checkups. First, relaxing the assumption
that D = z, the objective function becomes
max
t1;:::;tn
nX
i=1
Z ti
ti 1
g(k)[1  F (ti   k)] dk (2.15)
which for n = 1 equals
R t1
0
g(k)[1  F (t1   k)] dk, resulting in the following FONC:
0 =
@
@t1
Z t1
0
g(k)[1  F (t1   k)] dk =) g(t1) =
Z t1
0
g(k)f(t1   k) dk = g(t1)
(2.16)
Notice that the RHS of Eq. (2.16) is the formula for the probability density associated
with a readmission occurring at t1. This implies that at an optimal t1, the marginal
rate of developing a condition (i.e. the marginal increase in patients who could be
detected if t1 was increased) is equal to the marginal rate of a readmission occurring
(i.e. the marginal lost patients that would be readmitted if t1 was increased). Both
results extend our intuition from Section 2.4.1 to the case of stochastic delay-time.
Generalizing the FONC to an arbitrary number of checkups yieldsZ ti
ti 1
g(k)f(ti   k) dk = g(ti)F (ti+1   ti); 8 i 2 f1; :::; n  1g (2.17)Z tn
tn 1
g(k)f(tn   k) dk = g(tn) (2.18)
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The intuition behind these equations is similar to when n = 1 in that the optimal
solution balances the marginal rate of catching a condition with the ith checkup
with the marginal rate of missing a later condition. The LHS of Eq. (2.17) is the
probability of checkup i detecting a condition developed between ti 1 and ti. Since
the perfect checkup at ti 1 ensures ti will only detect conditions between ti 1 and ti,
the LHS of Eq. (2.17) can be thought of as the marginal benet of moving inspection
i slightly to the right from ti to ti +  (as  ! 0+), and therefore capturing more
conditions that could have developed between ti and ti + . This is essentially the
marginal opportunity cost. The RHS of Eq. (2.17) is the probability of ti+1 missing
the condition developed after ti. This is analogous to lost sales, in that it represents
the marginal rate of patients developing a condition at ti and being readmitted before
the next inspection at ti+1.
Rearranging the terms of Eq. (2.17) implies the timing between inspections follows
a newsvendor-type solution:
ti+1   ti = F 1
 R ti
ti 1
g(k)f(ti   k) dk
g(ti)
!
(2.19)
The structure of Eq. (2.19) closely resembles the equation for the optimal stocking
quantity in traditional newsvendor problems. This highlights the inherent tradeo
between (1) scheduling checkups closer together to increase the likelihood of detecting
illnesses that develop between the checkups and (2) scheduling checkups farther apart
to have the opportunity to detect more illnesses by covering a wider span of time.
Both of these tradeos are inherently linked to the density of the delay-time function,
F . Thus, the distance between any two checkups is determined by a solution where
the delay-time density functions as the demand function.
It is worth noting that one can construct a recursive algorithm to solve the opti-
mization in light of Eq. (2.19). For instance, given t0 = 0 and t1, one can determine
t2 = t1 + F
 1
 R t1
t0
g(k)f(t1   k) dk
g(t1)
!
. Recursively, one can determine t3; :::; tn.
This reduces the problem to a univariate optimization where t1 is the only decision
variable. Moreover, an optimal solution must exist since we are maximizing a con-
tinuous function over a compact set. For the general case with stochastic delay-time
and imperfect checkups, our solution procedure utilizes this recursive construction
to generate the initial solution seeds.
If the solution to the FONCs is not unique, then one can solve the following
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univariate maximization to generate the optimal checkup policy.
max
t1
nX
i=1
E[N(t1)i ] (2.20)
s.t. t1 2 [0; T ] (2.21)
In this optimization problem, the checkup policy (t1) is drawn from a set of
potential candidates based on the FONCs:
(t1) = [t1; t2; :::; tn]
T (2.22)
=
266666666666666664
t1
t1 + F
 1
 R t1
t0
g(k)f(t1   k) dk
g(t1)
!
t2 + F
 1
 R t2
t1
g(k)f(t2   k) dk
g(t2)
!
...
tn 1 + F 1
 R tn 1
tn 2
g(k)f(tn 1   k) dk
g(tn 1)
!
377777777777777775
(2.23)
Remark II.6. The analyses in this section are based on the KKT conditions, which
assume (1) g has support on [0; T ]; (2) f has support on [0;1); and (3) g and f are
continuously dierentiable. It is worth highlighting that these results do not require
unimodality.
2.4.3 Eect of Imperfect Inspection Checkups on Optimal Checkup Timing
As previously mentioned, hospitals have various checkup methods available with
diering detection rates. Hence, it is valuable from both a practical and a theoretical
perspective to understand how the optimal timing of checkups is aected by the
detection rates of the checkups. For the purpose of exposition, we let r(i) 8 i 2
f1; :::; ng denote the detection rate of the checkup method employed at time ti. We
begin by considering the case where n = 2 and r(1) = r(2) = r. This yields the
following objective value
r
Z t1
0
g(k)[1 F (t1 k)] dk+(1 r)r
Z t1
0
g(k)[1 F (t2 k)]dk+r
Z t2
t1
g(k)[1 F (t2 k)] dk
(2.24)
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We can then derive FONCs as followsZ t1
0
g(k)f(t1   k) dk = g(t1) (F (t2   t1) + (1  r)(1  F (t2   t1))) (2.25)
(1  r)
Z t1
0
g(k)f(t2   k) dk +
Z t2
t1
g(k)f(t2   k) dk = g(t2) (2.26)
The intuition behind these equations are similar to the perfect checkup case in
Eq. (2.17) and (2.18). The LHS of Eq. (2.25) is the probability density of detecting
a condition that developed between 0 and t1, i.e. marginal rate of gain in terms of
detection. The RHS of Eq. (2.25) is the marginal density of missing a condition
developed after t1, i.e. loss sales. To see this, note the term g(t1)F (t2  t1) appears
and has the same intuition as in Eq. (2.17), i.e., the condition developed after t1
but the patient was readmitted before t2. However, the inspection at t2 could also
miss an extant condition due to the imperfect detection. This event is captured by
the term g(t1)(1   r)(1   F (t2   t1)), which implies the condition was detectable
at time t2 but failed to be detected. Eq. (2.26) represents the tradeo between lost
sales (RHS) and marginal change in detection (LHS). The RHS of Eq. (2.26) is the
marginal density of a condition developing at time t2, i.e. lost sales as before since
any conditions developing after t2 will not be detected. The rst term on the LHS
is the density of a condition being detectable at time t2 that developed on 0 to t1
and was missed by the inspection at time t1, i.e. the marginal change in detection
for conditions missed by the rst inspection. The second term on the LHS is the
probability density of detecting a condition that developed between t1 and t2.
Using the FONCs, we next show that as r increases, the two checkups move
farther apart. Hence, by improving the detection rate of a particular method, the
doctors should place inspections farther apart and can cover a larger time period
in which to catch potentially developing conditions. The intuition behind this is
that with a poor detection rate, a subsequent inspection can catch a condition that
was previously missed if placed closer to the previous inspection. This comes at
the expense of covering less overall timespan, as placing this inspection earlier will
miss the opportunity to catch later developing conditions. As the detection rate
increases, however, there is a smaller benet of catching conditions missed by a
previous inspection, since fewer patients are missed the rst time.
For the analysis, let t1 and t

2 be the optimal values of t1 and t2, respectively.
To show this property analytically, we rst introduce an inequality that relates the
probability densities of developing the condition and readmission.
Denition II.7. Assuming g and g are dierentiable, the delayed readmission log-
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likelihood inequality at time t is dened as d
dt
log g(t) =
g0(t)
g(t)
 d
dt
log g(t) =
g0(t)
g(t)
.
This inequality states that, at time t, the derivative of the log-likelihood of de-
veloping the condition is less than or equal to the derivative of the log-likelihood
of readmission. This is similar to previous results we have seen relating the den-
sity functions of time-to-develop the condition, , and time-to-readmission, . The
following remark shows that this condition holds for Erlang and exponential distri-
butions. The condition has been veried numerically for other distributions we use in
our numerical studies (see Table 2.3 in Section 2.5). As we shall see in our numerical
analyses, the shape of Erlang distributions resembles the observed time-to-develop
the condition, and an exponential distribution is actually the best t distribution for
the delay-time.
Remark II.8. If the time-to-develop the condition follows an Erlang distribution
with scale  and shape parameter k (Erlang(k; )), and the delay-time follows
Erlang(kD; ), then the time-to-readmission follows an Erlang(k; ) where k =
k + kD. The delayed readmission log-likelihood inequality becomes (k   1)t 1 
(k   1)t 1, which holds 8t > 0.
The following lemma shows that, as the detection rate increases, the rst inspec-
tion will be placed closer to the patient's time of discharge (i.e. moved earlier).
Lemma II.9. If the delayed readmission log-likelihood inequality holds, then t1 de-
creases in r.
Using this lemma, we now prove An increase in r causes the LHS of Eq. (2.25)
to become smaller than the RHS, so t1 is no longer optimal. After simple algebraic
manipulation of Eq. (2.25), r can be expressed in terms of t1 as:
r(t1) =
g(t

1) 
R t1
0
g(k)f(t

1   k) dk
g(t1)

1  F (t2   t1)

=
1
1  F (t2   t1)
 
R t1
0
g(k)f(t

1   k) dk
g(t1)[1  F (t2   t1)]
(2.27)
Dierentiating this function with respect to t1 yields
@r
@t1
=   f(t

2   t1)
[1  F (t2   t1)]2
 
R t1
0
g(k)f
0(t1   k) dk + g(t1)f(0)
g(t1)[1  F (t2   t1)]
+
f(t2   t1)
R t1
0
g(k)f(t

1   k) dk
g(t1)[1  F (t2   t1)]2
+
g0(t

1)
R t1
0
g(k)f(t

1   k) dk
g(t1)2[1  F (t2   t1)]
(2.28)
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Then, notice the following:
g(t

1) =
Z t1
0
g(k)f(t

1   k) dk (2.29)
g0(t

1) =
Z t1
0
g(k)f
0(t1   k) dk + g(t1)f(0) (2.30)
We are interested in the situation where the derivative in Eq. (2.28) is non-positive.
Plugging Eq. (2.29) and (2.30) into Eq. (2.28), this is equivalent to saying:
0    f(t

2   t1)
[1  F (t2   t1)]2
  g
0
(t

1)
g(t1)[1  F (t2   t1)]
+
f(t2   t1)g(t1)
g(t1)[1  F (t2   t1)]2
+
g0(t

1)g(t

1)
g(t1)2[1  F (t2   t1)]
(2.31)
Combining like terms, we have
0  f(t

2   t1)
[1  F (t2   t1)]2
g(t1)
g(t1)
  1

+
1
g(t1)[1  F (t2   t1)]
g0(t1)g(t1)
g(t1)
  g0(t1)

(2.32)
=) f(t

2   t1)
[1  F (t2   t1)]

1  g(t

1)
g(t1)

 1
g(t1)
g0(t1)g(t1)
g(t1)
  g0(t1)

(2.33)
Multiplying both sides by g(t

1) yields
g(t

1)  g(t1)
 f(t2   t1)
[1  F (t2   t1)]
 g
0
(t

1)g(t

1)
g(t1)
  g0(t1) (2.34)
From Eq. (2.25), it follows that g(t

1)  g(t1). Then, the LHS of Eq. (2.34) is
positive. Hence, it is sucient to show that the RHS of Eq. (2.34) is negative. That
is, it is sucient that
g0(t

1)g(t

1)
g(t1)
 g0(t1) ()
g0(t

1)
g(t1)
 g
0
(t

1)
g(t1)
(2.35)
The above inequality holds as a result of the delayed readmission log-likelihood in-
equality, which completes our proof.
Leveraging Lemma II.9, we next show that the gap, t1  t2, widens as r increases.
Notice that the optimal timing t1 and t

2 is the solution to the FONCs, i.e. Eq. (2.25)
and (2.26). For general delay-time and time-to-develop the condition distributions,
the FONCs are essentially a set of integral equations without a closed form solution.
In the following theorem, we consider the case where the delay-time is exponential
and the time-to-develop the condition is Erlang so that the time-to-readmission is in
closed form since the convolution of exponential and Erlang distributions is an Erlang
distribution. The structure and shape of the Erlang and exponential distributions
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are close to what is observed in practice through our numerical analyses (see Figure
2.7 in Section 2.5.1). With exponential-Erlang distributions, Eq. (2.26) eectively
becomes a polynomial where t1 can be directly expressed in closed form.
Theorem II.10 now shows, for the case of Erlang and exponential densities for 
and D, that the two tests move farther apart as the detection rate increases. This
result is later generalized in our numerical study.
Theorem II.10. If the time-to-develop the condition follows Erlang(k; ) and the
delay-time follows exponential(), then t2   t1 strictly increases in r.
We begin with the following technical lemma.
Lemma II.11. If the delayed readmission log-likelihood inequality holds, then
g(t)
g(t)
increases in t.
Proof.
@
@t

g(t)
g(t)

=
g(t)g
0
(t)  g(t)g0(t)
g2 (t)
(2.36)
=
g0(t)
g(t)
  g
0
(t)
g(t)
g2 (t)
g(t)g(t)
 0 (2.37)
The last inequality follows from the delayed readmission log-likelihood inequality.
Using this lemma, we now prove Theorem II.10.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume  = 1. For  6= 1, the problem can be
scaled. We then rewrite Eq. (2.26) as follows:
g(t

2)  g(t2) = r
Z t1
0
g(s)f(t

2   s)ds ,
e t

2t2
k
k!
  e
 t2t2
k 1
(k   1)! = r
Z t1
0
e t

2sk 1
(k   1)! ds
(2.38)
e t

2t2
k
k!
  e
 t2t2
k 1
(k   1)! = r
e t

2t1
k
k!
, t2k   kt2k 1 = rt1k (2.39)
, t1 =

t2
k   kt2k 1
r
 1
k
(2.40)
The rst and second derivatives of t1 with respect to t

2 are
@t1(t

2)
@t2
=
(t2   k + 1)

t2
k 1(t2 k)
r
 1
k
t2(t

2   k)
and
@2t1(t

2)
@t2
2 =  
(k   1)

t2
k 1(t2 k)
r
 1
k
t2
2(t2   k)2
(2.41)
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Based on the rst and second derivatives, we show that t1(t

2) has the following
properties: (1) t1 strictly increases in t

2; (2) t

1(t

2) is concave; (3) limt2!+1
@t1(t

2)
@t2
=
(1=r)
1
k > 1; and (4)
@t1(t

2)
@t2
> 1; 8t1; t2.
For (1), notice that (t2   k) has to be strictly positive for t1 2 R+. Hence,
@t1(t

2)
@t2
> 0, which implies t1 strictly increases in t

2. For (2), since (t

2   k) > 0, it
is clear that
@2t1(t

2)
@t2
2 < 0 for k > 1, integer. Hence t1(t

2) is concave. To see (3), for
k > 1 and r 2 (0; 1), we have
lim
t2!+1
@t1(t

2)
@t2
= lim
t2!+1
(t2   k + 1)

t2
k 1(t2 k)
r
 1
k
t2(t

2   k)
(2.42)
> lim
t2!+1
(t2   k)(t2k 1(t2   k))1=k
t2(t

2   k)

1
r
1=k
(2.43)
= lim
t2!+1

t2
k   kt2k 1
t2
k
1=k 
1
r
1=k
(2.44)
= lim
t2!+1

1  k
t2
1=k 
1
r
1=k
=

1
r
1=k
> 1 (2.45)
Finally, (4) follows from properties 2 and 3. Given the four properties above,
Figure 2.5 sketches t1(t

2) schematically.
0 k t
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2 t
∗
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t∗∗1
t∗1
Figure 2.5: Schematic Sketch of t1 as a Function of t

2
Consider optimal t1 and t

2 with detection rate r. As r increases, t

1 decreases
(Lemma II.9). By property 1, t2 also decreases. Denote the new optimal solution as
t1 and t

2 . As shown in Figure 2.5, since the slope of t

1(t

2) is always strictly greater
than one, it follows that t2   t2 < t1   t1 . Therefore t2   t1 > t2   t1 as desired,
which completes our proof.
Proposition II.12. Under the assumptions of Theorem II.10, if the detection rate
changes from r to r+; ( > 0), then the increase in the gap between the two checkups
is bounded above by 1  r (if k = 1) or 2(r + )k (if k  2).
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Proof. For Erlang-exponential distributions, Eq. (2.25) and (2.26) (FONCs) become:
et2(k   t1)  e t1kr =0 (2.46)
rt1
k =t2
k   kt2k 1 (2.47)
Suppose r increases to r+, from Theorem II.10, we know that t1 moves to t1 x; x >
0.
Suppose t2 moves to t2   y; y > 0, at the new optimum, Eq. (2.26) becomes:
rt1
k =t2
k   kt2k 1 (2.48)
(r + )(t1   x)k =(t2   y)k   k(t2   y)k 1 (2.49)
For k = 1, we have
(r + )x = y   t1 (2.50)
We would like to express x  y as a function of r and  then put lower and upper
bounds on it.
Lower bound: One trivial lower bound is x  y  0 (result of Theorem II.10)
(r + )x  y = t1 (2.51)
, (r + )x  (r + )y  t1 > 0 (2.52)
Upper bound: From Eq. (2.46) we know t1 < k = 1. Also, we know that x  t1.
So
(r + )x  y = t1 (2.53)
 y = t1   (r + )x (2.54)
x  y = x  (r + )x+ t1 (2.55)
x  y  (1  r   )t1 + tk  (1  r) (2.56)
For k  2:
(t2   k)tk 12 = rt1tk 11 (2.57)
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Since t2 > t1 and k  2, we have tk 12  tk 11 . Then
t2   k  rt1  rk (since t1 < k) (2.58)
t2  (r + 1)k (2.59)
Now we bound t1.
et2(k   t1)  e t1kr = 0 (2.60)
(k   t1)  e t1kr  0 (2.61)
(k   t1)  kr  0 (2.62)
(1  r)k   t1  0 (2.63)
t1  (1  r)k (2.64)
The bounds for t1 and t2 at the new equilibrium (i.e. t1 x and t2 y are optimal
for t+ ):
t2   y  (1 + r + )k (2.65)
x  t1   (1  r   )k (2.66)
Combine the two inequalities, we have
x  y   t1 + t2  2(r + )k (2.67)
Therefore, the desired upper and lower bounds are
0  x  y  2(r + )k (2.68)
In practical terms, checkups should be placed farther apart as the detection rates
improve. This is because when the detection rate is relatively low, there is a benet
to scheduling checkups that \overlap" each other in case a checkup fails to detect
an existing illness. However, this benet diminishes as the detection rate improves,
so the checkups spread farther apart from one another. This allows the checkup
schedule to cover a wider range of potential readmissions without losing detection
quality.
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2.4.4 From Theory to Practice: Implementable Policies from Modeling Insights
Through the prior analysis, we have captured the key factors aecting the e-
cacy of post-discharge checkup policies. To summarize the analytical insights of the
previous section into practical rules of thumb, we now illustrate how to design a
simple checkup policy for doctors and discharge planners. Suppose a patient is to be
discharged and a post-discharge follow-up plan needs to be determined by the case
manager. The case manager rst decides the aggressiveness of the follow-up plan,
i.e., how many oce visits and phone calls to use. This can be done by evaluating
the patient's readmission risk using existing risk calculators (Hu et al. (2014)). Given
the estimates of the time-to-develop the condition density curve and the delay-time
D (later in Section 2.5.1 we estimate the densities using historical data), the next
step is to determine the timing of checkups.
From the analyses in Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 and Proposition II.4, the checkups
should be placed approximately z days apart (z being the average delay-time) such
that the rst and the last checkups are at the same height on the time-to-develop the
condition curve (one on either side of the mode). Finally, from Theorem II.10, the
case manager adjusts the spacing of checkups according to the detection rate of the
checkups: higher detection rate spreads the checkups farther apart. For instance, the
case manager should make less frequent contact with the patient if he/she believes
that the patient was well educated for the diagnosis and understands what post-
operative complications might happen (this translates to a higher detection rate);
or the case manager may want to make frequent contact if he/she believes that
the patient is less responsive to phone calls or is less adherent to the follow-up
appointments (this translates to a lower detection rate). In the next section, we
generalize the analytical insights using numerical studies to deepen the understanding
of how to empirically estimate model parameters, of the impact of oce visit and
phone call sequencing, and of quantity versus quality of checkups.
2.5 Numerical Analyses
In this section, we conduct extensive numerical analyses on cystectomy readmis-
sions from a regional hospital as well as the national State Inpatient Database (SID)
to address the key questions that arise in post-discharge checkup policies: when to
schedule checkups, how many checkups to schedule, and what types of checkups to
schedule. First, we study two-checkup policies with one phone call and one oce
visit, which are consistent with current practice at our partner hospitals. We show
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that our approach improves the detection probability upon current practice by up
to 43.7% when applied to readmitted patients. We test the robustness of our model
with dierent exponential and gamma delay-time distributions. We also verify the
delayed readmission log-likelihood inequality dened in Section 2.4.3. Next, we ex-
amine more aggressive checkup plans with more checkups to develop insights into: (1)
optimal checkup timing and sequencing, (2) eects of varying the detection rate, and
(3) checkup quantity vs. quality. We then validate our work by applying the optimal
policies found to a dierent subset of patients and show that our results continue to
hold. We conclude this section by summarizing rules of thumb that can be easily
implemented by healthcare professionals to develop post-discharge checkup policies
that have the potential to improve detection of readmission causing conditions.
2.5.1 Data and Model Parametrization
The numerical analyses in this section are based on two datasets. The rst dataset
contains delay-time information of 327 cystectomy patients discharged from our part-
ner hospital between 2007 and 2012. The information in the dataset includes the
following: date of discharge from the hospital, date of rst contact with the health-
care provider after discharge, who initiated the contact, what the chief complaint
was, date of readmission, what condition caused the readmission, and when the
condition was rst experienced. By computing the dierence between the date of
readmission and date of condition onset, we obtain the delay-time for each patient
in this cohort. The data was manually collected by a medical student and a medical
fellow at our partner hospital by going over medical charts and reviewing each pa-
tient's triage notes upon readmission. This patient cohort consisted of 79 female and
248 male patients between 37 and 91 years old (mean = 65.9, standard deviation =
11.2). Among the 327 patients, 63 patients (19%) were readmitted within 30 days of
discharge. We used this database to obtain data on the delay-time random variable
and the time-to-develop the condition random variable. Note that we focus on the
readmitted patients only and exclude the patients who were not readmitted from
our analysis. We also ignore the intervention and prevention eect of the checkups a
patient received, which, at our partner hospital, typically included a phone call and
a follow-up oce visit on the 2nd and 12th day after discharge respectively.
We acknowledge there are many empirical challenges with this type of data and we
do not address them all in this chapter. One of the key challenges is the estimation
of the distributions. Since we only used readmitted patients in our estimation, it is
likely that the estimated distributions dier from the ones parameterized using all
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patients, including readmitted and non-readmitted patients. In addition, since we
ignored the intervention and prevention eect of existing checkups, our estimated
distributions could be biased. Next, we provide an initial approach addressing how
incorporating both readmitted and non-readmitted patients might aect our model's
performance. Notice that results presented in that appendix are obtained from a
limited case study on a very specic dataset. Nevertheless, empirical estimation is
not the primary focus of our study and the remaining empirical challenges are left
to future work.
At our partner hospital, current practice is to place a phone call on day 2 and an
oce visit on day 12 after discharge. These checkups could bias the data and results
as there could be endogeneity induced by current checkup practice. We considered
four types of patients in our chart review cohort: (1) patients who were not going to
be readmitted regardless of checkups and intervention (non-readmit-able patients),
(2) patients whose 30-day readmissions were detected and prevented by the day-2
and the day-12 checkups, (3) patients whose 30-day readmissions could have been
prevented if the checkups were placed on days other than day-2 or day-12, and (4)
patients who were going to be readmitted regardless of checkups and intervention
(unavoidable readmissions).
To include all four types of patients, we went back to the chart review data
set, which contained 327 cystectomy patients who underwent cystectomy at our
collaborating hospital. We believe that the cohort of 327 patients included the four
types of patients. Out of the 327 patients, 63 developed post-surgical conditions
that lead to a 30-day readmission. The 63 patients included in our original analyses
included type 3 and type 4 patients. The remaining 327 63 = 264 patients included
type-1 and type 2 patients, which were not readmitted and therefore not included in
our original analysis.
Of the remaining 264 patients, 236 of them developed a condition at some point
in their post-discharge recovery. The 264   236 = 28 patients that never developed
a condition were considered to be type 1 (not going to be readmitted regardless of
monitoring policy). Of the 236 patients that developed a condition at some point, 24
patients were found to have had a condition detected on either the day-2 or the day-
12 checkups as recorded on the medical chart. These 24 patients could have either
(1) developed a non-readmission causing condition (reason 1) or (2) could have devel-
oped a readmission-causing condition that was mitigated by the checkups (reason 2).
However, we do not have sucient data to distinguish between the two reasons. Let
q denote the proportion of reason 2 patients among the 24 patients. These patient
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could be considered as type 2 patients. We could estimate this proportion by looking
at those 236   24 = 212 patients who developed a condition but were not detected
on day 2 or day 12 by the current follow-up protocol. Out of those 212 patients, 63
patients (63=212 = 30%) were readmitted. This means that if we assume that the
characteristics of those 24 patients are same as the population (212 patients), and
that the checkups are perfect inspections that can prevent readmissions with proba-
bility one, then q can be estimated to be 30%. In reality, q may be smaller than 30%
(if the checkups are not perfect) and it may not prevent readmissions with probabil-
ity one; or q could be greater than 30% if patients who are found sick on day-2 and
day-12 are more likely to be readmitted than the population average is. Another way
to estimate q is to use the national average readmission rate of cystectomy (which
was observed to be 24% in the SID database). We conducted sensitivity analyses
around the proportion of type 2 patients at q = 25%; 50%; 75%; and 100%. Gamma
distributions were tted to these cohorts with q = 25%; 50%; 75%, and 100% of the
24 patients added.
Finally, we took the checkup policies obtained using the original gamma distri-
bution (types 3 and 4 only) and computed their objective values (suboptimal) by
plugging the computed policies into the gamma distributions that included patients
(simulated by adding q = 25%; 50%; 75%; and 100% of the 24 patients) type 2 pa-
tients. We then computed the dierence in objective values between the suboptimal
objective values and the optimal objective values (using the distribution that in-
cluded type 2 patients as our testbed) for checkup policies consisting of 1 to 3 oce
visits and 1 to 7 phone calls. As seen in the following table, by ignoring types 1 and
2 patients, the detection probabilities degraded by at most 3.5%. The most likely
value of q, according to our estimation, would be around 24%, which shows at worst a
very small dierence of 0.54% between the original checkup policy (from our simpler
model containing only types 3 and 4 patients) and the true optimal. We believe that
the small observed dierences are sucient to demonstrate that the results from our
simpler analysis with only types 3 and 4 patients should still be valid.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst study in the clinical or operational
literature to attempt to characterize these two variables using actual data. This
is because existing available datasets do not capture delay-time or time when a
readmission-causing condition developed. Due to data scarcity, we conducted our
numerical analysis using population-based distribution curves. Given sucient delay-
time data, our approach can be tailored to individual patients by applying transfer
learning techniques for personalized readmission forecasting (Helm et al. (2016)). We
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q 1 Phone Call 2 Phone Calls 3 Phone Calls 4 Phone Calls
1 Oce Visit
25%  0.42%  0.46%  0.48%  0.49%
50%  1.16%  1.25%  1.24%  1.24%
75%  1.96%  2.15%  2.20%  2.24%
100%  2.64%  2.90%  2.98%  3.05%
2 Oce Visits
25%  0.51%  0.54%  0.54%  0.51%
50%  1.34%  1.45%  1.40%  1.27%
75%  2.34%  2.51%  2.47%  2.33%
100%  3.17%  3.39%  3.33%  3.16%
3 Oce Visits
25%  0.49%  0.53%  0.52%  0.53%
50%  1.17%  1.32%  1.26%  1.26%
75%  2.22%  2.41%  2.37%  2.39%
100%  3.04%  3.28%  3.22%  3.25%
Table continued
q 5 Phone Calls 6 Phone Calls 7 Phone Calls
1 Oce Visit
25%  0.49%  0.49%  0.50%
50%  1.22%  1.18%  1.24%
75%  2.24%  2.22%  2.28%
100%  3.04%  3.02%  3.09%
2 Oce Visits
25%  0.51%  0.53%  0.52%
50%  1.24%  1.34%  1.29%
75%  2.31%  2.42%  2.38%
100%  3.14%  3.27%  3.23%
3 Oce Visits
25%  0.49%  0.49%  0.54%
50%  1.11%  1.14%  1.38%
75%  2.20%  2.22%  2.49%
100%  3.02%  3.04%  3.37%
Table 2.2: Dierence in Detection Probabilities
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demonstrate robustness of our optimal policies to distribution in Table 2.3 and the
analytical results from Section 2.4 are not dependent on the form of the delay-time
distribution. Further, the mean of the delay-time distribution observed in the data
(2.35 days) is very close to delay-time estimates for common readmission-causing
conditions in a survey given to an independent group of ve practicing surgeons
(average of 2 days). These cross-checks should help mitigate some concerns about
the accuracy of the estimation. We also tested the dependency between delay-time
and the time-to-develop the condition using the 63 readmitted patients from this new
data set. The correlation between the two variables is 0.14, and they are independent
(p-value < 0:05) using the Hilbert-Schmidt independence criterion (Gretton et al.,
2007). While data for this study was collected manually as a proof of concept, this
process could be appropriately scaled with IT support due to the proliferation of
electronic health records. This type of analysis, however, is left to future work.
The second dataset comes from the the State Inpatient Databases (SID), which
was gathered as part of the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project sponsored by
the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. From the SID dataset, we iden-
tied 717 cystectomy patients (ICD-9 code 577, 5771, and 5779) from the states of
Florida, Iowa, North Carolina, New York, and Washington that were readmitted
within 30 days of discharge in 2009 and 2010. As mentioned in Section 1, we choose
cystectomy patients as a proof of concept given that our clinical collaborator is an
expert in this type of surgery and that it has one of the highest readmission rates in
the U.S. Note that subsequent work by our collaborator's surgical research group in-
dicates the dynamics of cystectomy are similar to many other surgeries, particularly
lower torso/abdomen surgeries (Jacobs et al., 2017), and our clinical collaborator be-
lieves this approach would be broadly applicable in the surgery domain; this includes
surgeries targeted for inclusion in Medicare's readmission penalty program (HRRP).
To further verify that the unimodality assumption holds for other surgery cohorts,
we extracted the readmission records of patients who had some of the most com-
mon abdominal and chest surgeries in 2009 and 2010: Abdominal Aortic Aneurysm
Repair (AAA), Esophagectomy, Pancreatectomy, Aortic Valve Replacement (AVR),
Coronary Artery Bypass Grafting (CABG), and Lung Resection. In all six cases,
the time-to-readmission and the estimated time-to-develop the condition curves (es-
timated using readmitted patients) appeared to be unimodal (see Figure 2.5.1).
We excluded patients who had ICD-9 code 4411, 4412, 4413, 4415 or 4416, patients
who were 18 years old or younger, and patients who died during cystectomy or
during their inpatient stay. The SID database captures the length of time between
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Figure 2.6: Time-to-Readmission and Time-to-Develop the Condition Distributions for Six Major
Abdominal and Chest Surgeries
each patient's initial discharge and his/her subsequent readmission. Among the 717
patients, 385 patients from 2010 were used for parametrization and optimization of
the models, and 332 patients from 2009 were used to test the optimal policies. We
used the rst dataset to estimate the delay-time distribution and to validate the
ecacy of recovering the time-to-develop the condition distribution. To do that,
we started by tting distributions to the observed time-to-readmission (shown in
Figure 2.7(a)) and to the observed delay-time (shown in Figure 2.7(b)). Gamma
and exponential distributions worked well to model the time-to-readmission and the
delay-time, respectively.
Given the time-to-readmission and the delay-time distributions, we recovered the
time-to-develop the condition distribution through a numerical inverse Laplace trans-
form. Next, we describe the inverse Laplace transform in detail.
Clinical data used to parametrize the delay-time models is limited in the fact that
time-to-develop the condition is currently not recorded in any databases known to
the authors. The historical data most readily available is the time-to-readmission. To
obtain data on the delay-time, which is not recorded in any major clinical databases,
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Figure 2.7: Time-to-Readmission and Delay-Time Distribution Fitted from Medical Charts
Note. Time-to-readmission   gamma(1:74; 5:98), delay-time D  exponential(2:35)
we conducted a study of 327 medical records and extracted data on how long the
patient had been feeling ill before returning to the hospital based on triage notes upon
readmission. However, given the time-to-readmission distribution and the delay-time
distribution, we can obtain the time-to-develop the condition probability density on
larger databases by applying the inverse Laplace transform.
Recall that the time-to-readmission, , is the summation of the time-to-develop
the condition  and the delay-time D, i.e.,  = +D. Since  and D are assumed to
be independent, the Laplace transform of , Lfg(x)g(s), is equivalent to the product
of the Laplace transforms of  and D, i.e., Lfg(x)g(s) and Lff(x)g(s).
Lfg(x)g(s)Lff(x)g(s) = Lfg(x)g(s) (2.69)
Dividing both sides by Lff(x)g(s), we get the following expression for the Laplace
transform of the time-to-develop the condition, denoted by G(s):
Lfg(x)g(s) = Lfg(x)g(s)Lff(x)g(s) =: G(s) (2.70)
Applying the inverse Laplace transform L 1fg to both sides of Eq. (2.70), we
obtain the probability density function of the time-to-develop the condition:
g(x) = L 1fG(s)g(x) (2.71)
The inverse Laplace transform yields closed-form solutions for certain g()-f()
pairs such as Erlang-exponential and normal-normal. Given arbitrary g() and f(),
a closed-form solution may not exist. In such cases, numerical algorithms for inverse
Laplace transform (Avdis and Whitt, 2007; Rizzardi, 1995; Lyness and Giunta, 1986)
can be implemented.
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The numerical Laplace inversion tted the true time-to-develop the condition
well with a Pearson 2 p-value = 0:36. This validates the ecacy of recovering the
distribution of the time-to-develop the condition using inverse Laplace transform.
With an eective approach to recover the time-to-develop the condition, we ex-
panded our analysis to the SID database (which includes patients from many hospi-
tals across ve states). Using the 2010 SID patients, we tted a gamma distribution
to the time-to-readmission as shown in Figure 2.8. Since the delay-time information
was not recorded on the SID database, we assumed that the delay-time for the SID
patients followed the same distribution as the delay-time observed on patients at
our partner hospital (exponential(2:35)). We used the inverse Laplace transform to
estimate the time-to-develop the condition distribution (see Figure 2.8).
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Figure 2.8: Fitted Time-to-Readmission and Recovered Time-to-Develop the Condition for 2010
SID Patients
Note. Time-to-readmission   gamma(2:50; 4:80), time-to-develop the condition   gamma(1:81; 5:08)
2.5.2 Comparison of Policies Against Current Practice
With the model parameterized on the 2010 SID patients, we evaluated how our
policy improves upon the current practice at our partner hospital. We also examined
the robustness of our model by tting various exponential and gamma delay-time
distributions (see Table 2.3). The distributions tested in Table 2.3 satisfy the delayed
readmission log-likelihood inequality dened in Section 2.4.3.
The current practice for post-discharge monitoring at our partner hospitals is to
place a phone call on the 2nd day after discharge and an oce visit on the 12th day
after discharge. Throughout our numerical analyses, we assume that an oce visit
is a perfect inspection with detection rate r = 1; and a phone call is an imperfect
inspection with detection rate r = 0:6 (given the patient has developed a condition,
a phone call will detect the condition successfully with probability 0:6). These values
were estimated by our clinical collaborators. In Section 2.5.4, we perform a sensitivity
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analysis on the detection rate.
Applying the algorithm described in Section 2.3.2, we solve for the optimal 2-
checkup policies with one phone call and one oce visit (for fair comparison with
current practice) using the 2010 SID patients. We tested seven delay-time distri-
butions (see Table 2.3) with the same mean and dierent variance as a sensitivity
analysis, since the delay-time distribution is estimated based on a small sample of 63
patients and no other publicly available data set captured delay-time information.
Table 2.3 shows how our policy outperforms current practice by signicantly increas-
ing the probability that ill patients are detected before readmission (dened as the
detection probability). The relative improvement of the detection probability ranges
from 23.9% to 65.3% (average = 49%) for the exponential and gamma delay-time
distributions tested. This improvement is achieved solely by optimizing the timing
and sequencing of the two checkups. As we shall see in the following sections, the
detection probability further increases if we adopt more aggressive post-discharge
monitoring policies by increasing the number of checkups. However, we would like
to point out that the improvement is computed using readmitted patients only, which
represent 19% of the entire cohort. Hence, when taking both readmitted and non-
readmitted patients into account, the improvement might be smaller. As a sanity
check, we conducted simulations and veried that, under current practice, the sim-
ulated readmission rates predicted by our model were very close to the readmission
rates that were actually observed in the data (both around 20%).
Distribution Time of Time Detection Probability
Delay-time E[D] Var[D] First between Optimal Current Relative
Distribution Checkup Checkups 2-Checkup Practice Improvement
exponential(=2) 1.2 1.4 4.9 3.1 0.13 0.08 56.8%
exponential()* 2.4 5.5 5.9 4.4 0.23 0.16 43.7%*
exponential(2) 4.7 22.1 7.4 6.1 0.35 0.29 23.9%
gamma(1=2; 2) 2.4 11.0 6.5 5.0 0.20 0.15 30.8%
gamma(2; =2) 2.4 2.8 5.5 3.9 0.25 0.16 56.4%
gamma(3; =3) 2.4 1.9 5.3 3.6 0.26 0.16 62.1%
gamma(4; =4) 2.4 1.4 5.2 3.5 0.26 0.16 65.3%
Table 2.3: Optimal 2-Checkup for Exponential/Gamma Delay-Time Distributions)
Note. * marks the estimated delay-time distribution using our chart review data set. The timing of checkup (rounded
to the rst decimal place) is in days. In our numerical studies, we observed that the solutions are insensitive to
rounding of the checkup timing.
In Table 2.3, where the mean of the gamma distribution is held constant and the
variance is increased, we see that increased (gamma-distributed) delay-time variance
leads to greater spacing between checkups. The performance of the optimal policy
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also degrades as the (gamma-distributed) delay-time variance increases. This im-
plies that eorts at standardizing patients' behavior at home could have benets
for readmission reduction because it reduces the delay-time variance. This variance
eect is oset in the exponential case by the concurrent increase in mean delay-time,
which indicates that eorts to keep patient conditions from degrading too fast (e.g.
compliance with physician orders and adherence to medication), can also provide
signicant benet by allowing the healthcare provider time to detect the condition
before it becomes too severe. Note that our approach can be tailored to each pa-
tient's time to readmission characteristics, but because of data scarcity, it is dicult
tailor the delay-time. If there were sucient data, the delay-time could also be per-
sonalized using the same method used to personalize time to readmission predictions
(Helm et al., 2016).
2.5.3 Optimal Timing and Sequencing of Checkups: Timing outweighs sequencing
Next, we explore the delay-time-spaced block structure shown by Proposition II.4
and the optimal sequencing of checkups in a more generalized scheme involving four
to ten checkups in total with three oce visits. Though conducting ten checkups
within a 30-day period could be burdensome for both clinicians and patients, the
purpose here is to study 10-checkup policies as the extreme upper bound for the sake
of comparison and completeness, and further investigate the structure of checkup
policies and their timing and sequencing.
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Figure 2.9: Optimal n-Checkup Sequencing and Timing, n 2 f4; :::; 10g: Consecutive Perfect Check-
ups Appear around the Mode of g()
Note. Assumptions: D  exponential(2:35)); r of perfect checkups = 1, r of imperfect checkups = 0:6; the left axis
denotes the probability density; the right axis denotes the number of checkups. The detection probabilities are 0.40,
0.43, 0.46, 0.48, 0.50, 0.52, and 0.54 respectively (from bottom to top).
From Figure 2.9, we draw the following insights: (1) checkups are scheduled in
a contiguous block surrounding the mode of the time-to-develop the condition dis-
tribution with spacing approximately equal to the mean delay-time. Slightly wider
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spacing is observed around the perfect checkups and the spacing increases as the
probability of developing the condition decreases; and (2) consecutive perfect check-
ups are placed surrounding the mode of the time-to-develop the condition curve (i.e.
put the best checkups in the most hazardous period).
Although optimal policies favor consecutive perfect checkups around the mode, it
is sometimes impractical to schedule them consecutively in a short period of time;
particularly because many patients may live far from the hospital where their initial
treatment occurred, making frequent travel to the hospital dicult or impossible.
Fortunately, we nd that, as long as the timing is optimal, the policies are robust to
sequencing. That is, the gaps between the worst-case and the best-case sequences
for all policies in our test suite (1 to 10 checkups consisting of 0 to 3 oce visits and
phone calls) ranged between 0.2% and 0.5%, indicating that the timing of checkups
is much more important than the sequencing. One way to explain why sequencing is
less important is that the optimization will mimic a perfect checkup by scheduling
multiple imperfect checkups closer together. For example, three phone calls of de-
tection rate 0.6 (made at once) have an equivalent detection rate of 1  0:43 = 0:94.
We conjecture that, by striking a balance between the spacing of checkups and the
eective detection rate, the sub-optimal sequencing can mimic the behavior of the
optimal sequencing. The robustness to sequencing is a valuable property: as the
number of checkups increases, the number of permutations of checkup sequences be-
comes large (e.g. the 10-checkup policy in Figure 2.9 has
 
10
3

= 120 sequences),
requiring a signicant amount of computational power to obtain an optimal solu-
tion. Results from the sequencing analysis, however, generate near-optimal policies
by xing the checkup sequence that is convenient for the physician and the patient
and then optimizing the timing of checkups. This also allows for accommodating
physician and patient preferences with little degradation in performance.
Remark II.13 (Multi-modal time-to-develop the condition distributions). We test our
model numerically using a multi-modal time-to-develop the condition distribution
estimated using a Gaussian Kernel Density Estimator. We show that checkup policies
can still be solved numerically to optimality and the dierences in optimal detection
probabilities are within 2%.
To test the robustness of our model under a multi-modal distribution. We created
a counter-factual time-to-develop the condition distribution by simulating the time-
to-develop the condition of 63 patients according to the tted gamma distribution
presented in Section 2.5.1. Then, patients that may have been readmitted on day-12
but were not (possibly due to the current practice of following up with patients on day
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12) were added to the cohort. We simulated 24 patients who developed a condition
prior to day-12 based on the exponential delay-time distribution. A Gaussian Kernel
Density Estimator (KDE) with bandwidth 0.8 was used to t the time-to-develop
the condition distribution curve. The KDE distribution is shown in Figure 2.10.
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Figure 2.10: The Counter-Factual Multi-Modal Distribution Created by a Gaussian Kernel Density
Estimator
We studied the sequencing and timing of checkups. Solving for optimal n-checkup
(n = 4; :::; 10) sequencing and timing under a multi-modal distribution, we found that
the insights on sequencing and timing developed under the unimodality assumption
of Proposition II.4 did not hold in the multi-modal case as perfect checkups were no
longer placed consecutively. However, the policies were still robust to the sequencing
of checkups: the gaps between the worst-case and the best-case sequences for all
policies in this test suite (4 to 10 checkups consisting of 3 oce visits and 1 to 7
phone calls) were between 0.9% and 1.5%. Moreover, as can be seen in Table 2.5.1,
the optimal detection probabilities of these policies were close to the ones obtained
using the original gamma distribution.
Checkup Policy 1P3O 2P3O 3P3O 4P3O 5P3O 6P3O 7P3O
Optimal Detection Original Gamma 0.40 0.43 0.46 0.48 0.50 0.52 0.54
Probabilities KDE 0.39 0.42 0.45 0.47 0.50 0.51 0.53
Gaps b/t Worst Original Gamma 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.4% 0.3% 0.4%
and Best Cases KDE 1.2% 1.2% 1.3 % 1.5% 1.1% 0.9% 1.2%
Table 2.4: Comparison of Optimal Detection Probabilities (P=Phone Call, O=Oce Visit)
As the detection rate increased, we noticed that imperfect checkups were centered
around each mode and placed closer together. However, increasing the detection
rate did not necessarily widen the overall coverage area. Since the checkups were
scattered to cover the prominent modes, the overall coverage area was dictated by
the separation of the modes.
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2.5.4 Impact of Detection Rate on Timing: Greater Coverage with Better Checkups
In this section, we study the impact of varying the detection probability of an
imperfect checkup, r, and extend the insight drawn from Theorem II.10 using a
realistic potential monitoring schedule (according to our clinical collaborator) of one
oce visit and nine phone calls. While this scenario is more aggressive than current
practice, it is still reasonable because phone calls can be done cost-eectively using
nurses, trained technicians, or even automated call systems (see www.cloud9hcs.com
and Tagliente et al. (2016)). Results are presented in Figure 2.11.
In Figure 2.11, the spacing between checkups increases as the detection rate im-
proves. This aligns with Theorem II.10 and our intuition: more accurate checkups
can be spread farther apart; whereas less accurate checkups should be placed closer
together to account for the higher probability that the condition is missed by pre-
vious checkups. With more accurate checkups, the associated larger spacings will
cover a longer time period. Since checkups are scheduled less frequently, patients
and family members are less likely to be inconvenienced. For example, too much
contact may lead patients to become irritated, ignore phone calls, or not consider
questions as attentively. Another benet is that by covering a longer time period,
there is an increased ability to detect potentially developing conditions. Finally,
the extended monitoring period may help patients feel that they are receiving bet-
ter attention/care, which can build trust between the patient and clinician, thereby
improving patient satisfaction.
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Figure 2.11: Optimal Checkup Timings under Dierent Detection Rates
Note. Assumptions: D  exponential(2:35), number of checkups = 10. The detection probabilities are 0.31, 0.41,
0.50, 0.57, and 0.64 respectively (from bottom to top).
2.5.5 Marginal Benets of Increasing Checkup Quantity vs. Improving Checkup
Quality: Quantity Outweighs Quality
Since scheduling frequent follow-up oce visits will increase the burden on fre-
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quently heavily loaded clinician schedules (Baron, 2010) , in this section, we consider
the value of doing more phone calls as a substitute for oce visits. Importantly
for the clinical community, we nd that checkup quantity is more important than
quality; i.e. multiple phone calls function as a good substitute for oce visits.
In our rst experiment, we study optimal checkup policies that have a total num-
ber of checkups between one and ten with zero to three oce visits.
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Figure 2.12: Detection Probability of n-Checkup Policies with 0{3 Perfect Checkups
Note. Assumptions: D  exponential(2:35), r of perfect checkups = 1, r of imperfect checkups = 0:6
As shown in Figure 2.12, both increasing the number of checkups and increasing
the number of perfect checkups improves the detection probability. However, we nd
that adding one additional phone call is nearly as eective as switching one phone call
to an oce visit. In our test suite where 1 to 10 checkups consisting of 0 to 3 oce
visits and phone calls were optimized, scheduling one additional phone call increases
the detection probability by an average of 3.35% whereas replacing a phone call with
an oce visit (and rerunning the optimization) increases the detection probability
by 3.45%. We also calculated the minimum number of additional phone calls needed
to outperform replacing a phone call with an oce visit. Across our test suite, on
average, an oce visit (r = 1) can be replaced with 2.57 phone calls (r = 0:6).
Further, when the total number of checkups is less than ve, an oce visit can be
replaced with 2 phone calls.
This result is highly valuable from the practical perspective, as phone calls are
signicantly less resource-intensive than oce visits for both patients and physicians.
Notice that phone calls have numerous benets over oce visits: (1) patients may be
located far from the clinic and may have limited mobility and transportation options;
(2) making an oce visit is burdensome as the capacity of the clinic and physicians'
time are limited; and (3) making phone calls can be done eciently through special-
ized call centers or physicians' nursing or auxiliary sta in their spare time. The key
nding is that an eective checkup policy can leverage these inexpensive phone calls
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to achieve similar results as those obtained with the more expensive and inconvenient
oce visits.
2.5.6 The Benet of Improving the Ecacy of Phone Calls
One strong interest in eorts at readmission reduction lies in designing eective
questionnaires for phone and telemedicine checkups (see, for example, readmission
reduction startup company Cloud9, which has developed detailed questionnaires for
many conditions, www.cloud9hcs.com) and testing predictive models based on histor-
ical responses to survey questions. Design of such questionnaires to eectively target
the main causes of readmission (as an example for cystectomy, ve main conditions
account for almost all of the readmissions) can increase the detection probability of
a phone call. These questionnaires are particularly easy to implement if the call is
being conducted by someone who is not the physician or, or if it is conducted by
an automated call system. To determine the importance of such improvements and
subsequently the amount of eort that should be expended to perfect such surveys,
we analyzed the impact of the detection probability, r, on the ecacy of a monitoring
schedule.
Figure 2.13 shows that, as might be expected, the benet of replacing a phone
call with an oce visit diminishes as the detection rate improves. To analyze the
overall impact, we developed a test suite, where policies consisting of 10 checkups
with 0-3 oce visits were optimized. We incremented the detection rate from 0.2 to
0.8 (with a step size of 0.2), with 0.2 and 0.8 functioning as extreme lower/upper
bounds for the sake of comparison and completeness. We started by computing the
detection probability as a function of the detection rate of the phone calls. We then
estimated (1) the improvement in detection probability achieved by upgrading an
existing phone call to an oce visit; and (2) the improvement in detection probability
achieved by increasing the detection rate of the phone calls. Finally, we computed the
relative eectiveness of increasing the phone call detection rate by 20% (compared
to upgrading an existing phone call to an oce visit). A relative eectiveness of
100% means that increasing the phone call detection rate by 20% is as eective as
upgrading a phone call to an oce visit.
Across this test suite, on average, increasing the detection rate by 20% absolutely
(e.g. 0:2 ! 0:4) achieves 29% to 70% (average = 47%) of the benet achieved by
replacing a phone call with an oce visit. The following table shows the relative
eectiveness.
The relative marginal benet of increasing the detection rate is greater when the
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Figure 2.13: Detection Probability as a Function of the Detection Rate
Note. Assumptions: D  exponential(2:35) with 10 checkups
# of
Oce
Visits
Phone Call
Detection
Rate
0:2! 0:4 0:4! 0:6 0:6! 0:8
0! 1 58% 63% 70%
1! 2 41% 46% 50%
2! 3 35% 29% 31%
Table 2.5: Relative Eectiveness of Increasing Phone Call Detection Rate with respect to Replace-
ment of a Phone Call with an Oce Visit
detection rate is low and the number of oce visits is few (see Table 2.5). Notice
that the relationship is not linear (plausibly concave as shown in Figure 2.13). The
intuition is that the eort required to improve checkup policies increases as the
policies get more aggressive and eective.
The practical implication suggests that physicians can benet signicantly by
designing more eective phone call questionnaires, which may be used to help replace
excessive or burdensome oce visits. Increasing the detection rate of phone calls may
be achieved by providing patient education upon hospital discharge (e.g. informing
patients of symptoms that indicate worsening conditions), ensuring that the content
of post-discharge questionnaires are tailored as much possible to individual patients
and their personal characteristics (which can be identied with readmission risk
models at the time of discharge), and targeting high risk conditions (e.g. infection,
dehydration, kidney failure, failure to thrive) with focused questions.
2.5.7 Out-of-Sample Testing on a Separate Dataset and Solution Robustness
To validate and test our models, we parameterized our delay-time random variable
using the rst dataset from our partner hospital for radical cystectomy patients. We
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then estimated the time-to-readmission by tting a gamma distribution (best t)
to the 2010 SID dataset, also for radical cystectomy patients. Using our inverse
Laplace transform method, we were able to recover the distribution on the time-to-
develop the condition. Finally, we generated an optimal monitoring schedule based
on the dynamics obtained from combining our partner hospital delay-time data with
the 2010 SID readmission data. We then tested this policy on a new dataset, 2009
SID data, comparing our checkup times to the readmissions for cystectomy patients
across ve states in 2009. To do so, we consider two methods. In both methods, we
begin by determining the optimal policy with parameters estimated from 2010 SID
data. Method 1: We compare the performance of the optimal policy from 2010 data
when applied to a time-to-readmission curve estimated from the 2009 data versus
the policy that optimizes according to the true 2009 time-to-readmission curve. We
can then compare the optimality gap caused by errors in estimation of the time-to-
readmission curve. Method 2: We apply the 2010 optimal policy to all the cystectomy
patients from 2009 SID data and estimate the performance using each patient's actual
readmission time and calculating the probability that his/her delay-time was long
enough such that one of the inspections from our optimal policy would have caught
the condition before it caused a readmission.
Method 1 is shown in Figure 2.17. The detection probabilities range from 0.1
to 0.5 and are very close to the detection probabilities using a time-to-readmission
curve estimated with the 2009 data itself (in-sample). The absolute optimality gaps
were less than 5% (see Table 2.6).
# of
Oce
Visits
Total # of
Checkups
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0 1.4% 2.1% 2.4% 2.7% 2.9% 2.6% 2.9% 2.9% 2.7% 2.9%
1 2.4% 2.7% 2.9% 3.0% 2.8% 2.9% 2.8% 2.9% 2.8% 2.8%
2 N/A 3.0% 3.1% 3.0% 3.1% 3.1% 3.1% 3.1% 3.0% 2.6%
3 N/A N/A 3.2% 3.0% 3.2% 3.1% 2.9% 2.9% 2.8% 2.6%
Table 2.6: Absolute Optimality Gap for 2009 SID Patients Using n-Checkup Policies with 0-3 Per-
fect Checkups that Were Parameterized Using 2010 SID Patients
We also calculated the relative optimality gaps and switched the testing and
training sets to further validate the ndings (see Figures 2.5.7, 2.5.7, 2.5.7, 2.5.7.
The largest relative optimality gaps were observed in one-checkup models, which
are not advisable in practice. As the number of checkups increases, the relative
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optimality gap diminishes. This indicates that the model becomes more robust as
the number of checkups increases, providing more support for the idea that quantity
of checkups is highly important. Practically speaking, not only does larger quantity
eliminate the need for excessive oce visits, it also increases the robustness of the
solution to errors in estimation.
Figure 2.14: Fitted Time-to-Readmission and Recovered Time-to-Develop the Condition for 2009
SID Patients
Figure 2.15: Detection Probability of Checkup Policies with 0-3 Perfect Checkups for 2009 SID
Patients.
Method 2 assumes independence between delay-time and time-to-readmission.
Let T be the time that the patient was actually readmitted (in the data). The
detection probability, D^, can then be calculated using the following formula. Let
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Figure 2.16: Detection Probability of Checkup Policies with 0-3 Perfect Checkups (Developed Using
2009 SID Patients) Tested on 2010 SID Patients (Method 1)
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Figure 2.17: Detection Probability of Checkup Policies with 0{3 Perfect Checkups Tested on 2009
SID Patients (Method 1)
N = argmaxn : tn  T .
D^ =r1  (1  F (T   t1)) (2.72)
+
NX
=2
 
r 
 
 1Y
=1
(1  r)
!
 (1  F (T   t1))
!
(2.73)
+
NX
=3
 
 1X
=2
 
r 
 1Y
=
(1  r)  (F (T   t 1)  F (T   t))
!!
(2.74)
+
NX
=2
(r  (F (T   t 1)  F (T   t))) (2.75)
where the four summands collectively represent the total probability of detecting
the patient as ill during every scheduled checkup. In particular, the rst summand
(2.72) represents the probability that the patient enters the ill state before the rst
checkup and is successfully identied as ill during the rst checkup. The second
summand (2.73) represents the probability that the patient becomes ill before the
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rst checkup, but checkups 1 through (   1) fail to properly detect the patient
condition and checkup  2 f2; :::; Ng successfully identies the patient as ill. The
third summand (2.74) represents the probability that the patient becomes ill between
checkups (   1) and  for  2 f2; :::; (   1)g, but is not properly identied as
being ill until checkup  2 f3; :::; Ng. The fourth summand (2.75) represents the
probability that the patient enters the ill state between checkups (  1) and , and
is immediately identied as being ill during checkup  2 f2; :::; Ng.
Method 2 evaluates how well the optimal policy would have performed in practice
if implemented on the radical cystectomy patients from the 2009 SID data. Figure
2.18 presents the results of this study, indicating that the optimal policies estimated
from 2010 SID data would in fact have been highly eective if put into practice
on the patients of the out-of-sample dataset. In particular, the estimated detection
probabilities (based on actual readmission times) are greater than 60% using one
or more perfect checkups on the 2009 SID patients. It is worth highlighting the
dierence between Methods 1 and 2 (i.e. Figure 2.12 vs Figure 2.18): in Figure
2.12, we were plotting the objective function, which is parameterized with gamma
and exponential distribution curves tted from the training data set. Whereas in
Figure 2.18, we were plotting a dierent objective, which uses the actual time to
readmission observations combined with the delay-time distribution function plus
the discrete observations.
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Figure 2.18: Proportion of Conditions Captured by the Optimal Policy with 0-3 Perfect Checkups
Obtained Using 2010 SID Patients and Tested on 2009 SID Patients (Method 2)
This improved performance seems to stem from the fact that the true time-to-
readmission for cystectomy patients tends to be more heavily front-loaded in the
rst 7-8 days than the tted gamma distribution. Another fact that contributed
to this higher performance is that the time to readmissions we used are in days
(discrete) rather than time (continuous). Using discrete data created a lumping
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eect and lead to improved performance. We are unable to use the exact time of
readmission (continuous data) to validate our model as it is protected information
and could be used to identify patients. Moreover, since the optimal policies tend to
also bunch a number of checkups soon after patient discharge, this policy ends up
actually detecting more conditions in practice that would have been estimated by
the tted gamma distribution for time-to-readmission.
As a further benet revealed by this study (seen in Figure 2.18), it appears that
one oce visit along with a few phone calls is sucient to capture much of the value
of post-discharge checkups. This is good news for busy clinicians concerned about
the added burden of increased checkups.
2.5.8 Design of Practical Post-discharge Checkup Policy
Combining the insights drawn from our analytical and numerical analyses, we
provide the following rules of thumb to facilitate the design of post-discharge checkup
policies.
• Timing of checkups outweighs sequencing: (1) schedule checkups in a
block surrounding the most-likely time (mode) of developing a condition; (2)
keep the time between checkups close to the expected delay-time; (3) oce visits
should be scheduled near the time of highest risk of readmission for the patient.
• Cover a longer time period and reduce oce visits with better check-
ups: Improving the quality of phone call checkups (e.g. better questionnaires,
patient education) allows the checkup team to (1) cover a longer time period
with less frequent calls (better for patients and detects more potential condi-
tions), (2) reduce the number of oce visits without reducing readmission de-
tection (better for patients, clinicians, and healthcare organizations). Further,
helping to standardize patient behavior at home, thereby reducing delay-time
variance, has added detection benets.
• Quantity of checkups outweighs quality: Multiple imperfect checkups
serve as a good substitute for oce visits; i.e., making more phone calls can
be nearly as eective as replacing a few phone calls with oce visits. Further,
the larger the quantity of checkups, the more robust the solution is to errors in
estimation/optimization.
In practice, hospitals could use the following steps to design better post-discharge
monitoring policies: (1) estimate the time-to-develop the condition and the delay-
time; (2) design an eective phone call questionnaire; (3) schedule checkups in a
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block with spacings approximately equal to the mean delay-time; (4) schedule oce
visits (perfect checkups) close to the time at which patients are at the highest risk of
readmission; (5) spread phone calls farther apart from each other to cover a longer
time period with improvements on the phone call questionnaires.
2.6 Discussion and Conclusion
In this study, we address the prevalent issue of hospital readmissions that con-
cerns healthcare professionals, hospital patients, and policy-makers. We propose an
analytical model based on delay-time analysis to design more eective post-discharge
checkup policies for individual patients. Key results from our model not only pro-
vide theoretical extensions of the traditional delay-time analysis framework, but also
important insights for healthcare decision-makers designing post-discharge checkup
policies. By simultaneously optimizing with respect to multiple factors such as the
number of checkups, the timing of checkups, and the types of checkup methods used,
our model demonstrates signicant improvements over current practice. Using the
same number of checkups, current practice (which detects only 16% of the conditions
experienced by readmission-bound patients) can be improved up to 23%, a relative
improvement of 43.7%.
Future extensions upon this research may involve examining the benet of detect-
ing illnesses as early as possible. The current model assumes equal benet from all
early illness detections, however, it may be valuable to assign more benet to earlier
detections as they may result in less burden on the patients. Similarly, the current
model also assumes that checkups have constant detection rate over the duration of
a patient's readmission-causing condition. It may be valuable to examine the eect
of time-dependent detection rate of phone calls, for example, the detection rate
becomes higher as the patient has had the condition for a longer time. Another
extension is to jointly optimize discharge (inpatient) and post-discharge (outpatient)
decisions as the timing of discharge can aect readmission risk (Kelly et al., 2015;
Rosen et al., 2017). While parameterizing our model with real data, we realized that
empirical estimation could be challenging as our model requires two distributions
(time-to-develop the condition and delay-time) as the input. One of the key empir-
ical challenges is the issue of censoring, as we only utilized data within the nite
30-day readmission penalty window. In addition, patients have dierent intrinsic
readmission risk: while some patients would not be readmitted, other patients would
be readmitted regardless of post-discharge monitoring and interventions. Though
the two distributions (and data beyond 30-day follow-up) are not widely available
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currently, we believe that our analysis will motivate the documentation and utiliza-
tion of the delay-time and time-to-develop the condition information. We leave to
future work the personalized delay-time and time-to-develop the condition forecast
as well as more robust empirical estimation that considers the censorship of data.
The application of our model and ndings has the potential for broad impacts
including reduced hospital readmissions, improved quality of patient care, improved
patient satisfaction, and reduced healthcare costs, all without overburdening clini-
cians (as clinician burden is often a major barrier to implementation of new health-
care practices). This is achievable by aligning checkup policy design with a number
of key insights, namely: timing of checkups is the most important factor, checkup
timing should be adjusted according to checkup detection rates, and checkup quan-
tity is more important than checkup quality. At the same time, our model presents
unique extensions to the traditional delay-time analysis framework by allowing for
a time-varying failure rate and inhomogeneous detection rate. Thus, our model ex-
tends the scope of delay-time modeling and provides new insights into the structure
of these types of problems. This ultimately broadens the scope of problems in which
delay-time analysis can be applied.
Tested on an out-of-sample dataset containing 332 patients from the states of
Florida, Iowa, North Carolina, New York, and Washington, our results demonstrate
robustness, with absolute optimality gaps within 5%. As the number of checkups
increases, the robustness further increases as the optimality gaps diminish. Our
clinical collaborators have shown great interest in implementing our models and look
forward to putting them through clinical testing. Going beyond cystectomy patients,
the new framework developed has the potential to signicantly reduce readmissions
from a variety of surgical procedures, thereby improving the quality of patient care
and decreasing healthcare costs.
CHAPTER III
Balancing Pre- and Post-Discharge Eorts
ABSTRACT: We developed a two-stage, Strengthen-then-Maintain framework
for reducing hospital readmissions in the continuum of care spanning pre- and post-
discharge. For the Markov Decision Process in the maintain stage, we develop a
closed-form approximation for the cost-to-go with a theoretical accuracy bound which
can then be used to understand the structure of the integrated two-stage framework.
We apply this model to study 1) how a hospital balances readmission reduction eorts
between pre- and post-discharge to minimize the cost of an episode of care and 2)
how a healthcare funder designs a bundled payment and readmission penalty policy
to incentivize readmission reduction. We specically consider three policy levers:
readmission penalty, treatment cost, and the length of the window of time that
hospitals are responsible for readmissions (episode/penalty window). We provide
a simple closed-form sucient condition that captures the impact of these levers
on the scope and ecacy of hospital readmission reduction programs. We nd the
episode/penalty window to be a major driver, which has yet to be purposefully
employed by payers. Specically, the length of the 30-day penalty window and 90-day
bundled payment episode may be too long to incentivize readmission reduction for
any but the low risk patients (which have little impact on overall readmission rate),
even under additional penalty or subsidy. This may be an explanation for stalled
readmission reduction after the implementation of the 30-day Medicare readmission
penalty program, HRRP. Though payers want long windows to ensure hospitals cover
as many readmission candidates as possible under reduction programs, long windows
lead to smaller programs as hospitals \give up" on risky patients, whereas shortening
this window can in fact encourage hospitals to expand readmission programs to
include more and riskier patients.
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3.1 Introduction
Hospital readmissions are burdensome and costly to the U.S. healthcare system.
One in ve Medicare Fee-For-Service patients were readmitted within 30 days of
discharge (Jencks et al., 2009), and as much as 75% of readmissions have been deter-
mined to be preventable (Benbassat and Taragin, 2000). Reducing these preventable
readmissions can save up to $25 billion for the U.S. healthcare system (PwC Health
Research Institute, 2010). To incentivize hospitals to reduce readmissions, the Cen-
ters for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) have established the Hospital Read-
missions Reduction Program (HRRP) to penalized hospitals with excessive readmis-
sion rates. Moreover, the CMS has been experimenting with dierent reimbursement
schemes, such as Pay-For-Performance (P4P) and Bundled Payments (BP), to pro-
vide further nancial incentives for hospitals to reduce readmissions. Nonetheless,
avoiding readmissions is still challenging both clinically and nancially, and it is un-
clear whether the new payment structures oered by BP, P4P and penalty programs
will be sucient to incentivize further progress.
The battle against readmissions requires hospitals to exert readmission reduction
eort in two phases of care: pre-discharge (during the inpatient stay) and post-
discharge follow-up (after the patient has left the hospital). For instance, a hospital
can extend the length of stay (LOS) to further stabilize a patient's condition and/or
can perform follow-up checkups and treatments after the patient has been discharged.
Though proven eective, these readmission reduction eorts can be overly costly. For
example, the Reengineered Hospital Discharge Program (Project RED) conducted
a randomized clinical trial and found that \the cost of the (readmission reduction)
intervention (...) involved 0.5 full-time equivalent for a nurse and 0.15 full-time equiv-
alent for a clinical pharmacist. If adopted broadly, this intervention could produce
substantial eects on health care nancing." (Jack et al., 2009). Due to the nan-
cial burden of the required eorts and investments, the momentum of readmission
reduction has stalled since the implementation of the HRRP, as reported in a JAMA
study (Desai et al., 2016).
To provide stronger readmission reduction incentives, the CMS is gradually shift-
ing its reimbursement schemes from Fee-For-Service to Pay-For-Performance and
Bundled Payment. Among these reimbursement schemes, the Bundled Payment is
believed to be most eective at providing incentives to reduce readmissions (Andrit-
sos and Tang, 2018; Guo et al., 2016). In 2013, the CMS established the Bundled
Payment for Care Improvement (BPCI) Initiative. Under BPCI, a hospital receives
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a bundled payment for all costs incurred during an episode of care. Specically,
Model 2 of BPCI denes an episode of care to be \the inpatient stay in an acute care
hospital plus the post-acute care and all related services up to 90 days after hospi-
tal discharge" (CMS, 2018a), including readmissions. Although a BP policy would
provide stronger incentives for readmission reduction, the design of an eective BP
policy still requires further investigation.
As a policymaker, the CMS faces challenging decisions when designing the BP pol-
icy and readmission penalty programs to properly incentivize readmission reduction.
If the cost (plus penalty) of a readmission is too little, hospitals may be unmotivated
to take action. If the costs of readmission reduction measures (e.g., extended LOS
and intensive post-discharge follow-up care) are too expensive, hospitals may give
up. In addition to the cost and penalty structures, the length of the readmission
penalty window and length of an episode of care also play an important role. A
New England Journal of Medicine article (Joynt and Jha, 2012) argued that hos-
pitals have little control over readmissions that occur more than seven days after
discharge, therefore policymakers should consider limiting the readmission penalty
window. Besides the readmission time frame, further complicating the matter are
factors such as the variation in the baseline readmission risk among surgical cohorts
(e.g., total joint arthroplasty has a 4% 30-day readmission rate while cystectomy
has a 25% one), the pathological nature of the complications that cause readmis-
sions (infection, organ failure, heart attack, etc.), and the various eectiveness of the
post-discharge treatments in preventing readmissions.
This chapter studies the policy-level decisions driven by the operational factors
that are critical to a hospital's readmission reduction. We study key policy-level de-
cisions such as designing readmission penalty programs, subsidizing post-discharge
follow-up treatments, and shortening/extending the length of an episode and the
readmission penalty window length. We consider these factors in the context of the
CMS's BPCI program { \Model 2 and Model 3 involve a retrospective bundled pay-
ment arrangement where actual expenditures are reconciled against a target price
for an episode of care" (CMS, 2018a). To study policy-level decisions, we study how
a hospital may allocate readmission reduction eorts between the pre- and post-
discharge stages of care. In the pre-discharge stage, the hospital exerts eort to
reduce the readmission risk of a patient cohort. In the post-discharge stage, the hos-
pital provides post-discharge follow-up care to the patient cohort whose readmission
risk is determined by the pre-discharge eorts. This integrated two-stage framework
enables us to analytically study the design of an eective bundled payment policy to
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align incentives.
This two-stage framework, which we call the Strengthen Then Maintain (STM)
framework, is applicable to a set of machine maintenance problems beyond read-
mission management. In the strengthening stage, a machine is strengthened so that
its failure rate is reduced. In the maintaining stage, the failure rate (determined
by the strengthening eorts) is exogenous and the machine is (ad-hoc) repaired if
defects appeared. If not repaired promptly, the machine could result a catastrophic
failure. An example of such problems can be an aircraft maintenance problem { in
the strengthening stage, an airline company performs (downtime) maintenance for
an aircraft, which reduces the failure rate. In the maintaining stage, the aircraft
is in operation, ad-hoc repairs are provided at the destination airports. Our model
uncovers valuable managerial insights into this type of maintenance problems.
3.1.1 Contributions
• Theoretical. This chapter makes theoretical contributions to the reliability
literature. We develop a novel Strengthen Then Maintain (STM) framework
and study how a decision maker balances eorts between the strengthening
stage and the maintaining stage. The maintaining stage is modeled as a discrete-
time nite-horizon Markov Decision Process (MDP). We provide a closed-form
expression for the cost-to-go for the machine maintenance MDP. Our approach
does not require a parametric failure rate distribution { for an arbitrary (non-
stationary) failure rate, we prove a theoretical accuracy bound for the closed-
form cost-to-go under an arbitrary optimal policy. By studying the closed-form
expression analytically, we show that the cost-to-go is aected by the failure
rate at an asymptotically linear rate. By integrating the strengthening and
maintaining stages, we provide a simple closed-form sucient condition for a
policy to incentivize the reduction of the failure rate (i.e., readmission rate).
The analytical results of the STM framework can be generalized to machine
maintenance problems with two distinct stages.
• Practical. We also uncover novel insights for designing an eective Bun-
dled Payment policy for readmission reduction. Our analytical results suggest
that hospitals have more nancial incentives if the readmission penalty win-
dow is shortened, the cost of post-discharge follow-up treatment is reduced, the
cost/penalty of readmission is increased, and the post-discharge treatment e-
cacy is improved. For patients that are likely to experience acute events leading
to a swift readmission, a more eective mechanism is to shorten the penalty
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window. For other cohorts, subsidizing inpatient and outpatient eorts may be
eective. We believe that our model is the rst study that analytically addresses
how the penalty window length impacts the incentives for readmission reduction.
Unlike many game-theoretical studies which use stylized functional forms, our
model is less restrictive with minimal assumptions imposed on the functional
form. At the core of our model is a Markov Decision Process model, which
directly captures the patient's pathological deterioration and the cost/penalty
structures.
The practical implications of this chapter add valuable insights to Bundled Pay-
ment and readmission penalty policy design. As a proof of concept, we develop
and validate our models using clinical data collected from bladder patients un-
dergo cystectomy. We found that 90-day and 30-day windows may not provide
readmission reduction incentives suciently for high-risk surgery cohorts. Our
study suggests that 14-day window would be robust in incentivizing readmis-
sion reduction, even if post-discharge treatments are inecient and the ecacy
is low.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 gives a brief re-
view of the relevant literature. In Section 3.3, we give an overview of the modeling
framework, which consists of a pre-discharge stage and a post-discharge stage. The
post-discharge stage model is introduced in Section 3.4 and the pre-discharge stage
model is introduced in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 studies the balance of eorts between
the two stages. The policy implications are discussed in Section 3.7. In Section
3.8, we conduct numerical studies using institutional data from patient undergo cys-
tectomy. Section 3.9 discusses some practical considerations and limitations of our
policy recommendations and potential future works. Finally, Section 3.10 concludes
the chapter.
3.2 Literature Review
This work lies at the junction of disease screening/monitoring and healthcare
payment/contract policy. Four streams of literature are relevant to this chapter: 1)
reliability; 2) disease monitoring and screening; 3) readmission management studies
in the operations management literature; and 4) the healthcare payment/contract
studies that aim to align incentives for better health outcomes. We provide a brief
overview of these four streams of literature.
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1) Reliability. In the reliability literature, many machine maintenance models
assume that once a machine fails, it can be repaired or replaced and it will resume its
normal operations. Hence, these models focus on minimizing the long-run cost and
downtime in a steady-state (innite horizon) setting (Wang, 2002). These models are
thus not suitable for our problem as we consider a nite period of time (due to the
nite nature of an episode of care, by denition). Our problem also considers failures
to be catastrophic, since readmission is a major adverse health event and may require
intensive treatments. Few papers, such as Ozekici and Pliska (1991) and Milioni and
Pliska (1988), study maintenance policies with catastrophic failures. However, most
models focus on \maintenance" only { they do not study the \strengthening" stage
where the failure rate can be reduced.
A relevant stream of literature studies maintenance under warranties. These stud-
ies are close to our work, as the manufacturer is responsible for all repair costs within
a warranty (see Shaee and Chukova (2013a) for a literature survey). In particular,
models have been created to study used item upgrades/refurbishments and warranties
{ before selling the item, the manufacturer can spend money to upgrade/refurbish the
item to reduce the failure rate. Among these models, Shaee and Chukova (2013b)
is one of the rst that studies how the seller of a used item can spend eorts to
upgrade an item, so that the failure rate is reduced and the warranty service cost is
consequently reduced. Our model is dierent from this stream of literature in the
following ways: 1) We aim to study the policy-level decisions where a policymaker
(the CMS) makes a policy and an agent (the hospital) responds to the policy; while
reliability models typically have only one decision maker { the seller, whose goal is to
maximize prots. 2) Our model does not force the seller to provide warranty mainte-
nance when it is economically not viable to do so (due to high costs). In particular,
we allow a hospital to adopt an engaged policy or a disengaged policy, whichever is
cheaper, depending on the cost and penalty structure and the patient's risk charac-
teristics. The goal of our model is to incentivize (not to force) \upgrade/refurbish"
behaviors via policy levers. 3) Reliability models often assume specic failure dis-
tributions (e.g., Weibull) but our model can handle arbitrary distributions with a
proven accuracy bound.
2) Disease Monitoring and Screening. Many models have been studied for
the prevention and treatment of chronic diseases such as cancer, hepatitis, and glau-
coma (Ayer et al., 2012; He et al., 2016; Helm et al., 2015). These models optimize
prevention and treatment decisions based on continuous and/or categorical variables
that are well-established clinical studies of these diseases. Examples include the
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Intra-ocular Pressure (continuous) of a glaucomatous eye and the METAVIR brosis
score (categorical) of a hepatitis patient. Unlike these models, our problem focuses
on modeling the post-discharge deterioration and readmission of a patient after the
patient leaves the hospital, where little to no clinical information is observed while
the patient is away from the hospital. Hence, we model the disease deterioration
using three discrete states (healthy, sick, and readmitted), similar to many studies
in existing literature (Helm et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2018a).
Some papers in the healthcare management literature consider the \strengthen-
ing" eect of inpatient care. For example, Andritsos and Tang (2018) models the
health outcome as a co-production process. Zhang et al. (2016) and Adida et al.
(2016) also model the readmission risk reduction eect of a hospitalization. We fol-
low the literature and model the cost of \strengthening" eorts in a stylized way,
without specic functional form assumptions. The novelty of our model is that we
link the strengthening stage to a more structured MDP model that captures key
operational factors in the post-discharge monitoring practice.
3) Readmission Management. Many clinical studies have found eective
methods to reduce hospital readmissions. These methods include patient education,
pre-discharge assessment, domiciliary aftercare, and post-discharge follow-up care.
(Benbassat and Taragin, 2000; Wong et al., 2013). In the operations management
literature, scholars have studied readmissions empirically and analytically. Kim et al.
(2014) and Chan et al. (2012) studied how admission and discharge strategies of ICU
admission aects readmission rates respectively. Chen et al. (2018) builds a read-
mission prediction model that incorporates latent heterogeneity using claims data.
Bayati et al. (2014) developed a readmission prediction model and analyzed post-
discharge intervention decisions. Helm et al. (2016) built a readmission prediction
model and optimized stang decisions for post-discharge follow-up appointments.
Related to our work is Zhang et al. (2016), where the HRRP program was ana-
lyzed from a game theoretic approach. The authors studied single-year, multi-year,
and two-hospital games to analyze the nancial incentives under HRRP. Moreover,
their model considers readmission reduction eort at a high level of abstraction (not
detailing the operational tactics) and does not focus on the operational interplay
between pre- and post-discharge eorts. Our model is dierent from these models as
these models do not capture the eect of post-discharge follow-up care. Moreover,
we believe we are the rst to analytically study the eect of the readmission penalty
window length.
4) Healthcare Payments and Contracts. Many papers studied the design of
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eective healthcare payment policies and contracts to align incentives for better care
and health outcome. Some recent works include Adida et al. (2016); Andritsos and
Tang (2018); Guo et al. (2016); Aswani et al. (2017); Bastani et al. (2016); Adida
and Bravo (2018). Within this domain, a stream of literature takes a game-theoretic
approach. Guo et al. (2016) is at the intersection between payment policy and
hospital operations management. They studied a three-level game with an M/M/1
queue embedded to analyze incentives. Andritsos and Tang (2018) models the health
outcome (readmissions) as a co-production process by the hospital and the patient.
They studied the equilibria under FFS, P4P, and BP schemes. In their model,
the hospital exerts eort in the inpatient stay stage only { it does not consider post-
discharge outpatient treatments that can potentially avert readmissions. Close to our
work is Adida et al. (2016), where the model consists of a rst-stage (inpatient-stay
stage) cost and a second-stage (post-discharge stage) cost. They assumed that the
second-stage cost of follow-up is independent of the rst stage cost. In our model, the
two costs are interlinked by the readmission risk as a surrogate for the eort. This is
an important distinction, since the operations management literature indicates that
the ecacy of follow-up programs is strongly dependent on the patient risk at time
of discharge (Helm et al., 2016), which is what is controlled in the inpatient stage.
3.3 Modeling Framework Overview
The overarching goal of this chapter is to study the design of an eective BP
policy. To achieve this, we study the behavior of a hospital under a BP policy to
infer policy-level implications for BP policy design. An overview of the framework
is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
At the provider level, we study how a hospital behaves when it minimizes the cost
of a T -day episode of care under a BP policy. In particular, we seek to understand
what would entice a hospital to engage in readmission reduction in both the pre-
and post-discharge stages. In the pre-discharge stage, the hospital invests CS() to
reduce a patient's readmission risk to  from a baseline 0 (see Denition III.2). A
lower readmission risk  requires greater eort and thus a greater CS(). This may
involve clinical interventions such as administering advanced treatments and extend-
ing the LOS for further observation and stabilization. In the post-discharge stage,
the hospital provides outpatient follow-up care for the patient whose readmission
risk is . The two stages are interlinked by the readmission risk  as we assume
that the post-discharge readmission risk is a result of the pre-discharge eorts.1 The
1We assume that the readmission risk can only be reduced during the index hospitalization. This is not a
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Hospital
Pre-Discharge Index
Hospitalization
Post-Discharge
Follow-Up Readmission
Exerts effort to reduce
readmission risk to ρ
($) costs CS(ρ)
Post-Discharge (Maintaining) Cost
CM(ρ)
Treat to avert readmissions
($) costs ω per treatment
Pre-Discharge (Strenthening) Cost
CS(ρ)
Readmission Risk ρ
Readmission
($) costs R
Bundled Payment
Hospital Minimizes Cost:
Policy	
Levers:	
T, ω, R
Episode Length
T
⇢⇤ = argmin⇢2[0,⇢0] CS(⇢) + CM (⇢)
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Figure 3.1: Overview of the Framework
cost of follow-up is denoted by CM(), which includes the cost of conducting post-
discharge follow-up treatment (which costs ! per treatment) to avert readmissions
(e.g., treating an infection outpatient) and potentially the cost a readmission (R) if
readmitted. The hospital chooses the optimal readmission risk level  (as a surro-
gate for the optimal eort level) to minimize the cost of the entire episode of care
Z() = CS() + CM().
We would like to emphasize that our model is generalizable to a set of produc-
tion and maintenance problems consisting of a strengthening stage { where a ma-
chine/product is strengthened, so that its failure rate is reduced to  at a cost of
CS() { and a maintaining stage { where CM() is incurred by the maintenance and
repair/replacement of the machine/product over a nite period. A table of notation
is provided in Table 3.1.
restrictive assumption because, in clinically practice, physicians have more control over a patient's health via inpatient
interventions. In the post-discharge stage, we assume that the outpatient treatments do not alter the nature of a
patient's readmission pathology. This is a critical assumption to ensure the Markovian property and therefore the
model's analytical tractability.
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Notation Description
; t; ~ Readmission risk
0 Baseline readmission risk
 Engagement threshold
 A lower bound for 
d Delay-time failure rate
f Treatment ecacy
CS() The pre-discharge (strengthening) stage cost of reducing readmission risk to 
CM () The post-discharge (maintaining) stage cost of follow-up with a patient cohort at readmission risk 
Z() The total cost Z() = CS() + CM ()
R Cost of a readmission
! Cost of a post-discharge outpatient treatment
RA;S;H Readmitted, Sick, Healthy states in the Markov Decision Process
V t The optimal cost-to-go
V t The cost-to-go if policy  is implemented
Table 3.1: Table of Notation
3.3.1 BP Policy and Balance Criterion
At the policy level, we study how the CMS shall leverage critical policy levers to
incentivize hospitals to engage in readmission reduction. First, we dene the notion
of a BP policy and the key policy levers therein.
Denition III.1 (A Bundled Payment Policy). Let the tuple (T; !;R) denote a
Bundled Payment (BP) policy. It has the following policy levers:
• T , the episode length: this is a key policy-level decision we consider for the CMS.
The length of a BP episode (and the HRRP penalty window) is a nontrivial and
challenging policy decision as argued by Joynt and Jha (2012).
• !, the (average) cost of a post-discharge outpatient treatment: although this
cost is determined by the types of treatment and procedures administered in
each post-discharge outpatient encounter, we argue that the CMS can subsidize
post-discharge monitoring and treatments (e.g., PCP visit, home care, and etc.)
to eectively lower the cost of treatment ! to achieve a better continuum of care
between pre- and post-discharge.
• R, the (average) cost (plus potential penalties) of a readmission: this cost is
determined by the pathological nature of each readmission case. However, we
argue that the CMS can have some control over this cost by penalizing read-
missions and/or decreasing the Bundled Payment amount (so that readmission
costs take up a greater portion of the BP budget).2
2Currently, BPCI and HRRP do not overlap { hospitals do not get penalized for excessive readmissions if they
are reimbursed under a BP scheme. However, if stronger incentives are needed, it might be viable for the CMS to
impose HRRP penalties on top of the BP scheme.
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In this chapter, we do not consider the decision of the Bundled Payment amount
(a.k.a. the target price as dened by BPCI). The CMS has a well-established method
for calculating the target price (CMS, 2018b); therefore this is out of our research
scope.
To determine whether the hospital is eectively reducing readmissions, we intro-
duce the following notion of the baseline readmission risk. We follow Zhang et al.
(2016) and dene the baseline readmission risk as follows:3
Denition III.2 (Baseline Readmission Risk). The baseline readmission risk of a
patient cohort, 0, is dened as the readmission risk observed without exerting any
additional (costly) readmission reduction eort. Ideally, this would be the natural
readmission rate intrinsic to the pathology of the surgery and its recovery. However,
it is dicult to observe such a natural readmission risk since patients are rarely free
of interventions. For the policy-level purpose of incentivizing readmission reduction,
in practice, the CMS can set 0 to the national average or the pre-HRRP histori-
cal readmission risk. This serves as a baseline for evaluating whether a hospital is
eectively reducing readmissions.
We say a hospital or a BP policy is balancing pre- and post-discharge readmission
reduction eorts if it manages to reduce the readmission risk to below the baseline
risk. The following denition formalizes this criterion.
Denition III.3 (Balance). Suppose the hospital minimizes the cost of the entire
episode of care by choosing the optimal readmission risk level (as a surrogate for the
eort level):
 = argmin
2[0;0]
CS() + CM(): (3.1)
If  < 0, the hospital and the BP policy is balancing eorts.
As we shall see later in Section 3.6, this implies that the hospital is engaged in
post-discharge care so that the follow-up cost CM(
) < R is reduced and the hospital
is exerting pre-discharge readmission reduction eort so that CS() > 0.
3.4 The Post-Discharge (\Maintaining") Stage
In this section, we develop the post-discharge stage model. We rst introduce
the post-discharge MDP model that captures the key cost/penalty structure and the
3Zhang et al. (2016) denes the \cost of process improvements" to be C(r0; r), which captures the cost of reducing
the readmissions rate from the baseline r0 to r.
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readmission risk characteristics. Then, we study a hospital's behavior if it minimizes
the cost according to this MDP. As such, we obtain key insights from the MDP to
guide policy-level decisions.
3.4.1 The Post-Discharge Follow-Up MDP
Under a BP policy, a hospital aims to minimize the expected cost of the entire
episode of care. As such, in the post-discharge stage, the hospital seeks to nd
the optimal follow-up policy to minimize the follow-up cost. We assume that the
hospital's optimal post-discharge policy can be obtained by solving a discrete-time,
nite-horizon MDP. Figure 3.2 summarizes the immediate costs, the terminal costs,
and the transition probabilities of the MDP. The notations of the post-discharge
MDP are as follows.
ct(s; a) s = RA s = S s = H
a = Treat 0 ! !
a =Wait 0 0 0
Terminal Costs R 0 0
Healthy Sick Readmitted
Wait: ρt(1− d)
Treat: 0
Wait: ρtd
Treat: 0
Wait: 0
Treat: f
Wait: d
Treat: 1− f
Wait: 1− ρt
Treat: 1
1Wait: 1− d
Treat: 0
Figure 3.2: Costs and Transition Probabilities of the Post-Discharge Follow-Up MDP.
• t 2 f0; 1; :::; Tg: we assume that decisions are made on a daily basis after
discharge. The day of discharge is denoted by t = 0. The episode length is
denoted by T .
• s; st 2 S = fH;S;RAg: the state space S consists of Healthy (H) { the patient
is free of readmission-causing conditions such as infections and failure to thrive;
Sick (S) { the patient has developed some readmission-causing condition but
has not yet readmitted; and Readmitted (RA) { the patient has been readmitted
to the hospital.
• a; at 2 A = fTreat;Waitg in each decision epoch, the healthcare provider
decides whether to treat the patient or to wait.
• ct(s; a) represents the immediate cost of applying action a on a patient in state
s in period t 2 f0; 1; :::; T   1g. We assume that the cost of treating a patient
who is not yet readmitted (s 2 fH;Sg) is !. We set the cost of treatment
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on a readmitted patient zero, since readmission is assumed to be the absorbing
state. The immediate cost of waiting (doing nothing) is zero in all states. cT (s)
represents the terminal cost. We assume that the cost of a readmission is R.
The cost of terminating in the healthy state or the sick state is zero.
• Pt(st+1jst; at) denotes the transition probability from st to st+1 when action
at is applied in period t 2 f0; 1; :::; T   1g. The developing and worsening
of a readmission-causing complication is governed by two probabilities. The
readmission risk, denoted by t 2 [0; 1], is the probability of a patient developing
such a complication in period t (transitioning from H to S). The delay-time
failure rate, denoted by d 2 [0; 1], is the probability of a sick patient worsening
to the point of requiring a readmission in period t (transitioning from S to RA).
This concept stems from the delay-time analysis framework (Liu et al., 2018a),
which models the time it takes for a condition to worsen to a readmission.
The treatment ecacy, denoted by f 2 [0; 1], is the probability of a treatment
successfully averting a readmission. We assume that treating a healthy patient
will maintain the patient's healthy state. Finally, we assume RA is an absorbing
state.4
• (s; t) denotes a follow-up policy that maps S  f0; 1; :::; T   1g to A. An
optimal follow-up policy is denoted by .
The MDP model makes the following key assumptions. 1) The hospital mini-
mizes the cost under a BP policy. Although hospitals are typically not-for-prot
organizations, they more or less act like cost-minimizing business entities as widely
modeled in the literature (Zhang et al., 2016; Adida et al., 2016). 2) An episode
of care consists of an index hospitalization and at most one readmission due to the
nite nature of an episode of care dened by BPCI. This is consistent with many
Markov disease models in the literature { typically the absorbing state involves a
major adverse event and/or a major pathological change (e.g., heart attack, death,
readmission, cancer diagnosis). Moreover, among surgery patients, more than one
readmissions within 90 days are rare. Even if there are repeated readmissions, the
pathology after the index hospitalization and each re-hospitalization is drastically
dierent.
To minimize the expected cost in the post-discharge stage, the hospital solves
4Note that from a modeling stand-point, it is possible to model death as an absorbing state. However, we
do not model death since we assumed hospitals minimize costs and it is dicult to assign a monetary cost to
death. Furthermore, the chance of death within the bundle payment window is rare compared to the probability of
readmissions, and mortality rate is not penalized by the CMS. For these considerations, we do not model mortality.
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the Bellman equations of the MDP. Let V t (s) = V
(s) be the minimum expected
post-discharge cost of following-up with a patient in state s 2 S on the tth day after
discharge. The Bellman equations are given by:
If t = T : V t (s) = cT (s);8s 2 S. For t 2 f0; 1; :::; T   1g : V t (RA) = R; and
V t (H) = min
8>>><>>>:
! + V t+1(H) (at = Treat)
(1  t)V t+1(H) + t(1  d)V t+1(S) + tdR (at = Wait)
(3.2)
V t (S) = min
8>>><>>>:
! + fV t+1(H) + (1  f)R (at = Treat)
(1  d)V t+1(S) + dR (at = Wait)
(3.3)
We are interested in analyzing hospitals' behavior as they reduce the readmission
risk t. Hence, we introduce the following notation for the purpose of evaluating the
post-discharge cost as a function of the risk t. When an arbitrary follow-up policy
 (not necessarily optimal) is applied to a patient whose readmission risk is t, the
expected follow-up cost is given by:
If t = T : V t (s; t) = cT (s);8s 2 S. For t 2 f0; 1; :::; T   1g : V t (RA; t) = R; and
V t (H; t) =
(
! + V t+1(H; t+1) if (H; t) = Treat
(1  t)V t+1(H; t+1) + t(1  d)V t+1(S; t+1) + tdR if (H; t) =Wait
V t (S; t) =
(
! + fV t+1(H; t+1) + (1  f)R if (S; t) = Treat
(1  d)V t+1(S; t+1) + dR if (S; t) =Wait
Without loss of generality, the patient is assumed to be in the healthy state upon
discharge in period t = 0. Under policy , the expected T -period follow-up cost of a
patient whose readmission risk is ~ = (0; 1; : : : ; T ) is denoted by
V 0 (~) = V

0 (H; 0): (3.4)
If the readmission risk is stationary (i.e. t = ; 8t), then we write V 0 () =
V 0 (H; ) for simplicity. Next, we shall analyze the behavior of a hospital when the
minimize the expected cost according to the optimal policy obtained by solving the
post-discharge follow-up MDP.
3.4.2 Technical Preliminaries
To facilitate our discussion, we present some technical preliminaries, including
some assumptions we impose and some structural properties of the MDP. First,
we make the following two mild assumptions so that the follow-up MDP model is
realistic and the hospital's follow-up behavior is sensible.
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Assumption III.4 (Treatments are Eective). We assume that 1   f < d, i.e.,
the probability of a sick patient being treated and readmitted is smaller than the (no-
treatment) delay-time failure rate.
In reality, this is very likely to hold since post-discharge care is clinically proven
to be eective at reducing readmissions.
Assumption III.5 (Following-Up Every Day is Expensive). We assume that T! >
R, i.e., the cost of providing treatments every single day over the T -day period is
more expensive than a readmission.
This assumption is likely to be true as veried in our numerical study (see Section
3.8.1). If this is violated, a hospital could provide post-discharge treatments every
single day at a cost cheaper than a readmission. Under the current denition of an
episode of care by BPCI, this may require the provider to see the patient every single
day in the 90-day period, which will be unrealistic and much more expensive than a
readmission.
In addition to these mild assumptions to ensure sensible behavior, we also make
the following stationary readmission risk assumption for analytical tractability. We
do acknowledge that a patient's readmission risk is not likely to be stationary in
reality (Liu et al., 2018a). Nonetheless, this assumption is only used for tractability
in the development of some initial structural properties.
Assumption III.6 (Stationary Readmission Risk). The readmission risk is station-
ary, i.e., t = ; 8t 2 f0; 1; :::; T   1g.
This assumption is only used in Propositions III.9 and Theorem III.13. When the
readmission risk is nonstationary, Theorem III.16 provides a theoretical accuracy
bound.
First, we present a lemma which will be used in later proofs. Lemma III.7 states
that in any period, the cost-to-go of a healthy patient is no more than the cost-to-go
of a sick patient. All costs-to-go are bounded by the cost of a readmission R since
the worst case cost is R as it is assumed to be the absorbing state.
Lemma III.7. V t (H)  V t (S)  V t (RA) = R; 8t 2 f0; 1; :::; Tg.
Proof. Proof of Lemma III.7. Dene a policy  such that (s; t) = W;8s 2 S; t 2
f0; 1; :::; Tg. Note that this policy always applies \wait" to a patient, which incurs no
immediate cost. Hence its maximum expected cost is no greater than the maximum
terminal cost cT (RA) = R. Then we have V

t (s)  V t (s)  R; 8s 2 S;8t 2
f0; 1; :::; Tg.
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Next, we show V t (H)  V t (S);8t 2 f0; 1; :::; Tg by induction. For t = T ,
V T (H) = 0  V T (S) = 0 holds. Suppose the induction base assumption holds:
V t+1(H)  V t+1(S).
Recall the Bellman equations in t:
V t (H) = min
8>>><>>>:
! + V t+1(H) (at = Treat)
(1  t)V t+1(H) + t(1  d)V t+1(S) + tdR (at = Wait)
(3.5)
V t (S) = min
8>>><>>>:
! + fV t+1(H) + (1  f)R (at = Treat)
(1  d)V t+1(S) + dR (at = Wait)
(3.6)
We rst argue that Vt(H; at = Treat)  Vt(S; at = Treat). ! + V t+1(H) 
! + V t+1(S)  ! + fV t+1(S) + (1   f)R since V t+1(S)  R and V t+1(H)  R.
We next argue that Vt(H; at = Wait)  Vt(S; at = Wait). It follows that (1  
t)V

t+1(H)+t(1 d)V t+1(S)+tdR = (1 t)V t+1(H)+tV t+1(S)+td(R V t+1(S)) 
V t+1(S) + d(R  V t+1(S)) = (1  d)V t+1(S) + dR.
Finally, we argue that V t (H) = min(Vt(H; at = Treat); Vt(H; at = Wait)) 
V t (S) = min(Vt(S; at = Treat); Vt(S; at = Wait)). We show this by contradic-
tion. Suppose (for contradiction) that min(Vt(H; at = Treat); Vt(H; at = Wait)) >
min(Vt(S; at = Treat); Vt(S; at = Wait)). At least one of the following must hold:
• Vt(H; at = Treat) > Vt(S; at = Treat) and Vt(H; at = Wait) > Vt(S; at =
Treat)
• Vt(H; at = Treat) > Vt(S; at = Wait) and Vt(H; at = Wait) > Vt(S; at = Wait)
However, either one leads to contradiction. Hence, by contradiction, the induction
holds.
Next, we develop some structural properties of the post-discharge MDP. The
following proposition establishes the optimality of a control limit policy. In practice,
a hospital is very likely to adopt such a control limit policy because it is insensible
for a hospital to treat a sick patient and not to treat a healthy patient.
Proposition III.8 (Control Limit Policy Optimality). If f = 1 (treatments are
perfect), then there exists an optimal control limit policy  such that if (H; t) =
Treat then (S; t) = Treat, and if (S; t) = Wait then (H; t) = Wait 8t 2
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f0; 1; :::; T   1g. If f < 1 (treatments are imperfect), then condition 4 in Puterman
(2005) Theorem 4.7.4 is violated. The existence of optimal control limit policies is
not necessary.
Proof. Proof of Proposition III.8. To show the existence of an optimal control limit
policy, we introduce a dummy action ? and modies the costs and transition prob-
abilities as follows:
Costs
s = RA s = S s = H
a = ? 0 0 0
a = Treat M ! !
a =Wait 2M 0 0
Terminal Costs R 0 0
!: cost of treatment
R: cost of readmission
M : a suciently large cost (M > R+ T!)
Transition Probabilities
at = ? st+1 = RA st+1 = S st+1 = H
st = RA 1 0 0
st = S 1 0 0
st = H 1 0 0
at = Treat st+1 = RA st+1 = S st+1 = H
st = RA 0 0 1
st = S 0 0 1
st = H 0 0 1
at =Wait st+1 = RA st+1 = S st+1 = H
st = RA 1 0 0
st = S d 1  d 0
st = H td t(1  d) 1  t
Note that it is always optimal to take the dummy action in the RA state. Hence,
the new MDP with the dummy action is equivalent to the original MDP.
Let us order the state space as S = f0 = RA; 1 = S; 2 = Hg and order the actions
as A = f0 = ?; 1 = Treat; 2 = Waitg. Now we can verify the sucient conditions
for the existence of an optimal control limit policy (Theorem 4.7.4 in Puterman
(2005)).
1. ct(s; a) is non-increasing in s 2 S for all a 2 A.
2. The tail sum of transition probabilities qt = (kjs; a) =
P2
j=k Pt(jjs; a) is nonde-
creasing in s for all k 2 S and a 2 A.
3. ct(s; a) is subadditive on S A.
4. The tail sum of transition probabilities qt = (kjs; a) is supermodular on S  A
for all k 2 S.
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5. cT (s) is non-increasing in s.
Conditions 1 and 5 can be easily veried. We verify conditions 2, 3, and 4.
Condition 2:
qt(kjs; a) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
a = 0 k = 0 k = 1 k = 2
s = 0 1 0 0
s = 1 1 0 0
s = 2 1 0 0
a = 1 k = 0 k = 1 k = 2
s = 0 1 1 1
s = 1 1 1 1
s = 2 1 1 1
a = 2 k = 0 k = 1 k = 2
s = 0 1 0 0
s = 1 1 1  d 0
s = 2 1 1  td 1  t
Condition 3 holds as !   0 M   0 and 0  !  2M  M .
Condition 4:
• k = 0 then qt(0js; a) = 1;8a 2 A and s 2 S. Supermodularity holds trivially.
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• k = 1, we have
qt(1js+ 1; a+ 1)  qt(1js+ 1; a) =
a = 0 a = 1
s = 0 1  d
s = 1 1  td
(3.7)
qt(1js; a+ 1)  qt(1js; a) =
a = 0 a = 1
s = 0 1  1
s = 1 1  d
(3.8)
(3.9)
qt(1js+1; a+1) qt(1js+1; a)  qt(1js; a+1) qt(1js; a) holds for s 2 f0; 1g; a 2
f0; 1g.
• k = 2, we have
qt(2js+ 1; a+ 1)  qt(2js+ 1; a) =
a = 0 a = 1
s = 0 1  1
s = 1 1  t
(3.10)
qt(2js; a+ 1)  qt(2js; a) =
a = 0 a = 1
s = 0 1  1
s = 1 1  1
(3.11)
(3.12)
qt(1js+1; a+1) qt(1js+1; a)  qt(1js; a+1) qt(1js; a) holds for s 2 f0; 1g; a 2
f0; 1g.
qt(2js+1; a+1) qt(2js+1; a)  qt(2js; a+1) qt(2js; a) holds for s 2 f0; 1g; a 2 f0; 1g.
Therefore, all ve conditions are satised. There exists an optimal control limit
policy  that is non-decreasing in s. In other words, if (H; t) = Treat then
(S; t) = Treat and if (S; t) = Wait then (S; t) = Wait.
Note that when f < 1, the existence of an optimal control limit policy is necessary.
However, in our numerical experiments, optimal control limit policies still exist if !=R
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is suciently small and the treatment ecacy f is suciently large. As we shall see
later in Denition III.22, a suciently small !=R quotient requires the treatments
to be suciently ecient.
The next proposition shows that reducing the readmission risk reduces the follow-
up cost. Moreover, under a mild condition, the relationship is concave, implying that
reducing readmission risk generates a larger saving as the risk gets closer to zero.
Proposition III.9 (Follow-Up Cost Concave Non-Decreasing in Readmission Risk).
If Assumption III.6 (stationary readmission risk) holds, then the follow-up cost V 0 ()
is non-decreasing in the readmission risk . Furthermore, under a mild condition
(supermodularity in the health state and the readmission risk (s; ) 2 S  [0; 1]), the
follow-up cost is concave in .
Proof. Proof of Proposition III.9. We prove by induction. The base case t = T holds
trivially. Suppose in period t+ 1, V t+1(s); s 2 fH;Sg is non-decreasing in .
Recall the Bellman equations in t:
V t (H) = min
8>>><>>>:
! + V t+1(H) (at = Treat)
(1  )V t+1(H) + (1  d)V t+1(S) + dR (at = Wait)
(3.13)
V t (S) = min
8>>><>>>:
! + fV t+1(H) + (1  f)R (at = Treat)
(1  d)V t+1(S) + dR (at = Wait)
(3.14)
It follows trivially that Vt(H; at = Treat) = ! + V

t+1(H), Vt(S; at = Treat) =
! + fV t+1(H) + (1   f)R, and Vt(S; at = Wait) = (1   d)V t+1(S) + dR are non-
decreasing in . Since taking the minimum preserves monotonicity, it suces to show
that Vt(H; at = Wait) = (1 )V t+1(H)+(1 d)V t+1(S)+dR is non-decreasing in .
To see the non-increasing monotonicity, we shall look at the rst order derivative. Let
us simplify the notation, let VH() := V

t+1(H; ) and VS() := V

t+1(S; ). Following
from Lemma III.7, we have:
d
d
((1  )VH() + (1  d)VS() + dR) (3.15)
=d(R  Vs()) + (VS()  VH()) + (1  )V 0H() + (1  d)V 0S()  0 (3.16)
To show the concavity, consider any 0  1  2  1 and  2 [0; 1]. We shall verify
the following inequality:
(1  1   (1  )2)VH(1 + (1  )2) + (1 + (1  )2)(1  d)VS(1 + (1  )2)
(1  1)VH(1) + (1  )(1  2)VH(2) + 1(1  d)VS(1) + (1  )2(1  d)VS(2) (3.17)
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Applying the induction hypothesis, Eq. (3.17) can be rewritten as
(1  )(2   1)[VH(2)  VH(1) + (1  d)(VS(1)  VS(2))]  0 (3.18)
This follows as Vs() = V

t (s; ) is assumed to be supermodular in fs; g 2 S  [0; 1]
for all t 2 f0; 1; :::; Tg.
The supermodularity assumption states that the benet of reducing the read-
mission risk is greater on a healthy patient than on a sick patient. Note that the
supermodularity does not hold in general. For example, if d = 0, then supermodu-
larity is violated. However, it holds for large enough R and d.
It is intuitive that the cost of follow-up is non-decreasing in the readmission risk 
since lower risk patients require fewer treatments and are less likely to be readmitted.
For the cost of follow-up to be concave in , the Bellman equations are required to
be supermodular in the health state and the readmission risk (s; ) 2 S  [0; 1].
Supermodularity here means that the marginal benet of having a lower readmission
risk, , in the healthy state is greater than the marginal benet for a patient in the
sick state. This condition is intuitive, since risk of getting sick is less important to
future cost when a patient is already sick, because there is a chance that she will
never return to the healthy state and thus the risk of getting sick becomes irrelevant.
In contrast, for a healthy patient, this risk is more relevant to future outcomes. Note
that supermodularity does not necessarily hold. For instance, in the pathological
case where the delay-time failure rate d is zero, supermodularity does not hold.
However, for suciently large R and d, which is the most likely case in practice,
supermodularity should hold.
Next, we numerically verify concavity and demonstrate that even when the func-
tion is not technically concave, it still resembles a concave shape. To do this, we
compute the second derivative of V () numerically.
We tested the following 144 combinations of parameters: T 2 f7; 14; 30; 90g,
!=R 2 f0:01; 0:2; 5; 10g; d 2 f0:1; 0:3; 0:5g; f 2 f0:5; 0:75; 1g. Out of the 144 cases,
97 cases were found to be concave as desired. The rest 47 cases were non-concave.
Figure 3.3 shows the 47 non-concave cases. The tuple above each subplot denotes
(T; f; d; !=R). The horizontal axis is the readmission risk  and the vertical axis is
the cost V (). In these nonconcave cases, V () still behaves very much like a concave
function.
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Figure 3.3: Examples of Non-concave V
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3.4.3 Engaged and Disengaged Follow-Up Policies
In this section, we rst identify two types of follow-up policies { the engaged policy
and the disengaged policy (Proposition III.10). We show that disengaged policies
are expensive and undesirable (Proposition III.11) and that the engaged policy is
optimal when patients are at low risk and the treatments are eective and ecient
(Proposition III.12). We argue that an eective BP policy should entice hospitals to
adopt an engaged policy.
First, we identify two types of follow-up policies adopted by a hospital to minimize
the expected follow-up cost. Under Assumption III.5 (following-up every day is
expensive), a hospital will adopt either one of the following two policies.
Proposition III.10 (Engaged and Disengaged Follow-Up Policies). Suppose As-
sumption III.5 (following-up every day is expensive) holds, either one of the following
two types of policies is optimal:
• Engaged Follow-Up Policy: a policy E is said to be an engaged policy if
8t 2 f0; 1; : : : ; T   1g, E(S; t) = Treat; E(H; t) = Wait;8t 2 f0; 1; :::; T   1g.
• Disengaged Follow-Up Policy: a policy DE is said to be a disengaged policy if
in some period t 2 f0; 1; : : : ; T 1g, the action is DE(H; t) = DE(S; t) = Wait.
Proof. Proof of Proposition III.10. Since T! > R, it is never optimal to treat the
patient every single day. Hence, by denition, a hospital adopts either the engaged
policy or a disengaged policy.
Adopting an engaged follow-up policy, a hospital will provide treatment to a pa-
tient if and only if the patient is sick. This means that the hospital is responsive
and fully engaged in providing timely post-discharge care. It also means that med-
ical resources are not \wasted" on treating a healthy patient. In contrast, under a
disengaged follow-up policy, a hospital is not fully engaged because it may prefer to
wait and let a sick patient get readmitted rather than providing treatments to avert
the readmission.
It is tempting to wonder why a hospital would ever adopt a disengaged policy
to minimize the follow-up cost. Intuitively, one may conjecture that a hospital may
adopt such a disengaged policy due to the following reasons. 1) The patient is at very
high risk of readmission. As such, an engaged policy requires the hospital to provide
intensive post-discharge interventions, which may be more costly than a readmission
(this case was found to exist in the modeling eorts of Zhang et al. (2016) and found
empirically by Desai et al. (2016)). 2) Treatments that can avert a readmission may
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be very expensive. In such cases, the hospital would rather readmit the patient. 3)
Post-discharge treatment may be little eective in averting readmissions (f is very
small). 4) Readmissions are very cheap (or not penalized suciently), therefore the
hospital cares little about preventing readmissions. 5) The bundled payment episode
length is too long, requiring too much eort. A hospital may give up on preventing
readmissions for such a long time interval. As we shall see later in Section 3.6, our
analytical results conrm our intuition.
As a policymaker, the CMS shall design a BP policy to eliminate the nancial
incentives for disengaged policies. Although it is not illegal for hospitals to deny
non-emergent patients treatment (Adida et al., 2016), it is arguably irresponsible
and unethical to do so. Moreover, from the provider's perspective, we argue that
disengaged policies are also undesirable. The next proposition shows that a disen-
gaged policy is undesirable due to its excessive cost.
Proposition III.11 (Disengaged Policies are Expensive). Suppose Assumption III.4
(treatments are eective) holds, if a disengaged policy is ever optimal, then over the
T -day follow-up period, the hospitals incurs a follow-up cost V 0 (H) = V
DE
0 (H) 
R   !
d  (1  f) , which equates to the cost of a readmission less a multiple of the
cost of a treatment.
Proof. Proof of Proposition III.11. Since in period t, the optimal action is to wait
when a patient is sick, we have
(1  d)V t+1(S) + dR  ! + fV t+1(H) + (1  f)R (3.19)
By Lemma III.7, V t+1(H)  V t+1(S) implies
(1  d)V t+1(H) + dR  ! + fV t+1(H) + (1  f)R (3.20)
V t+1(H)  R 
!
f + d  1  R 
!
f + d  1 (3.21)
By Lemma III.7, we have V t 1(S)  V t 1(H)  R  !f+d 1 . Since all immediate costs
are nonnegative, it follows that V 0 (S)  V 0 (H)  R  !f+d 1 holds.
Note that if 1  f  d (i.e., treatments are highly eective), then the disengaged
policy follow-up cost becomes as expensive as the cost of a readmission. In this case,
since treatments are very eective, not providing them (under a disengaged policy)
will result in a very high cost. For instance, if treatments are perfect (f = 1) and
the delay-time failure rate d = 0:3 (representing the baseline estimate, see Section
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3.8.1), then the cost of follow-up is greater than R  3:3!, which equates to the cost
of a readmission less the cost of 3.3 treatments.
As disengaged policies are shown to be undesirable from both the policymaker's
and the provider's perspectives, we now shift our focus to the engaged policy. The
next proposition shows that a hospital will adopt an optimal engaged policy if 1) the
patient is at very low risk of readmission, 2) the treatments are suciently eective
(in this case a sucient condition is f = 1), and 3) treatments are suciently
ecient5 (!=R  d, and this holds in our numerical studies, see Section 3.8.1).
Proposition III.12 (Engaged Policy Optimality). Suppose Assumption III.6 (sta-
tionary readmission risk) holds, if !=R  d (this requires treatments to be suciently
ecient).5 There exists fE  0 and E  0 such that for all f  fE and   E, an
engaged policy is optimal.
Proof. Proof of Proposition III.12. Suppose 0    E = 0. Let f = 1  fE = 1.
The Bellman equations become:
V t (RA) = R (3.22)
V t (H) = min
8>>><>>>:
! + V t+1(H) (at = Treat)
V t+1(H) (at = Wait)
(3.23)
V t (S) = min
8>>><>>>:
! + V t+1(H) (at = Treat)
(1  d)V t+1(S) + dR (at = Wait)
(3.24)
It follows that wait is the optimal action in the healthy state and V t (H) = 0;8t 2
f0; 1; :::; T   1g. So V t (S) = min
8>>><>>>:
! (at = Treat)
(1  d)V t+1(S) + dR (at = Wait)
:
Since ! < dR, the optimal action in the sick state is to treat the patient.
As the policymaker, we shall entice a hospital to adopt an engaged policy be-
cause it implies that the hospital is being responsive and engaged in providing post-
discharge care.
5 The quotient !=R is dened as the treatment ineciency in Denition III.22. Therefore, a smaller !=R value
implies higher eciency.
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3.4.4 Closed-Form Engaged Policy Follow-Up Cost
In this section, we develop crucial structural properties when an engaged follow-
up policy is adopted by the hospital. We show that under an engaged policy, the
follow-up cost can be closed-form expressed in terms of the MDP's costs, transition
probabilities, and the episode length T (Theorem III.13). This closed-form expression
reveals that reducing readmission risk generates savings (asymptotically) linear in
the readmission risk (Corollary III.14). Moreover, Corollary III.14 uncovers the
relationship between the follow-up cost and the policy-level levers (T; !;R).
Theorem III.13 (Engaged Policy Follow-Up Cost in Closed-Form). Suppose As-
sumption III.6 (stationary readmission risk) holds. Given an engaged follow-up pol-
icy E, the cost of following-up with a patient (who is discharged healthy initially)
for T days is
V () := V E0 (H; ) = 1z
T
1 + 2z
T
2 + ; (3.25)
where 1; 2; z1; z2; and  are functions of ; f; d; R; and !. Note that
T is the
exponent not to be confused with the transpose operator in linear algebra. The closed-
form expressions for these terms are dened in Eq. (3.27) { (3.30).
The function V () is strictly increasing in  (following from the proof of Propo-
sition III.9), though V () is not necessarily concave.6 Under mild condition (super-
modularity), V () is concave (by Proposition III.9).
Proof. Proof of Theorem III.13. We rst list the variables:
1 =
(d  1)!
p
(1  )2 + 4f(1  d)    1

 R((d  1)f + 1)
p
(1  )2 + 4f(1  d) + 2d    1

2((d  1)f + 1)p(1  )2 + 4f(1  d)
(3.26)
2 =
(d  1)!
p
(1  )2 + 4f(1  d) + + 1

 R((d  1)f + 1)
p
(1  )2 + 4f(1  d)  2d+ + 1

2((d  1)f + 1)p(1  )2 + 4f(1  d)
(3.27)
z1 =
(1  ) p(1  )2 + 4f(1  d)
2
(3.28)
z2 =
(1  ) +p(1  )2 + 4f(1  d)
2
(3.29)
 =
(1  d)! + dR+ (1  d)(1  f)R
1  f + fd (3.30)
Since an engaged policy is implemented, we can rewrite the Bellman equations as
follows:
6For example, let T = 3; d = 0:4; ! = 1; R = 2:9, and f = 1, then V 00(0:99) = 0:12 > 0 implies the function is
not concave. However, we observe that, for large T and f , V () is concave. Since V () is obtained by solving a
recurrence relation, it is dicult to derive a tractable and meaningful condition to ensure concavity. Nevertheless,
one can numerically compute the second order derivative of V () using the closed-form expression (Eq. (3.25)) to
verify concavity.
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If t 2 f0; 1; :::; T   1g:
V Et (H) = (1  )V Et+1(H) + (1  d)V Et+1(S) + dR (3.31)
V Et (S) = ! + fV
E
t+1(H) + (1  f)R (3.32)
V Et (RA) = R (3.33)
If t = T :
V ET (H) = 0 (3.34)
V ET (S) = 0 (3.35)
V ET (RA) = R (3.36)
The Bellman equation in the healthy state can be expressed in the following
recurrence relation:
V Et (H) = (1  )V Et+1(H) + (1  d)(! + fV Et+2(H) + (1  f)R) + dR (3.37)
To simplify our notation, dene Vt = V
E
T t(H). Then we have
Vt+2 =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
(1  )Vt+1 + (1  d)(! + fVt + (1  f)R) + dR if t 2 f0; : : : ; T   2g
0 if t = 0
dR if t = 1
(3.38)
We can solve this nonhomogeneous recurrence. First we solve for a homogeneous
solution V Ht . The characteristic equation is
z2   (1  )z   f(1  d) = 0 (3.39)
The two roots are
z1 =
(1  ) p(1  )2 + 4f(1  d)
2
(3.40)
z2 =
(1  ) +p(1  )2 + 4f(1  d)
2
(3.41)
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So the homogeneous solution is
V Ht = z
t
11 + z
t
22 (3.42)
where 1 and 2 are constants that are determined later. For the particular solution,
we guess a constant form V Pt = . Plugging in to the recurrence,    (1   )  
f(1   d) = (1   d)! + dR + (1   d)(1   f)R. The solution is V Pt =  =
(1 d)!+dR+(1 d)(1 f)R
1 f+fd .
Now we can plug in the two boundary conditions to solve for 1 and 2:
V0 = V
H
0 +  = 0 (3.43)
V1 = V
H
1 +  = dR (3.44)
The solutions are
1 =
(d  1)!
p
(1  )2 + 4f(1  d)    1

 R((d  1)f + 1)
p
(1  )2 + 4f(1  d) + 2d    1

2((d  1)f + 1)p(1  )2 + 4f(1  d)
(3.45)
2 =
(d  1)!
p
(1  )2 + 4f(1  d) + + 1

 R((d  1)f + 1)
p
(1  )2 + 4f(1  d)  2d+ + 1

2((d  1)f + 1)p(1  )2 + 4f(1  d)
(3.46)
Computing the follow-up cost in closed-form, instead of using backward induc-
tion, enables us to derive powerful analytical insights into the operational impact of
bundled payment design features. Corollary III.14 reveals that if a hospital manages
to reduce the readmission risk to a low level (! 0), then readmission reduction will
generate savings linearly in the readmission risk. The marginal benet is a function
of the MDP's costs, transition probabilities, and the episode length.
Corollary III.14 (Marginal Benet of Reducing Readmission Risk). For an engaged
policy E with Bellman equation V () := V
E
0 (H; ), the marginal benet of reducing
the readmission risk is asymptotically linear for suciently small . Formally, we
have
lim
!0+
V 0() := lim
!0+
V E0 (H; ) = fd+ [1  (1  d) f ] (T   1)gR + (T   1) (1  d)!:
(3.47)
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Proof. Proof of Corollary III.14. For the purpose of exposition, we prove for the case
f = 1. For f < 1, the idea is similar.
Let f = 1: for notational convenience, we dene the following function:
s() =
p
(1  2) + 4(1  d) (3.48)
k =  (1  d)!
d
 R (3.49)
g = 2Rd+ k (3.50)
Note that as ! 0+, we have
lim
!0+
s() = 1 (3.51)
lim
!0+
s0() = lim
!0+
1 +   2d
s()
= 1  2d (3.52)
Then we can rewrite 1; 2; z1; and z2 as follows:
1 =
1
2

k   g+ k
s()

;2 =
1
2

k +
g+ k
s()

(3.53)
z1 =
1    s()
2
;z2 =
1  + s()
2
(3.54)
Hence, we rewrite V () as
V () =
1
2

k   g+ k
s()

1    s()
2
T
+
1
2

k +
g+ k
s()

1  + s()
2
T
  k
(3.55)
Take the derivative with respect to , we have
V 0() = (3.56)
  T
4

k   g+ k
s()

1    s()
2
T 1
(1 + s0()) +
1
2

1    s()
2
T  gs() + (g+ k)s0()
s()2

  T
4

k +
g+ k
s()

1  + s()
2
T 1
(1  s0()) + 1
2

1  + s()
2
T 
gs()  (g+ k)s0()
s()2

(3.57)
Taking the limit, we have
lim
!0+
V 0() =  T
4

k   0 + k
1

1  0  1
2
T 1
(1 + s0()) +
1
2

1  0  1
2
T  g + (0 + k)s0()
12

  T
4

k +
0 + k
1

1  0 + 1
2
T 1
(1  s0()) + 1
2

1  0 + 1
2
T 
g   (0 + k)s0()
12

(3.58)
=0 + 0  Tk
2
(1  s0()) + g   ks
0()
2
(3.59)
=dRT + (T   1)(1  d)! (3.60)
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For f < 1, the idea behind the proof is the same. We omit the proof since the proof
is too lengthy for exposition.
3.4.5 Approximation of the Post-Discharge Cost
So far we have shown some very nice properties of the engaged follow-up policy.
However, in reality, a hospital may not always adopt the engaged policy. In this
section, we shall allow a hospital to adopt either the engaged policy or a disengaged
policy, whichever is cheaper. We show that we can still leverage the closed-form
engaged policy cost V () to construct a piece-wise closed-form (PWCF) expression
CM() that approximates the optimal post-discharge cost well (Eq. (3.63)). Even
when the readmission risk is nonstationary, we can still use the PWCF expression to
approximate the follow-up cost with a proven accuracy bound (Theorem III.16).
To construct the approximation, let us rst compare the engaged policy follow-up
cost V () (given by Eq. (3.25)) with the optimal dynamic programming (DP) policy
cost V () (obtained by solving the Bellman equations). Under Assumption III.6
(stationary readmission risk), Figure 3.4 shows that the engaged policy is optimal
in the light grey area, when the patient's readmission risk is below E (conrming
Proposition III.12). Moreover, we see that the curve resembles a linear relationship
as  ! 0, which conrms Corollary III.14. In this light grey area, the optimal DP
policy cost (the dashed line) coincides with the engaged policy cost (the solid line)
because the engaged policy is in fact optimal. However, as the readmission risk
increases into the dark grey area, a disengaged policy is optimal.
Figure 3.4: Engaged Policy Cost and Optimal DP Policy Cost (T = 30; d = 0:3; f = 1, ! =
$1; 000; R = $5; 000)
In the dark grey area, we also observe that the engaged policy cost can be more
expensive than a readmission. For instance, in the extreme (pathological) case where
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 = 1 and f = 1, we have V (1) = R + (1   d)!=d  R. This may seem counter-
intuitive because a trivial worst-case cost for the hospital is to provide no treatments
at all in the post-discharge stage and get a readmission. This worst case costs at
most R, which is lower than the engaged policy cost R + (1   d)!=d  R. In fact,
the engaged policy may be suboptimal when the readmission risk is very high. In
such cases, a patient being very likely to develop complications will require intensive
and frequent post-discharge treatments. As such, the required intensive care can be
more costly than a readmission, which makes a readmission more economical for the
hospital. When f = 1, the dierence between the engaged policy and the optimal
dynamic programming policy is (1 d)!=d. As the delay-time failure rate d decreases
and the cost of a treatment ! increases, the engaged policy performs worse since it
\wastes" expensive treatments on a patient who is unlikely to be readmitted due to
low failure rate.
Since the engaged policy might be more expensive than a readmission, we shall
allow a hospital to switch to a disengaged policy if the engaged policy cost exceeds
the cost of a readmission (V ()= V E0 (H; )  R). As such, we dene the piece-wise
closed-form (PWCF) follow-up cost approximation function as
CM() = minfV (); Rg: (3.61)
Since V () is non-decreasing in  (Theorem III.13), we can dene , the threshold
below which an engaged policy is cheaper than the cost of a readmission, as
 =
8>>><>>>:
argmin V ()  R if 9 2 [0; 1] : V ()  R
1 otherwise
(3.62)
Remark III.15 (Post-Discharge \Maintaining" Cost Function). The post-discharge
\Maintaining" cost is expressed as a PWCF function:
CM() =
8>>><>>>:
V () if  2 [0; ]
R if  2 (; 1]
(3.63)
Next, we shall show that the PWCF function can approximate the optimal DP cost
well. When the readmission risk is nonstationary, it can still be used to approximate
the follow-up cost with a proven accuracy bound.
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Theorem III.16 (PWCF Approximation is -Accurate). Suppose Assumption III.4
(treatments are eective) holds. For a patient whose readmission risk t is non-
stationary, let V 

0 (H; ~) denote the optimal DP policy cost of follow-up. We can
approximate the cost of follow-up using CM() such that jCM()   V 0 (H; ~)j 
. The accuracy  = max

!
f + d  1 ;
PT 1
t=0 tR

, where t = jt   j for all
t 2 f0; 1; : : : ; T   1g. To achieve best accuracy, one can compute  using the Least
Absolute Deviation (LAD) estimates of t, which is the median over the time index.
Proof. Proof of Theorem III.16. To prove this, we rst prove a lemma.
Lemma III.17 (Non-Stationary Readmission Risk Approximation). Suppose
the true readmission risk ~ = (0; : : : ; T ) is non-stationary. The engaged pol-
icy follow-up cost V E0 (H; ~) can be approximated using V () (which assumes
stationary readmission risk ). The accuracy is given by jV E0 (H; ~)  V ()j PT 1
t=0 tR, where t = jt   j for all t 2 f0; 1; : : : ; T   1g.
Proof. Proof of Lemma III.17. To simplify the notation, let the engaged policy
cost of follow-up for the non-stationary readmission risk model is V tt (s) :=
V Et (s; t). Let the engaged policy cost of follow-up for the stationary read-
mission risk model is V t (s) := V
E
t (s; ). Dene the loss in each period gt =
maxs2S jGt(s)j = maxs2S jV t (s)  V tt (s)j.
We prove by induction. Given gt+1; t 2 f1; : : : ; Tg, we shall establish bounds
for gt. We focus on Gt(S) rst. Since the follow-up policy is to wait on sick
patients, we have
Gt(S) = V

t (S)  V tt (S) (3.64)
= ! + fV t+1(H) + (1  f)R  (! + fV tt+1(H) + (1  f)R) (3.65)
= fGt+1(H) (3.66)
By the induction hypothesis, we have
 gt+1   fgt+1  Gt(S)  fgt+1  gt+1 (3.67)
Next, we derive the bounds for the healthy state, in which the optimal action
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is to wait:
Gt(H) =V

t (H)  V tt (H) (3.68)
=(1  )V t+1(H) + (1  d)V t+1(S) + dR
  (1  t)V tt+1(H)  t(1  d)V tt+1(S)  tdR (3.69)
=(1  )Gt+1(H) + Gt+1(S) + (  t)(dR + (1  d)V tt+1(S)  V tt+1(H))
(3.70)
To obtain an upper bound, we construct a linear program (LPUBH ):
GUBH = max
t;GH ;GS ;VH ;VS
(1  )GH + GS + (  t)(dR + (1  d)VS   VH)
(3.71)
s.t.   t  t  + t (3.72)
0  VH  VS  R (3.73)
  gt+1  GS; GH  gt+1 (3.74)
0  t  1 (3.75)
This linear program attains its maximum GUBH = gt+1 + tR when t =   
t; VS = R; VH = 0, and GS = GH = gt+1.
To obtain a lower bound, we construct a linear program (LPLBH ):
GLBH = min
t;GH ;GS ;VH ;VS
(1  )GH + GS + (  t)(dR + (1  d)VS   VH)
(3.76)
s.t.   t  t  + t (3.77)
0  VH  VS  R (3.78)
  gt+1  GS; GH  gt+1 (3.79)
0  t  1 (3.80)
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This linear program attains its maximum GLBH =  gt+1   tR when t =  +
t; VS = R; VH = 0, and GS = GH =  gt+1. Hence,  gt+1   (t)R  Gt(H) 
gt+1 + tR. Thus, gt  gt+1 + tR.
Observe that GT (S) = GT (H) = 0. Hence, it follows that g0 
PT 1
t=0 tR
inductively.
Now we leverage this lemma to prove the theorem.
Consider a T -period problem with non-stationary readmission risk ~. The state
space ~ = (0; 1; :::; T 1) 2 [0; 1]T can be partitioned into two mutually exclusive
sets: F and P . For any ~ 2 F , an engaged policy is optimal. For any ~ 2 P , a
disengaged policy is optimal.
Let's focus on  2 F rst. Let the optimal engaged policy cost of follow-up for
the non-stationary readmission risk model be V 

0 (H; ~). Since an engaged policy is
optimal, i.e., V 

0 (H; ~) = V
E
0 (H; ~), by Lemma III.17, we have
 
T 1X
t=0
tR  V 0 (H; ~)  V () 
T 1X
t=0
tR (3.81)
Since by Lemma III.7, V 

0 (H; ~)  R. We can pick  such that V () = CM()  R
and ensure jCM()  V 0 (H; ~)j   =
PT 1
t=0 tR.
Next, let us consider  2 P . Take any ~ 2 P , by Proposition III.11 and Lemma
III.7, we have R   !
f+d 1  V 

0 (H; ~)  R. We can pick  such that CM() = R to
ensure jCM()  V 0 (H; ~)j   = !f+d 1 .
Theorem III.16 provides a theoretical accuracy bound for using the PWCF func-
tion CM() to approximate the optimal value function for a non-stationary readmis-
sion risk. This enables us to use the PWCF function to compute the cost of follow-up
for patients with non-stationary readmission risks. To achieve the best accuracy, one
can use the median readmission risk (over the time index) to approximate the optimal
follow-up cost.
Note that in our numerical studies, the estimated  are small (between 0.01 and
0.08, see Table 3.2 in Section 3.8.1). So Theorem III.16 can potentially provide a
reasonably tight theoretical accuracy bound. Numerically, the accuracy is observed
to be reasonably tight for the purpose of policy-level decisions. For example, if
!=R  1 (which is likely to hold as it requires a treatment to be less expensive than a
readmission), the accuracy is within 20% of the cost of a readmission (see Figure 3.6).
Based on our baseline estimates (see Section 3.8.1), 20%R  $1; 000 is comparable
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to the cost of one outpatient treatment (e.g. one Primary Care Physicians (PCP)
oce visit and the medications and procedures administered). It is also comparable
to the cost of a half day of hospitalization (Henry J Kaiser Family Foundation, 2015).
When treatments are expensive (! is large), the treatment ecacy f is low, or the
delay-time failure rate d is small, the accuracy bound becomes large. Under these
conditions, however, it is unlikely that a hospital would be interested in engaging
in post-discharge eort since the cost is high and ecacy is low, and the patient is
unlikely to be readmitted, hence these are unrealistic scenarios.
3.4.6 Analysis for Nonstationary Readmission Risk
In this section, we relax the assumption on stationary readmission risk. We tted a
kernel smoothed estimation of the readmission risk (Diehl and Stute, 1988) using the
327 patients from our partner hospital. Figure 3.5 shows the tted and the empirical
cumulative distributions as well as the readmission risk (failure rate/hazard). The
readmission risk was non-stationary in this case, being noticeably high within the
rst two weeks after discharge. It then dropped and became steady after day-20.
After day-50, the readmission risk dropped even more. Towards the end of the 90-
day window, the readmission risk increased. One possible explanation for this slight
increase near day-90 is the \bathtub" failure curve { increasing failure rate indicates
\wear-out". A more plausible cause of this bathtub shape was due to the censoring
of our data and the nite support ([0; 90]) used in the kernel smoothed estimation.
For the 7-, 14-, 30-, and 90-day penalty windows, we computed the Least Ab-
solute Deviation (LAD) estimates of the readmission risk: T=7LAD = 0:079; 
T=14
LAD =
0:059; T=30LAD = 0:035; and 
T=90
LAD = 0:026.
Kernel Smoothed CDF
Empirical CDF
Kernel Smoothed
Least Absolute Deviation (LAD)
Panel A: CDF Panel B: Readmission Risk
Figure 3.5: Fitted Kernel Smoothed Distribution (Panel A) and Least Absolute Deviation Estimates
(Panel B) for the Readmission Risk
We rst demonstrate that the PWCF approximation CM(
T
LAD) is a good approx-
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imation. We normalize the readmission cost to R = 1 and let d = 0:3 and computed
the dierence between the LAD estimates CM(
T
LAD) and the optimal dynamic pro-
gramming policy cost (V 

0 (H; ~)). Figure 3.6 shows the accuracy, which is dened
as jCM(TLAD)   V 0 (H; ~)j. Since R = 1, the gaps can also be interpreted as a
relative (percentage) gap with respect to the cost of a readmission (R). We varied
the treatment ineciency !=R from 0:01 to 1 and plotted the accuracy versus the
treatment ineciency !=R in a log scale. The cost-to-go using LAD approximation
was within 20% of the optimal non-stationary cost for !=R  100 = 1. This approx-
imation error is comparable to the cost of one outpatient treatment (e.g. one PCP
oce visit) or half day of hospitalization (Henry J Kaiser Family Foundation, 2015).
We also observed that the approximation gaps were smaller as the treatment ecacy
increased.
Figure 3.6: Gaps between the Optimal Dynamic Programming Cost with Non-stationary Readmis-
sion Risk and the LAD Estimations
Next, we consider reducing the non-stationary readmission risk and its eect on
the cost of follow-up. Let ~ be the non-stationary readmission risk vector. We scale
the readmission risk vector up/down element-wise rt  minftr; 1g where r > 0 is
the scaling factor. This scaling operation preserved the shape of the non-stationary
risk. We varied r from a very small value (10 5=maxt(t)) to a very large value
(1=mint(t)). As a result, the scaled readmission risk ranged from (10
 5; :::; 10 5) to
(1; :::; 1) For each scaled readmission risk rt , we computed the LAD estimate LAD.
Figure 3.7 shows that CM(LAD) can approximate the optimal DP cost very well
for T 2 f7; 14; 30; 90g. Using Proposition III.21, the lower bound
 = 1
d+[1 (1 d)f ](T 1)+(1 d)(T 1)!=R (plotted as dotted line) served as a reasonably
tight lower bound on .
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Figure 3.7: Eect of Reducing Non-stationary Readmission Risk Approximated Using LAD Esti-
mations
3.4.7 Post-Discharge Care Engagement Threshold
Having established that the PWCF approximation CM() =
8>>><>>>:
V () if  2 [0; ]
R if  2 (; 1]
is an accurate approximation, we now discuss the implications of the term .
Remark III.18 (Post-Discharge Care Engagement Threshold). The term  can be
interpreted as an engagement threshold { for patients whose risk is at above this
threshold, a hospital has no incentive to engage in exerting post-discharge readmis-
sion reduction eorts. If a hospital can manage to reduce the readmission risk to
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below the threshold , the hospital will engage in post-discharge readmission preven-
tion and benet from it at an (asymptotically) linear rate by Corollary III.14.
Note that  is uniquely determined by the MDP's costs, transition probabilities,
and the episode length (!;R; f; d; T ). Since V () is non-decreasing in  by Theorem
III.13,  can be eciently computed using a univariate binary search. However, a
closed-form expression is not available for . We present Proposition III.19 to bound
 from below using a closed-form expression. This lower bound is denoted by . For
patients at risk below , a hospital would engage in post-discharge care since it could
generate savings at a linear rate.
Proposition III.19. If V () is concave (see Theorem III.13, and Proposition III.9),
then a lower bound for  is , such that
   = 1
d+ [1  (1  d) f ] (T   1) + (T   1)(1  d)!=R: (3.82)
This means that for patients at risk below , the hospital would engage in post-
discharge care because it could generate savings at a linear rate.
Proof. Proof of Proposition III.19. The result follows from the concavity of V ():
  R
lim!0+ V 0()
=
R
fd+ [1  (1  d) f ] (T   1)gR + (T   1) (1  d)!
)   = 1
d+ [1  (1  d) f ] (T   1) + (1  d)(T   1)!=R (3.83)
This lower bound relies on the concavity of V (), as it implies the marginal benet
(i.e., the derivative) decreases in . Although V () is not necessarily concave (see
footnote 6 for a counter-example), in our numerical studies, V () behaves very much
like a concave function even it is not concave.
3.5 The Pre-Discharge (\Strengthening") Stage
In this section, we provide a stylized way to capture the relationship between a
patient's readmission risk and the required pre-discharge eorts and costs for achiev-
ing the readmission risk. We do acknowledge that it is very dicult to quantify the
exact cost of a hospital exerting eorts that reduce the readmission risk to a specic
value . This chapter does not attempt to provide a structural pre-discharge model
or to estimate CS() from data. Specifying and estimating such a structural model
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would require a separate empirical study like Bartel et al. (2014). Instead, we take
a stylized approach and follow Zhang et al. (2016) to dene this cost. Dierent from
their work, our approach is more general as it does not assume a specic functional
form. Note that the functional form used in Zhang et al. (2016) satises all of the
assumptions we impose.7
Assumption III.20 (Pre-Discharge \Strengthening" Cost Function). Without spe-
cic functional form assumptions, the pre-discharge strengthening cost CS() should
satisfy the following mild and intuitive conditions:
1. CS() = 0 for  2 [0; 1] { a hospital can achieve the baseline readmission risk
(or worse) without any (additional) spending on readmission reduction (which
is true by denition of 0).
2. CS() is continuous on [0; 1]. This condition is for analytical tractability.
3. CS() is twice dierentiable on [0; 0) and twice left dierentiable at 0. This is
also for analytical tractability.
4. CS() is strictly convex and strictly decreasing on [0; 0). This requires that the
cost of reducing the readmission risk becomes more costly as  gets closer to
zero.
5. CS(0) = H0 > R { eliminating the possibility of a readmission is more expensive
than the cost of a readmission. This is likely to be true because otherwise, a hos-
pital could spend CS(0) < R in the pre-discharge stage to eliminate readmissions
completely.
3.6 Balancing Pre- and Post-Discharge Eorts
Next, we integrate the pre- and post-discharge stages and study how a hospital
balances eorts between the two stages to minimize the total expected cost of the
entire episode of care.
To check whether a BP policy is balancing, we analyze how Z() behaves and
nd the minimizer . There are two important cases that must be considered: (1)
  0 and (2)  > 0. Figure 3.8 provides an example of each case. Recall that  is
a threshold above which the hospital does not engage in reducing readmissions and
7Following the functional form used in Zhang et al. (2016), we can dene: CS() =
(
0 if   0
H0
0
(0   ) if  < 0 ,
where 1 <  < 1. This satises Assumption III.20 for all 1 <  < 1 if H0 > R. The parameter  and H0
characterize the convexity and the diculty of reducing readmissions. A larger  indicates a more convex shape of
CS() so that reducing readmissions become increasingly dicult as  approaches zero.
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below which the hospital benets from reducing readmissions at an (asymptotically)
linear marginal rate. Theorem III.21, shows that a BP chosen such that  > 0
balances the eorts between both the pre- and post-discharge stages.
Figure 3.8: Schematic Sketch of the Costs in Cases 1 and 2
Theorem III.21 (Sucient Condition For Balancing BP Policy). Suppose the fol-
lowing mild condition on the derivative of the pre-discharge strengthening cost func-
tion CS() holds:
C 0S(0) > min

 CS(0) R
0
; V 0(0)

(3.84)
This condition requires that the rst order derivative be suciently large (i.e., not
too negative). Intuitively, this requires reducing readmissions in the pre-discharge
stage to be not too dicult and expensive. Graphically, the CS curve should not be
too \steep." This condition holds if we use the specic functional form from Zhang
et al. (2016).
If V () is concave (see Theorem III.13, Proposition III.9), then a sucient con-
dition for a BP policy to be balancing is
 =
1
d+ [1  (1  d) f ] (T   1) + (1  d)(T   1)!=R  0: (3.85)
If V () is not concave, a sucient condition is  > 0, where  can be eciently
computed using a univariate search for V () = R on  2 [0; 1].
Note that the cost of a treatment ! and the cost of a readmission R appear as
a quotient in the denominator in Eq. (3.85). In fact, this quotient has a practical
meaning { it quanties how inecient and expensive a treatment is, relative to the
cost of a readmission. We shall now formally dene this quotient as the treatment
ineciency.
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Denition III.22 (Treatment Ineciency). The quotient !=R denotes the treat-
ment ineciency. If !=R  1, a treatment is considered very inecient since it
is as expensive as a readmission (if not more so). In this case, a hospital would
rather readmit the patient and incur the readmission cost and avoid providing any
treatments. If !=R = 0, the treatment is considered very ecient as it is virtually
costless. Hence, a larger value of !=R indicates that treatments are more inecient.
Eq. (3.85) provides powerful insights into the design of a bundled payment policy.
Next, we discuss each one of the moving parts and the policy implications of this
equation.
3.7 Design of a Balancing Bundled Payment Policy
Theorem III.21 provides intuition into how the CMS can design a bundled pay-
ment policy that can incentivize readmission reduction. In this section, we discuss
the policy implications. To provider stronger readmission reduction incentives, the
following actions can be taken by the CMS.
• Shortening the Episode Length (T &). Shortening the BP episode length
provides stronger incentives for hospitals to exert more readmission reduction
eort. As shown in Eq. (3.85), the episode length T being in the denominator
suggests that reducing the length has a \convex" impact on the incentives {
as the length gets shorter, the incentives get increasingly stronger (the convex
relationship is shown numerically in Figure 3.13). This aligns with our intu-
ition. A longer episode length means that the hospital is held accountable for
a longer period of time, making preventing readmissions less feasible and more
expensive.8 Hence, extended episode length can strongly disincentivize hospi-
tals to reduce readmissions, possibly explaining the observed lack of progress in
national readmission reduction (Desai et al., 2016). Conversely, shortening the
penalty window can incentivize hospitals to exert more readmission reduction
eort, as the nancial benets of such eorts begin to outweigh the costs.
Moreover, we nd that shortening the episode length is more eective if the
patient cohort experiences urgent and acute post-discharge complications that
require immediate inpatient care (e.g., an organ failure). In such cases, patients
will get readmitted very quickly once a complication develops. This is reected
8For example, as T increases to 1, Corollary III.14 implies that the post-discharge cost becomes a step func-
tion. This means that following-up will be as expensive as a readmission, unless the readmission risk is completely
eliminated (i.e.,  = 0). In this case, the hospital would not exert any readmission reduction eort in either pre- or
post-discharge stage.
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by a larger delay-time failure rate d. As d increases, the delay-time window in
which post-discharge outpatient treatment is eective becomes shorter. This
means that there is little room for error. The hospital must exert full eort to
engage in preventing readmissions, because otherwise, if the patient developed
a complication and was not treated timely, this complication would quickly trig-
ger a readmission. Consider the extreme case in which complications require
immediate inpatient care (d = 1). Despite perfect treatments (f = 1), subsi-
dizing treatment and penalizing readmission would not work. In this case, Eq.
(3.85) becomes 1=T  0, from which !=R disappears. The only way to increase
incentives is to shorten the episode length.
In recent medical literature, how long a BP episode of care should be and how
long the HRRP penalty window should be have been controversial. A New Eng-
land Journal of Medicine article argued that \policymakers (...) could consider
limiting the (HRRP) time window. The causes of readmissions occurring within
3 days after discharge or even 7 days after discharge are much more under the
hospital's control, and these near-term readmissions are preventable far more
often than later ones" (Joynt and Jha, 2012). The Healthcare Cost and Utiliza-
tion Project (HCUP) (Fingar et al., 2017) found that over one-third of 30-day
readmissions were 7-day readmissions and 7-day and 30-day readmissions were
similar for many surgeries. Moreover, a recent study (Graham et al., 2018)
showed that early readmissions (within 7 days of discharge) were more likely to
be preventable than late ones (after day 7). Our ndings support these medical
hypotheses on the benets of a shorter HRRP/BP window, and could provide
a quantitative guideline for policy design.
• Making Post-Discharge Treatment More Ecient (!=R&). To fur-
ther incentivize readmission reduction, the treatment ineciency can be low-
ered by subsidizing post-discharge treatments and/or increasing the readmission
penalty:
{ Subsidizing Post-Discharge Treatments (! &). To incentivize read-
mission reduction, the CMS should encourage post-discharge outpatient
treatment by subsidizing and cost sharing. High cost of outpatient follow-
up treatment can be burdensome thus can make reducing readmission costly
for hospitals. Reducing this cost !, without sacricing the quality of care,
can incentivize members of a healthcare bundle (e.g., Accountable Care Or-
ganizations) to work to reduce readmissions. Under current BP policy, the
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payment covers the costs of post-discharge outpatient treatments. However,
the CMS does not have policies in place for post-discharge care subsidies. In
some cases, post-discharge services and treatments are not even covered by
Medicare or Medicaid. Our nding suggests that subsidizing post-discharge
care could entice hospitals to reduce readmission. In fact, some private
healthcare providers have already started to encourage and support their
patients to seek better post-discharge care. For example, Tenet Healthcare,
a private healthcare corporation, has put into eect a policy to fund patients
for their spendings in post-discharge care such as \non-covered medically
appropriate outpatient services at a hospital or another provider of the pa-
tients choice" (Tenet Healthcare, 2015). Our nding suggests that the CMS
should encourage post-discharge outpatient treatment by subsidizing and
cost sharing. In particular, for high-risk surgeries, such subsidies would
play an important role to ensure hospitals exerts eort in the continuum of
care pre- and post-discharge.
{ Penalizing Readmissions (R%). As readmissions become more costly
or more penalized, the hospital will put more eorts into readmission re-
duction to avoid such a high cost. Although this cost is determined by
the pathological nature of each readmission case, we believe that the CMS
can still have some control over this cost by penalizing readmissions and/or
decreasing the Bundled Payment amount (so that readmission costs take
up a greater portion of the BP budget). Currently, BPCI and HRRP do
not overlap { hospitals do not get penalized for excessive readmissions if
they are reimbursed under a BP scheme. However, if stronger incentives
are needed, it might be viable for the CMS to impose HRRP penalties on
top of the BP scheme.
In practice, the cost of a readmission exhibits large variation: a 30-day
readmission after a major abdominal or chest surgery can cost as low as
$576 and as high as $147,904 (Jacobs et al., 2017; Leow et al., 2018). As
such, hospitals may not have enough incentives to reduce low-cost readmis-
sions. In practice, a hospital can anticipate the cost of a future readmission
{ medical studies have found predictors and ags for high readmission costs
and longer readmission LOS, such as blood transfusion, imaging, patho-
logical stage, and comorbidity in the index hospitalization (Jacobs et al.,
2017). Therefore, it is possible that a hospital decides to exert less eort
on patients who exhibit low-cost readmission characteristics. To \equally"
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incentivize the reduction of both low-cost and high-cost readmissions, we
argue that the CMS could consider penalizing readmissions dierently to
reduce the variance in costs. For instance, readmissions can be reviewed
case by case by a panel of external clinicians, and accordingly, the CMS can
determine a case-specic penalty based on the cause, cost, and intensity of
each readmission. In fact, this ts well into the CMS's current policy and
practice as the BPCI retrospectively reconciles with the hospital for the
bundled payments (CMS, 2018a).
3.8 Numerical Case Study
In this section, we rst estimate the parameters using two datasets of cystectomy
patients. We then discuss how to design a BP policy and how each moving part
impacts the policy.
3.8.1 Parameters Estimation
As a proof of concept, we use data collected from bladder patients who have
undergone cystectomy surgery. Cystectomy, a surgery to remove the bladder, has
one of the highest 30-day readmission rates among all major chest and abdominal
surgeries. Using these patients as an initial testbed, we validate some of the key
assumptions used in our analytical study.
We used two datasets to parameterize the model. The rst dataset consists of
327 cystectomy patients discharged from our partner hospital between 2007 and
2012. The second dataset contains 717 cystectomy patients from the State Inpatient
Database (SID) discharge in 2009 and 2010. For detailed description of the inclusion
and exclusion criteria, we refer the readers to Liu et al. (2018a).
Baseline Readmission Risk (0) and the Delay-Time Failure Rate (d).
To estimate the readmission risk 0, we rst tted an exponential distribution with
 = 0:044 using right-censored data from the 327 cystectomy patients (see Meeker
and Escobar (2014) for estimation method).9
We estimate the readmission risk t = P (st+1 = Sjst = H; at = Wait) =
9We would like to stress that the readmission risk is distinct from the probability of readmission. Recall that
the readmission risk  is the probability of a healthy patient developing a post-operative complication (i.e. becomes
sick). The reason why this rate may seem higher than expected is due to the fact that a post-operative complication
may not necessarily lead to a readmission. Potential reasons include: 1) some complications were treated (thus a
readmission was prevented); 2) some complications may have caused mortality (instead of a readmission); and 3)
some complications were never treated and did not trigger a readmission. Nevertheless, in clinical practice, without
proper diagnoses at a clinical encounter, it is dicult to tell whether a patient's condition would cause a readmission
or not. Thus, as long as the patient is experiencing complications, our model treats them indierently as a potential
readmitable complication. Although this is a simplication, we believe that this is suitable for policy-level analyses.
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Panel A: Readmission Risk 0 Panel B: Failure rate d
Figure 3.9: Fitted Exponential Distribution for the Time to Symptom (Panel A) and Time between
Symptom Onset and Readmission (Panel B)
S(t) S(t+1)
S(t)
, where S(t) is the survival function (i.e. complementary cumulative dis-
tribution function) of the exponential distribution. For an exponential distribution
with rate , the readmission risk can be computed using t = 1   exp( ). Hence
we estimate the baseline readmission risk 0 = 0:04. This represents the 25% 30-
day readmission rate of cystectomy patients. Since the overall 30-day readmission
rate of Medicare beneciaries are 20% (Jencks et al., 2009), we use 0 = 0:04 as a
baseline scenario and varied it between 0.01 and 0.08 to represent a low-risk case
and a high-risk case respectively. This serves as a baseline for evaluating whether
a hospital is eectively reducing readmissions. In this chapter, we do not attempt
to estimate the natural readmission rate intrinsic to the pathology of the surgery
and its recovery because it is dicult to observe such a natural readmission risk as
patients are rarely free of interventions. Based on the data tting shown in Figure
3.9, the delay-time failure rate d is estimated to be d = 0:3 . We varied d between
0:1 and 0:5 for sensitivity analysis.
Cost of a Readmission (R) and Cost a Treatment (!). There are huge
variations in the cost of readmissions. A 30-day readmission can cost as low as
$576 and as high as $147,904 (Jacobs et al., 2017; Leow et al., 2018). While this
might be an issue for an operational model, for policy-level analyses, we use the
population average to gain insights. The average cost of a readmission is estimated to
be R = $5; 000 according to Leow et al. (2018). To estimate the cost of a treatment
!, we refer to Kilroy et al. (2013), which estimated that an average Emergency
Department (ED) visit within 30 days of discharge costs $1,900. Given the fact that
ED visits are very expensive, if patients were treated at the Primary Care level, the
cost will be much less. For a baseline treatment cost, we use the cost of half of an
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ED visit ! = $1; 000. The cost of post-discharge readmission reduction eorts is
dicult to estimate in practice due to the varied methods that can be employed and
the diculty of quantifying the cost of those eorts in practice. To address this, we
vary the cost of ! along a reasonable interval, with the average cost of a readmission
$5,000 as an upper bound and $200 as a lower bound (which represents the average
cost of a Primary Care visit).
Pre-Discharge Cost of Eliminating Readmissions (CS(0)). We acknowledge
that it is very dicult to estimate the cost of eliminating readmissions completely
for a patient cohort. Here we propose a conservative estimate. Based on a study of
49,540 cystectomy patients in the U.S. between 2003 and 2010 (Leow et al., 2015),
the 95% condence upper bound for the 90-day hospital direct cost was $27,269.
The average LOS was 10.8 days. The average cost of hospitalization per day can be
roughly estimated to be $2,525. One conservative estimate for the cost of eliminating
readmissions is the cost of keeping all patients hospitalized for 90 days after surgery.
We estimate this cost to be CS(0) = $230; 000  $227; 242 = 90 $2; 525.
Treatment Ecacy (f). In the medical literature, studies have found varying
levels of ecacy for post-discharge follow-up care to reduce readmissions. Jack et al.
(2009) found that follow-up care, joined with other readmission reduction measures,
reduced readmissions. Misky et al. (2010) reported that patients who had timely
PCP follow-up after discharge had 2% readmission rate whereas patients lacking
timely PCP visit had 21% readmission rate. According to Benbassat and Taragin
(2000), up to 75% percent of readmissions are preventable. In line with the latter
paper, we choose f = 0:75 to be the baseline scenario. We vary f between 0:5 and
1 to conduct sensitivity analyses.
For the purpose of exposition, we round the parameters and present them in
Table 3.2 to summarize the estimation results, the uncertainties, and the bounds for
sensitivity analyses. We acknowledge that many of these parameters are dicult to
estimate, however we believe our ranges are reasonable based on available nancial
and clinical data for our stated purpose, which is to provide insight into system-level
policy design, rather than operational-level decision support, which requires more
accurate estimates of model parameters. There are many practical and theoretical
challenges in the estimation of these parameters, which provide motivation for a
separate empirical study as future work.
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Parameter Baseline Uncertainty Lower Bound Upper Bound Source
0 0.04 Moderate 0.01 0.08 Liu et al. (2018a)
d 0.3 Low 0.1 0.5 Liu et al. (2018a)
R $5,000 Very High $500 $150,000 Leow et al. (2018)
! $1,000 Very High $200 $5,000 Kilroy et al. (2013)
H(0) $230; 000 Moderate $230,000 +1 Leow et al. (2018)
f 0.75 High 0.5 1 Benbassat and Taragin (2000)
Table 3.2: Summary of Baseline Estimates, Uncertainties, and Bounds for Sensitivity Analyses
3.8.2 Assumption Justication and Validation
Assumption III.4 (treatments are eective) holds in the baseline scenario
of d = 0:3 and f = 0:75. Assumption III.5 (Following-Up Every Day is
Expensive) holds in the baseline scenario of ! = $1; 000 and R = $5; 000 if T  5.
Assumption III.6 (stationary readmission risk) is used to derive a closed-form
expression for analysis of the post-discharge follow-up cost. When this assumption
violated, Theorem III.16 provides an accuracy bound for the PWCF expression.
Assumption III.20 (Pre-Discharge \Strengthening" Cost Function) is quite
general as it only specied the shape of the curve. As mentioned previously, if we
follow the literature and use a similar functional form as in Zhang et al. (2016),
CS() =
8>>><>>>:
0 if   0
H0(0   )=0 if  < 0
, then Assumption III.20 holds for CS(0) =
H0 > R and for all  2 (1;1).
3.8.3 Policy Recommendations
In this section, we rst analyze the status quo and shed light on the recent trend
indicating that readmission reduction has stalled under current HRRP penalty pro-
gram. We then propose policy recommendations through policy levers of (1) short-
ening the episode length (or the HRRP penalty window) T . (2) subsidizing post-
discharge treatments, and (3) penalizing readmissions.
Status Quo: lengthy episode/penalty window weakens readmission reduction incen-
tives.
Much of the work on readmissions has focused on penalties and methods (costs)
for preventing readmissions. In this section, we analyze these two methods in con-
junction with a third dimension: the episode/penalty window length. Here, we dene
the status quo as T = 30 under the HRRP dened penalty window, and T = 90 un-
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der the BPCI dened length of an episode of care. We test whether the sucient
condition for balanced readmission reduction eorts is met by varying the treatment
ecacy f and ineciency !=R for low (0 = 0:01), medium (0 = 0:04), and high
(0 = 0:08) risk cohorts.
Baseline Case
Unbalanced
Balanced
Figure 3.10: Status Quo: in Baseline Scenarios, 90-day BP Episode Length is Too Long for Medium
and High-Risk Cohorts. HRRP 30-day Window is Too Long for High-Risk Cohorts
In Fig. 3.10, the green (light gray) region indicates that the optimal policy is
balanced (i.e. the sucient condition (Eq. (3.85)) is met) and red (dark gray) region
is indicates the optimal policy is unbalanced and the hospital will not exert eort in
both stages (i.e. the condition is not met). For the medium- and high-risk cohorts,
it appears that a 90-day BP episode may be too long to incentivize readmission
reduction; the eort of keeping these patients out of the hospital is too great even if
post-discharge treatments are very eective and ecient. In this case, it is unlikely
that a treatment subsidy or operational improvement to decrease cost of treatments
or an increase in penalty can overcome the burden of preventing these riskier patients
from returning to the hospital for up to 90-days after discharge. The only option
for these cases is to shorten the penalty and episode window. This could be done
on a case-by-case basis for diagnoses/procedures that are considered particularly at
medium or high risk for readmission; e.g. radical cystectomy with a 25% readmission
rate (Lee et al., 2019).
In the baseline scenario (marked with asterisks), a 30-day penalty window could
incentivize readmission reduction only for low and medium risk cohorts. Unfortu-
nately, the contribution of these patients to the overall readmission rate is dampened
by the fact that their risk is low, hence targeting these patients may not have the
desired magnitude of impact on readmissions. For the high-risk cohorts, treatment
ecacy and eciency must be high for readmission reduction incentives, even if there
is only a 30-day penalty window. This observation supports one possible explanation
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for why the readmission reduction has plateaued under the HRRP's 30-day penalty
program (Desai et al., 2016): the penalty window is arduously long, particularly for
riskier patients that contribute signicantly to the overall readmission rate, while the
low hanging fruit (low and medium risk) provides insucient improvement to move
the needle.
In the next two subsections, we analyze each of these three levers in greater detail.
To do so, we quantify what we mean by \incentivizing readmission reduction" as
follows. For each BP policy, (!;R; T ), there is an upper threshold on the risk level
of patients that would be included in a Readmission Reduction Program that we
call the RRP threshold ; e.g. only patients with baseline risk level 0 < 0:04 would
induce the hospital to employ a balanced policy (i.e. exert appropriate eort in a
readmission reduction program). The higher the threshold, the more (and riskier)
patients would be included in a readmission reduction program. Hence we quantify
readmission reduction incentive in terms of the impact on this threshold: the higher
the threshold, the more the incentive to expand readmission reduction programs and
to target riskier (and hence more needy) patients. We refer to this quantitative
measure as X%-RRP (readmission reduction program) expansion (or similarly RRP
expansion), an increase in the risk threshold for program inclusion by X% (absolute).
Subsidizing Post-Discharge Treatments and Penalizing Readmissions.
In this section, we study how a policymaker (e.g., the CMS) may consider sub-
sidizing post-discharge treatments and/or increasing the penalty of readmissions to
incentivize readmission reduction.
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Figure 3.11: Readmission Reduction Program (RRP) Threshold is Convex Decreasing in Treatment
Ineciency !=R (d = 0:3)
In Fig. 3.11, the lines show the RRP threshold for inclusion as a function of
treatment ineciency, !=R . If a point (!=R; 0) falls below the line then the hospital
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will engage in readmission reduction and if the point lies above line, then the hospital
will not. In the latter case, the CMS may subsidize the post-discharge treatments or
increase the readmission penalty to incentivize readmission reduction. The curves can
be interpreted as displaying how many extra patients (greater 0) would be targeted
for reduction eorts if treatments are made more ecient. Note, more ecient is to
the left in this graph.
The convex shape of the impact of the subsidy/penalty ineciency ratio indicates
that an improvement in eciency (move to the left on the curve) has greater im-
pact when the treatments are already ecient. This means that, if the BP structure
and readmission ecosystem is already inecient, it will take signicant eciency
improvement to see even a small change in RRP expansion (as a measure of read-
mission reduction eort). Conversely, if the system is already fairly ecient, small
improvements in eciency can result in increasingly more substantial RRP expan-
sion. The managerial implication is that, it may take signicant improvements in
eciency (e.g. like a setup cost) for incentives to begin having an impact on RRP
programs (literature indicates current eorts may not be sucient), but once we
start seeing an impact a program may experience increasingly impactful gains from
further increases in eciency. This is with the caveat, however, that BP design may
not linearly impact ineciency as a function of their controllable inputs. We next
study the impact of the subsidy/penalty levers individually to shed more insight on
the policy design choices for insurers.
Fig. 3.12 plots the sensitivity (marginal) to subsidy/penalty for a wide range
of ! and R (based on Table 3.2). On the left panel, we set the treatment cost to
the baseline ! = $1; 000 and varied the cost of readmission between the estimated
lower and upper bounds (from $500 to $150,000). To do so, we compute the deriva-
tives of the LHS of Eq. (3.85) with respect to ! and R. The absolute values of
the derivative measure the sensitivities to subsidy and penalty (j d= d! (!)j and
j d= dR (R)j respectively). Hence, a larger sensitivity indicates a greater change in
terms of incentives (i.e., LHS of Eq. (3.85)) per dollar of subsidy/penalty.
We found that subsidizing is more eective when the cost of a readmission is
relatively low. When the readmission penalty is too high, the additional impact of
subsidy becomes muted because the high penalty is already suciently motivating.
On the right panel, we set the readmission cost to the baseline R = $5; 000 and
varied the cost of treatment between the estimated lower and upper bounds (from
$200 to $5,000). We found that increasing the penalty is more robust to a variety of
treatment costs. In contrast to subsidy, the general trend indicates that increasing
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Figure 3.12: Sensitivities to Subsidy and Penalty (T = 30; f = 0:75)
readmission penalties is more eective when treatment costs are higher. Thus, if
readmission prevention methods are expensive a penalty can be more incentivizing.
Because penalty and subsidy move in opposite directions with respect to each other,
it may be prudent to consider only engaging in one of these mechanisms, depending
on the status quo of current costs.
Shortening the BPCI/HRRP Window Length.
As our analytical result suggests (see §3.7), reducing the episode/penalty window
length T has a \convex" eect on the incentives, making the episode/penalty window
length a highly eective mechanism to increase the incentives to reduce readmissions.
In Fig. 3.13, we varied the window length T for two treatment ineciency (!=R)
scenarios at 0:2 (baseline) and 0:8 (inecient treatments). A larger area under
the line in Fig. 3.13 indicates more robustness in readmission reduction incentives
because the hospital will engage in readmission reduction for cohorts at or below
the baseline readmission risk 0. Due to the convex impact of T , shortening the
window length is increasingly eective as the window shrinks. Fig. 3.13 indicates
that a 14-day window would provide sucient incentives for hospitals to reduce
readmissions for patient cohorts at high risk. Moreover, shortening the window is
also more eective than improving the ineciency (as the great area under the curve
covers a broader range of risks).
From Fig. 3.13, we also observed that when the treatment ineciency increases
(from 0.2 to 0.8), increasing the treatment ecacy becomes less eective in providing
incentives. This is due to the fact that the high cost makes the post-discharge
treatments less economically viable. As a result, under the same budgetary constraint
(a hospital is willing to spend at most R in the post-discharge stage), the hospital
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Figure 3.13: Readmission Reduction Program (RRP) Threshold is Convex Decreasing in the Win-
dow Length (d = 0:3)
will conduct fewer post-discharge treatments.
3.8.4 Summary of Numerical Insights
We summarize the insights from our numerical studies.
Status quo HRRP penalty window and BPCI episode are possibly too
long. Specically, current BPCI 90-day episode of care might be too long if the
patient cohort is at medium- or high-risk of readmission. Under HRRP, if a hospital
minimizes the cost (as it does under a BP policy), then 30-day HRRP penalty window
might be too long for high-risk surgery cohorts. With too long a HRRP/BPCI
window, there is no amount of subsidy or penalty that could incentivize hospitals to
include medium or high risk patients in their readmission reduction program. This
shed light on why readmission reduction has recently stalled under current HRRP
scheme.
For high-risk patients, HRRP/BPCI window must be appropriately
shortened rst, before exploring other subsidy and penalty options. Short-
ening the BPCI episode and HRRP penalty window has a convex impact { as it
shortens to 14-day, hospitals would gain sucient incentives to reduce readmissions
for patient cohorts at a broad range of readmission risks.
Subsidy of treatment and penalty of readmission can make treatments
ecient enough to provide readmission incentives. In particular, the treat-
ment eciency has a convex impact { improving the eciency has a greater im-
pact when the system is already ecient. The more we work toward incentivizing
readmission reduction, the more eective our eorts become. In conjunction with
the shortening of the BPCI/HRRP window, subsidy and penalty in readmission re-
duction initiatives can become increasingly eective to overcome the stalling of the
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readmission reduction momentum.
Eectiveness of subsidy and penalty work in contrasting ways. When
treatments are expensive, penalties are increasingly eective. In contrast, subsidy is
only eective when penalties are small to moderate and rapidly becomes ineective as
the readmission cost/penalty increases. Depending on the readmission and treatment
costs intrinsic to each patient cohort, the CMS should focus on the most eective
lever between subsidy and penalty.
3.9 Practical Considerations, Limitations, and Future Work
Our analytical and numerical analyses have found the following policy levers could
be used to increase the incentives: the readmission penalty could be increased; the
post-discharge treatment that prevents readmissions can be subsidized; the HRRP
penalty window and the BPCI episode of care length can be shortened to provide
stronger incentives. Implementing such policy changes might raise some practical
concerns. The policymakers should consider the following practical issues before
actually implementing the recommended policy changes. These considerations also
provide sensible directions for future research.
Shortening the BPCI Episode (or HRRP's Penalty Window) Length.
Reducing the window T in certain instances may be very eective. However, there is
an argument that this may lead hospitals to try to avoid readmissions by deferring
the readmission to day T + 1. For instance, if a patient presents him/herself at the
ED on day T after discharge, the hospital can simply keep the patient in the ED or
an observation unit till day T+1 and then admit the patient. However, this incentive
exists regardless of the window, T , and there is anecdotal evidence that healthcare
providers are already doing this with a 30-day readmission window. With a shorter
window, the concern becomes that a larger fraction of the overall readmissions may
be avoided in this manner. However, the choice of penalty window impacts this
delay phenomenon only in terms of the number of potential readmissions that could
occur within 1-2 days of the penalty cut-o. Hence, choosing an appropriate window
based on historical readmission times (which would be not tampered with if the
window were shortened below 30 days) could mitigate some of this behavior. A
future research direction is to study and incorporate the this \defer" behavior of
hospitals.
Post-discharge Treatment Subsidy. Subsidizing post-discharge treatment can
help lessen the hospital's nancial burden so that better post-discharge care can be
provided. In practice, such subsidies can create unnecessary incentives for premature
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discharge and/or unnecessary post-discharge eorts exceeding what is economical to
reduce readmissions. Earlier discharge, on one hand, could reduce the LOS and in-
crease throughput. On the other hand, it could also lead to adverse health outcomes.
Discharge timing and the LOS play important roles in readmission risk management.
In this chapter, our inpatient stay model does not consider discharge timing. This is
left to future work, where a more structured model for the inpatient stage could be
developed with the support of empirical estimation.
Readmission Penalty. Currently, BPCI and HRRP do not overlap { hospitals
do not get penalized for excessive readmissions if they are reimbursed under a BP
scheme. However, if stronger incentives are needed, it might be viable for the CMS to
impose HRRP penalties on top of the BP scheme. The HRRP readmission penalty
is limited to 3% of the reimbursement amount Our study provides insights and a
quantitative guideline for increasing this penalty, if stronger incentives are needed.
However, if the readmission penalty is too high, it could lead hospitals to eschew
patients from that payer (e.g. Medicare HRRP) or may cause signicant nancial
hardship for the healthcare industry. Therefore, a sensible future extension is to
incorporate patient selection.
While many aspects of our modeling framework require more investigation and
empirical support, we believe that our analyses point to new directions for future
research regarding incentives to reduce readmissions.
3.10 Conclusion
In this chapter, we study how a health funding policymaker can design an eective
bundled payment and readmission penalty policy to incentivize hospitals to balance
pre- and post-discharge eorts and thus reduce readmissions. To do so, we propose
a novel Strengthen Then Maintain (STM) framework that models an episode of care
consisting of an inpatient stay (strengthening) stage and a post-discharge follow-up
(maintaining) stage. This framework is applicable to a set of machine maintenance
problems where the failure rate of a machine can be reduced at a cost in the strength-
ening stage, and in the maintaining stage maintenance policies are optimized based
on the failure rate produced by the strengthening stage. To study policy-level deci-
sions, we rst study how a hospital would behave under a BP policy. By analyzing
the hospital's behaviors, we identied two possible follow-up monitoring regimes {
in an engaged policy, the hospital treats the patient if and only if the patient is
sick; whereas, in a disengaged policy, the hospital may not treat a sick patient due
to the high costs associated with readmission prevention eorts. We show that a
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disengaged policy is undesirable due to its high costs and should be disincentivized
at the policy level. We then develop a piece-wise closed-form expression for the
post-discharge stage cost-to-go and provide a theoretical bound for the optimality
gap when key assumptions are violated. Making minimal assumptions on the cost of
the inpatient stay stage, we derive a sucient condition to incentivize the hospital
to reduce readmission while minimizing the cost of both the pre- and post-discharge
stages.
Our analytical ndings suggest that the following policy levers could be used
to increase the incentives for reducing readmissions: 1) subsidizing post-discharge
outpatient follow-up treatments; 2) penalizing readmissions; and 3) shortening the
readmission penalty window and the length of an episode of care. We also provide
a quantitative guideline for the CMS to decide the subsidization and penalty as well
as the program window length. Parameterized with data from a cystectomy patient
cohort, we found that the bundled payment policy and the readmission penalty
program status quo may not provide sucient incentives for hospitals to reduce
readmissions. This sheds lights on the potential causes of the plateaued readmission
reduction momentum since the implementation of the HRRP.
CHAPTER IV
Pre-Discharge Readmission Risk Prediction
ABSTRACT: Despite eorts to reduce their frequency and severity, complica-
tions and readmissions following radical cystectomy remain common. Leveraging
readily available, dynamic information such as laboratory results may allow for im-
proved prediction and targeted interventions for patients at risk of readmission. We
used an institutional electronic medical records database to obtain demographic,
clinical, and laboratory data for patients undergoing radical cystectomy. We charac-
terized the trajectory of common postoperative laboratory values during the index
hospital stay using support vector machine (SVM) learning techniques. We com-
pared models with and without laboratory results to assess predictive ability for
readmission. Among 996 patients who underwent radical cystectomy, 259 (26%) pa-
tients experienced a readmission within 30 days. During the rst week after surgery,
median daily values for white blood cell count, urea nitrogen, bicarbonate, and creati-
nine dierentiated readmitted and non-readmitted patients. Inclusion of laboratory
results greatly increased the ability of models to predict 30-day readmissions af-
ter cystectomy. Common postoperative laboratory values may have discriminatory
power to help identify patients at higher risk of readmission after radical cystectomy.
Dynamic sources of physiological data such as laboratory values could enable more
accurate identication and targeting of patients at greatest readmission risk after
cystectomy
4.1 Introduction
Radical cystectomy has one of the highest rates of complications and readmissions
of any surgical procedure, with 25% of patients experiencing unplanned readmission
within 30 days (Borza et al., 2017; Stimson et al., 2010; Hu et al., 2014; Skolarus et al.,
2015). These high readmission rates, coupled with increasing policy focus on reducing
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readmissions, have motivated investigations into identication and optimization of
patients at highest readmission risk. However, the ability to predict readmission
using traditional administrative data is limited, making it unclear where and when
to focus resources, leaving readmission rates largely unchanged (Minnillo et al., 2015;
James et al., 2016).
There is increasing interest in incorporating dynamic data sources into readmis-
sion prediction models to better enable identication of high risk cohorts (Goldstein
et al., 2017). While traditional administrative data are typically limited to static fac-
tors (e.g., demographics, comorbidities), widespread use of electronic health records
has made dynamic sources of data, laboratory results for example, readily available.
The degree to which readily available laboratory data used to guide day-to-day clin-
ical decision-making might impact readmission risk prediction after cystectomy is
unknown. Indeed, such variables can be successfully incorporated into prediction
models to improve performance for other outcomes ranging from transfer to the in-
tensive care unit to mortality (Escobar et al., 2008; Kipnis et al., 2016; Escobar
et al., 2015; Lim et al., 2015). For cystectomy patients with frequent postopera-
tive lab draws, models using dynamic laboratory data could allow for better risk
stratication and postoperative planning.
In this context, we used data from our institutional electronic health record to
examine whether incorporating dynamic laboratory data into readmission prediction
models improved risk stratication after radical cystectomy. Specically, we assessed
daily post-operative values for commonly obtained laboratory tests, and used ma-
chine learning techniques to compare values between readmitted and non-readmitted
patients. This study demonstrates the unique promise of readily available, dynamic
data to inform risk stratication of patients most likely to be readmitted after cys-
tectomy.
4.2 Data Source
We used the Michigan Medicine database containing records on all inpatient and
outpatient visits at our tertiary care facilities. This dataset was queried for all
inpatient encounters associated with a diagnosis of bladder cancer (International
Classication of Diseases 9th Revision code 188.X) and procedural codes for radical
cystectomy (57.71) for the period from 2006 to 2016.1 This yielded a cohort of 996
patients who underwent radical cystectomy during the study period.
1The nature of this surgery, which is the removal of the entire bladder, has not changed over the study period.
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4.3 Outcomes and Covariates
Our primary outcome for this study was unplanned readmission within 30 days
of discharge from the index hospitalization. Among patients who did not have an
additional inpatient record within 30 days of discharge, we manually reviewed their
electronic charts to identify any patients who had documentation of readmission to an
outside facility during the post-discharge time window. This revealed an additional
62 readmitted patients.
We extracted the following administrative data as covariates for this study includ-
ing age, body mass index (BMI), Charlson comorbidity score (precalculated within
the source data using ICD-9 codes), marital status, gender, race, and insurance.
We also obtained daily laboratory result data for the index admission after radical
cystectomy. In order to focus on the most clinically relevant and readily available
laboratory data, we restricted our analysis to the most common laboratory tests
during the postoperative period including: complete blood count (white blood cell
count, hemoglobin, hematocrit, and platelet count), basic metabolic panel (sodium,
potassium, chloride, bicarbonate, blood urea nitrogen (BUN), creatinine, and glu-
cose), and coagulation studies (prothrombin time (PT), international normalized
ratio (INR), partial thromboplastin time (PTT)). We used ICD-9 codes to deter-
mine postoperative complications for inclusion in our readmission prediction models
using previously described methods (Tan et al., 2011).
4.4 Statistical Analysis
We tested for dierences between readmitted and non-readmitted patient charac-
teristics using chi square testing for categorical variables and t-tests or Wilcoxon
rank-sum tests for continuous variables depending on distribution. We assessed
changes in laboratory values in several ways including: minimum and maximum
during hospitalization, mean across the entire hospitalization, proportion of mea-
sured laboratory values outside of the normal reference range, and binary indicator
variables if values were ever outside reference ranges.
To assess for dierences in laboratory results between readmitted and non-readmitted
cohorts, we applied support vector machine (SVM) techniques. This is a machine
learning method used to generate classications for a group of observations. In this
case, we used SVM to generate cut-o laboratory values between readmitted and
non-readmitted patients across the postoperative time period, with unique thresh-
olds generated for each laboratory value on each postoperative day. We also assessed
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whether variance in these laboratory values diered between readmitted and non-
readmitted patients.
Lastly, we built multiple logistic regression models using a combination of the SVM
laboratory value thresholds, complications data, and baseline patient demographic
and clinical data to examine eects on readmission risk stratication. We halved our
cohort into derivation and validation cohorts, and selected predictors for inclusion in
the model on the basis of the Akaike information criterion, a statistic that estimates
the relative quality of competing models (Akaike, 1974). For comparison we also
built a model using the same variables and a random forest regression algorithm, a
machine learning technique which captures interactions between variables.
All analyses were conducted using SAS software version 9.4 (SAS Institute, Cary,
NC) and all testing was two-sided using an alpha of 0.05. This study was approved
by our Institutional Review Board (HUM00128698).
4.5 Results
Demongraphics Readmitted (N=259) Non-readmitted (N=737) p-value
Mean age, y. (SD) 67.6 (10.8) 66.3 (11.0) 0.09
Male gender, % 81.2 83.2 0.5
Mean BMI, kg/m2 (SD) 29.2 (7.1) 28.8 (7.5) <0.01
Race, % 0.54
Caucasian 90.8 91.3
Black 4.6 2.4
Other/unknown 4.6 6.3
Marital status, % 0.17
Married 74.1 68.1
Unmarried 2.3 3.6
Unknown 23.6 28.3
Charlson comorbidity index, % 0.22
0 3.5 4.9
1 0 0
2+ 96.5 95.1
Primary Payer, % 0.41
Private 39 39.7
Medicare 53.4 52.3
Medicaid 5.7 5.9
Other 1.9 2.1
Robotic cystectomy, % 3.1 4.5 0.43
Table 4.1: Patient Characteristics Stratied by Readmission Status after Radical Cystectomy
Among the 996 patients included in this cohort 259 (26%) were readmitted within
30 days of discharge. Readmitted and non-readmitted patients were similar in their
demographic and clinical characteristics, though readmitted patients had higher
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Body Mass Index (BMI) values, on average (Table 4.1, p < 0:01). Most patients
were older, married, Caucasian men, and the minority were treated with robotic
cystectomy.
As illustrated in Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4, several of the laboratory tests in this
study showed dierences between readmitted and non-readmitted patients during the
postoperative period. The common postoperative laboratory values demonstrating
discriminatory ability according to readmission status included: white blood cell
count, bicarbonate, blood urea nitrogen, and creatinine. On the top panels, the
red (green) line shows the median lab values of (non-) readmitted patients. The
red (green) shaded area shows the 25th and 75th percentile of the lab values (non-)
readmitted patients. For each lab, a one-dimensional SVM is constructed for each
postoperative day to separate readmitted and non-readmitted patients. The dashed
line plots the SVM boundary. The SVM decision boundaries for these laboratory
values are shown in Table 4.2. On the bottom panels, the red (green) line, which
corresponds to the right axis, shows the number of (non-) readmitted patients whose
lab results available on each day. Note that the number of available lab results
dropped in the days after surgery (length of stay). On the 7th day after surgery,
about 55% patients had lab taken. The bars (corresponding to the left axis) show
the p-value of two sample t-tests for dierence in mean and the black line shows the
 = 0:1 signicance level. We included up to seven days of lab results in the model
since the p-values were relatively small (indicating signicant dierence between
readmitted and non-readmitted patients) within the rst seven days after surgery.
Laboratory
Value
Day 0 Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7
CO2 (mmol/L, <) 24 26 26 26 26 26 25 25
Creatinine (mg/dL, >) 1.2 1.2 1.1 1 0.98 1 1 1
BUN (mg/dL, >) 18 19 18 17 16 18 19 20
WBC (billion cells/L, >) 12.9 11.4 10.5 8.8 8.6 8.3 8.6 9.2
Table 4.2: Daily Postoperative Laboratory Value Thresholds for Readmission Risk as Determined
by Support Vector Machine Learning Techniques
To examine whether including postoperative laboratory data into readmission
prediction models would increase predictive ability, we tested several multiple logistic
regression models (Figure 4.5) (A) included baseline clinical and demographic values
and achieved a c-statistic of 0.52. The value of this c-statistic increased to 0.54 with
inclusion of laboratory value thresholds solely from the day of discharge (B). Next,
we added daily postoperative laboratory thresholds (within 7 days of surgery) to the
121
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Days after surgery
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
W
BC
RA w/ 25 and 75 percentile
Non RA w/ 25 75 percentile
SVM Decision Boundary
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
Sa
m
pl
e 
Si
ze
 (#
 pa
tie
nts
)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Days after surgery
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
P-
va
lu
e
P-value
p=0.1 sign. lv
RA Sample Size
Non-RA Sample Size
Figure 4.1: Daily WBC Values and Readmission Risk Thresholds during the Postoperative Period
after Radical Cystectomy
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Figure 4.2: Daily CO2 and Readmission Risk Thresholds during the Postoperative Period after
Radical Cystectomy
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Figure 4.3: Daily BUN Values and Readmission Risk Thresholds during the Postoperative Period
after Radical Cystectomy
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Figure 4.4: Daily CREAT Values and Readmission Risk Thresholds during the Postoperative Period
after Radical Cystectomy
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demographic and clinical variables to achieve a c-statistic of 0.59 when applied to the
validation half of our sample (C). The inclusion of postoperative complications data
further increased the c-statistic to 0.62 (D). Lastly, the random forest classication
including baseline characteristics, laboratory values, and complications achieved a
c-statistic of 0.68 (E). In between model (B) and (C), we included 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7
days of laboratory values incrementally. The c-statistics were 0.55, 0.55, 0.56, 0.56,
and 0.59 respectively.
4.6 Discussion
Using machine learning techniques, we found dierences in common postopera-
tive laboratory values between readmitted and non-readmitted patients treated with
cystectomy. We also calculated threshold values to help dierentiate patients at
high and low risk of readmission within 30 days of discharge. Moreover, incorporat-
ing daily postoperative laboratory value thresholds into our readmission prediction
models greatly increased accuracy as measured by the c-statistic, when compared to
models using only static demographic and clinical variables. Taken together these
ndings suggest that inclusion of dynamic sources of physiologic information such as
laboratory values into prediction models may allow for important advancements in
risk stratication and intervention targeting, especially in the seemingly refractory
setting of readmissions after radical cystectomy.
While use of dynamic data points obtained from electronic health record sources is
a new approach in the cystectomy literature, recognition and use of this information
has been growing in other elds. The utility of EHR data such as laboratory values
and vital signs has been established in prediction and risk adjustment for in-hospital
mortality (Escobar et al., 2008; Liu et al., 2013; Escobar et al., 2013; Tabak et al.,
2013). While these data are used to direct daily clinical decision-making, our cog-
nitive capacity to incorporate subtle trends across multiple factors (e.g., laboratory
data, vital signs, medications) and predict clinical decompensation and readmission
is limited. For example, we found a trend for higher blood urea nitrogen over time
among readmitted patients indicating potential subclinical postoperative dehydra-
tion placing patients at risk for readmission. In light of such human information
processing limitations, similar methods have been explored in the projection of in-
tensive care admission, extended length of stay, as well as condition-specic risk
adjustment (Kipnis et al., 2016; Lim et al., 2015; Escobar et al., 2012; Liu et al.,
2010; Smith et al., 2016). More recently, these techniques have used in predicting
readmissions in large, generalized cohorts of patients (Escobar et al., 2015). As use
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Figure 4.5: Area under the Receiver Operating Curve Showing the Performance of Multiple Logistic
Regression Models Incorporating Daily Laboratory Values Tested in a Validation Cohort
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of these methods continues to grow, they will likely become more standardized and
broadly applicable (Goldstein et al., 2017).
The proximal opportunities for these approaches lie not only in their improved
predictive ability, but also in the chance to directly build these algorithms into the
electronic medical record systems from which they draw their data. This real-time
approach has been piloted with promising results in the identication of patients
at risk for death in the hospital (Khurana et al., 2016). More streamlined, albeit
simplistic, rehospitalization prediction algorithms such as the LACE index already
appear in some interfaces. Our ndings suggest that these techniques may hold sim-
ilar promise in the care of patients following radical cystectomy. Ongoing advances
in predictive methodology and incorporation into medical information systems may
signicantly advance the ability of urological surgeons and their teams to more read-
ily assess patient risk after cystectomy, consequently improving discharge planning
and patient outcomes.
We note several important limitations to this study. First, using data from a
single institution limits the external generalizability of our ndings. However, our
results are consistent with robust data from prior studies in dierent cohorts illus-
trating the predictive power of physiologic data contained in electronic health record
systems. Next, while application of laboratory values in risk stratication for cys-
tectomy patients is unique and improved prediction, we were unable to include vital
signs into the models as the data were incomplete. Similarly, this analysis did not
incorporate other granular data such as inpatient medications or in-hospital proce-
dures. Nonetheless, existing studies have found the most signicant improvements in
model performance appear to be realized with inclusion of laboratory values. Last,
while this retrospective study did include novel laboratory data, due to the nature of
the data source we were unable to include more detailed disease-specic information
(e.g., stage) that could impact postoperative care and readmission risk. However, our
inclusion of daily postoperative laboratory testing could actually account for greater
testing typically associated with more aggressive resections.
In spite of these limitations, this work highlights an opportunity to advance read-
mission risk assessment following radical cystectomy. If coupled with eective inter-
ventions, this could in turn have positive eects on bladder cancer patient outcomes
regarding discharge timing decisions and after leaving the hospital. These improve-
ments could also enable urologists to apply these techniques across the range of
urological surgery, providing spillover benets to an even larger patient cohort.
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4.7 Conclusion
We found that readmission risk assessment following radical cystectomy is signif-
icantly improved by the addition of dynamic physiologic data collected in modern
electronic health record systems. Future work should rene these algorithms and
study their implementation into daily practice in order to help guide clinical deci-
sion making. While the problem of readmission after radical cystectomy appears
refractory, innovative, dynamic approaches to existing data sources appear poised
to enable signicant progress towards risk stratication, ultimately helping ensure
patients who are discharged home are able and ready to stay there.
CHAPTER V
Conclusion and Future Research
How to eectively and eciently reduce hospital readmissions is one of the major
challenges faced by healthcare systems. Readmissions burden patients (as well as
hospitals and practitioners) and cause a signicant amount of unnecessary healthcare
spendings. While up to 75% of the readmissions are preventable, we still struggle
to understand why unnecessary readmissions happen and how to prevent them from
happening.
In this dissertation, we develop operations research models to reduce hospital read-
missions. Our approach focuses on both the hospital operations level and the policy-
maker system level. We develop a delay-time optimization framework to maximize
the detection of post-operative complications via post-discharge checkups. Then,
we study how to design a bundled payment policy to balance and incentivize pre-
and post-discharge readmission reduction eorts. We build a readmission predic-
tion model using laboratory values observed during the index hospitalization. Ulti-
mately, we provide novel methods for reducing readmissions between the pre- and
post-discharge stages at the hospital and policymaker levels.
In the following sections, we discuss a potential future research direction for each of
the three research works in this thesis. In the post-discharge stage, we ask questions
regarding E-visits and their consequences on readmissions. In the pre-discharge stage,
a stochastic programming model could be developed to incorporate the learning and
reduction of a patient's readmission risk. Between the pre- and post-discharge stages,
the management of a panel of patients at various readmission risks could be modeled
and solved as a multi-armed bandit problem.
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5.1 Future Research: E-Visits and Readmission
The analytical results in Chapter II demonstrate that E-visits and telemedicine
visits could serve as replacements for traditional oce visits. Nonetheless, the remote
nature of E-visits requires more careful investigation.
The adoption of E-visits has signicantly increased in recent years. Many believe
that E-visits are cost-eective replacements for oce visits. By replacing oce visits
with E-visits, clinics can increase the capacity and patients can receive health care
at their convenience. Studies have found that E-visits are cheaper (in terms of
the cost of the initial visit, subsequent medical care, and pharmacy) than many
other patient-provider encounter modes such as PCP visits, ED visits, retail clinical
visits, and urgent care center visits (Gordon et al., 2017). Moreover, the majority of
patients (more than 60%) are willing to accept E-visits as shown in a survey of 1,378
ambulatory urology patients (Viers et al., 2015).
Although E-visits are more aordable and convenient, whether they can improve
patient health outcomes remains unclear { studies in both the medical literature and
the operations management literature have found mixed results (Schoenfeld et al.,
2016; Bavafa et al., 2018). Moreover, a study empirically showed that E-visits may
trigger 6% more follow-up visits (compared to oce visits). This could undermine
the premises of adopting E-visits and ultimately result in a 15% reduction in new
patients acceptance each month (Bavafa et al., 2018). In the context of readmission
reduction, a randomized trial found that phone calls after discharge did not decrease
but increased the readmission rate (Auger et al., 2018). Before adopting E-visits
widely to replace oce visits, researchers need to further research and investigate
the nature of E-visits and its consequences.
Specically, we suggest the following research questions as future work that could
be done in this eld:
Who (Physicians and Patients) Should Adopt E-Visits? Shaw et al.
(2018) pointed out that \whilst some clinicians are very keen to use this format (E-
visits), others are reluctant or oppose." Aside from personal preferences (e.g., tech-
savviness), what factors inuence physicians' willingness to adopt E-visits? What
patient cohorts (e.g., medical vs. surgical), what clinical settings (e.g., acute care
vs. primary care), and what stages of care (e.g., chronic/routine care vs. post-acute
care) should adopt E-visits?
Do Physicians Behave Dierently in E-Visits? If So, Do E-Visits Im-
pact Health Outcomes? Due to the remote communication nature of E-visits,
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physicians may behave more conservatively. A few medical papers (Mehrotra et al.,
2013; Uscher-Pines et al., 2016, 2015) found that physicians prescribe more antibi-
otics in E-visits. Moreover, E-visits may trigger more follow-up tests and visits
to resolve the uncertainties about the patient's condition that arise during the E-
visit (Bavafa et al., 2018). It is unclear whether E-visits in a post-discharge setting
will eectively reduce readmissions. Moreover, if E-visits can detect and intervene
readmissions promptly, a potential future step would be to examine whether the
readmission intensity (e.g., LOS and cost) is reduced by E-visits.
How do E-visits Aect Physician Productivity? How to Incorporate
E-visits into a Physician's (and the Clinic's) Practice and Workow? It
is known that communications within an E-visit are dierent from a face-to-face
encounter. According to Shaw et al. (2018), physicians are more likely to dominate
the communication in E-visits. Moreover, both physicians and patients sometimes
needed to state things explicitly in a remote consultation that remained implicit in a
face-to-face encounter. Moreover, the cognitive tasks and resources that are required
in an E-visit also dier. As such, switching between E-visit and oce visit may
incur a cognitive \switching" cost that degrades the productivity and burdens the
physician's cognitively. While designing a physician's clinic schedule, one may want
to schedule E-visits back-to-back to avoid such switching cost.
To address these questions, one may rst use empirical methods (e.g., dierence-
in-dierence and instrumental variables) to address these questions. One could use
data from EHR and insurance claims to build empirical models.
5.2 Future Research: Incorporating Pre-Discharge Readmission Learn-
ing and Reduction Intervention
Chapter III focused on the policy-level analysis in a continuum of care spanning
between pre- and post-discharge. In this section, we discuss a future research direc-
tion that focuses on the patient-level analysis.
As a future research, we propose a patient-level modeling framework for the trade-
o faced between pre- and post-discharge readmission learning and reduction as a
two-stage model. The problem of interest consists of two stages. The rst stage
is the inpatient stay stage. In clinical literature, there are mixed results on how
the length of stay is associated with readmission risk Engelman et al. (1994); Lahey
et al. (1998); Lazar et al. (2001); Bohmer et al. (2002); Cowper et al. (2007); Hannan
et al. (2003). In the proposed future research, we could consider two actions in the
inpatient stay, namely taking readmission reduction interventions and learning the
132
patient's readmission risk characteristics. Upon discharge, the patient enters into
the second stage, which is the post-discharge monitoring stage. Moreover, the post-
discharge planning is dynamic, in the sense that we will update our belief on what
time the patient will be readmitted dynamically using the information learned in
each checkup. For example, if we checked up a patient and the patient was not sick,
our belief on readmission timing (i.e., the time-to-readmission probability density
curve) should change accordingly.
A partially observable Markovian decision process (POMDP) could be developed
to jointly optimize both discharge decisions and post-discharge activities. One may
incorporate a sequential learning component that enables the model to create per-
sonalized treatment and monitoring policies specic to each individual patient.
5.3 Future Research: Balancing Pre-Discharge Eorts for a Panel of
Patients
Chapter IV focused on the prediction of readmission risk for an individual pa-
tient. In this section, we propose a model that utilizes the individual readmission
risk prediction model for the management of a panel of patients at various risks of
readmission.
Programs and initiatives for reducing readmissions have been developed and im-
plemented at U.S. hospitals for almost a decade (Strunin et al., 2007; Mitchell et al.,
2010). Particularly, the project called Re-Engineered Discharge (project RED) has
been proven to be very eective at reducing hospital readmissions (Jack et al., 2009).
However, implementing the project RED involves 12 components which requires the
eort from both the physicians and nurses. Implementing project RED to every
patient is very resource-intensive and impractical. Moreover, the probability of read-
mission, the time of the readmission, the cause of readmission, and the intensity
of readmission vary across dierent types of patients (Jacobs et al., 2013; Skolarus
et al., 2015). Given constrained resources, it is important to identify the patients
that are at higher risk of readmission and focus the readmission reduction eort on
the subset of high-risk patients.
There exists an extensive amount of literature in predicting the readmission risk
for patients (Kansagara et al., 2011; Helm et al., 2016). However, many existing
studies model the prediction and learning process as a static one. They do not
utilize the longitudinal clinical data observed during the inpatient stay in a sequential
fashion (online learning). Moreover, there does not exist a quantitative model for
the readmission management of a panel of patients. We propose, as future work,
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to develop a sequential learning model to dynamically learn the readmission risk
of the patients in the panel and optimally allocate readmission reduction resources
across the inpatient stage and the post-discharge monitoring stage. While operations
research models have been developed for screening a panel of patients at risk of
developing conditions (Lee et al., 2015, 2018) and treating a panel of patients with
chronic conditions (Jonasson et al., 2017), there does not exist a quantitative model
addressing readmission management for a panel of patients at the patient-level.
5.4 Conclusion
In conclusion, this thesis provides operations research models that aims to re-
duce hospital readmissions, nonetheless, there is still much work to be done in this
eld. We propose three potential future research directions and hope that more
investigation and research would be done to reduce hospital readmissions. In partic-
ular, we propose to study the eect of E-visits, and analyze whether they could help
detect and avert readmissions, and how they could be incorporated into clinical prac-
tices. We also propose that one could build a patient-level model to personalize the
readmission reduction interventions spanning between the pre- and post-discharge
stages. As the medical data proliferates, one could incorporate dynamic readmission
risk prediction models to manage the readmission risk for a panel of patients. As
more attention is given to reducing readmission from both medical and operations
research communities, it is our hope that hospital readmissions would be reduced
and managed eciently and eectively.
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